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Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis Cost of Betrayal

Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis Cost of Betrayal Abstract This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent’s policy approach his/her own policy. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Japanese Economic Review Springer Journals

Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis Cost of Betrayal

Asako, Yasushi
The Japanese Economic Review , Volume 66 (3): 32 – Sep 1, 2015
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References (55)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
2015 Japanese Economic Association
ISSN
1352-4739
eISSN
1468-5876
DOI
10.1111/jere.12053
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent’s policy approach his/her own policy.

Journal

The Japanese Economic Review – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 1, 2015

Keywords: economics, general; microeconomics; macroeconomics/monetary economics//financial economics; econometrics; development economics; economic history

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