Modal Justification via Theories: Theory Selection
Fischer, Bob
2016-12-16 00:00:00
[This chapter begins Part II. In it, I develop a general framework for selecting between competing modal epistemologies, focusing on three desiderata that are especially relevant to our choice: conservatism, simplicity, and the ability to handle modal disagreement. Unsurprisingly, I argue that TEM fares well in the relevant respects. However, I’ll also distinguish the senses in which TEM is and isn’t conservative, eventually describing TEM’s disagreement with some modal intuitions as its cautiousness. This requires further discussion in subsequent chapters.]
http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.pnghttp://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/modal-justification-via-theories-theory-selection-yF8UjnMpca
[This chapter begins Part II. In it, I develop a general framework for selecting between competing modal epistemologies, focusing on three desiderata that are especially relevant to our choice: conservatism, simplicity, and the ability to handle modal disagreement. Unsurprisingly, I argue that TEM fares well in the relevant respects. However, I’ll also distinguish the senses in which TEM is and isn’t conservative, eventually describing TEM’s disagreement with some modal intuitions as its cautiousness. This requires further discussion in subsequent chapters.]
To get new article updates from a journal on your personalized homepage, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.