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More efficient rent-seeking — A Münchhausen solution

More efficient rent-seeking — A Münchhausen solution Public Choice 75: 43-62, 1993. © 1993 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. More efficient rent-seeking - A Miinchhausen solution* WOLFGANG LEININGER Fachbereich Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Postfach 500500, DW-Dortmund 50, Deutschland Accepted 21 March 1991 1. Introduction In the by now standard Tullock model of rent-seeking (Tullock, 1980) fulfill- ment of the rent-dissipation hypothesis advanced by Tullock (1967) and Posner (i975) is rather the exception than the rule. Using a game-theoretic model, Tul- lock showed that in non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium the extent of rent-dissipation crucially depends on the (scale) returns to individual rent- seeking expenditures. His seminal work, in particular the 'intellectual mire' (Tullock, 1980) presented by increasing returns to such expenditure (which may lead to non-existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium) has subsequently attracted considerable attention (see, e.g., Hillman and Katz, 1984; Higgins, Shughart and Tollison, 1985; Corcoran and Karels, 1985; Michaels, 1988; and Allard, 1988). While all of these contributions have shed new light on the issue, they did not satisfactorily solve the basic modeling problem, which obstinately kept its status as an 'intellectual swamp' (Tullock, 1985). The present contribution is an attempt to point to a way out of this swamp by questioning the appropri- ateness of the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Public Choice Springer Journals

More efficient rent-seeking — A Münchhausen solution

Public Choice , Volume 75 (1) – Jan 12, 2005

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References (24)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright
Subject
Economics; Public Finance; Political Science
ISSN
0048-5829
eISSN
1573-7101
DOI
10.1007/BF01053880
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Public Choice 75: 43-62, 1993. © 1993 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. More efficient rent-seeking - A Miinchhausen solution* WOLFGANG LEININGER Fachbereich Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Postfach 500500, DW-Dortmund 50, Deutschland Accepted 21 March 1991 1. Introduction In the by now standard Tullock model of rent-seeking (Tullock, 1980) fulfill- ment of the rent-dissipation hypothesis advanced by Tullock (1967) and Posner (i975) is rather the exception than the rule. Using a game-theoretic model, Tul- lock showed that in non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium the extent of rent-dissipation crucially depends on the (scale) returns to individual rent- seeking expenditures. His seminal work, in particular the 'intellectual mire' (Tullock, 1980) presented by increasing returns to such expenditure (which may lead to non-existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium) has subsequently attracted considerable attention (see, e.g., Hillman and Katz, 1984; Higgins, Shughart and Tollison, 1985; Corcoran and Karels, 1985; Michaels, 1988; and Allard, 1988). While all of these contributions have shed new light on the issue, they did not satisfactorily solve the basic modeling problem, which obstinately kept its status as an 'intellectual swamp' (Tullock, 1985). The present contribution is an attempt to point to a way out of this swamp by questioning the appropri- ateness of the

Journal

Public ChoiceSpringer Journals

Published: Jan 12, 2005

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