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Phenomenological Approaches to PhysicsA Revealing Parallel Between Husserl’s Philosophy of Science and Today’s Scientific Metaphysics

Phenomenological Approaches to Physics: A Revealing Parallel Between Husserl’s Philosophy of... [One of the central motivations for Husserl to develop his transcendental phenomenology is what he perceives as the crisis of the sciences of his time (physics in particular), which have forgotten their meaning-fundament by substituting the life-world with mathematically structured idealities and mistaking the latter for true being. It thus seems that Husserl would have had little sympathy for today’s attempts to draw metaphysical conclusions from highly mathematized scientific theories within the project known as scientific metaphysics. Nevertheless, I argue in this chapter that there is an important parallel between Husserl’s approach to science and the currently most influential version of scientific metaphysics. As a consequence, I will show that a certain line of criticism against Husserl’s phenomenology holds important lessons for the contemporary debate on scientific metaphysics.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Phenomenological Approaches to PhysicsA Revealing Parallel Between Husserl’s Philosophy of Science and Today’s Scientific Metaphysics

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 429)
Editors: Wiltsche, Harald A.; Berghofer, Philipp
Egg, Matthias
Phenomenological Approaches to Physics — Jun 24, 2020
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
ISBN
978-3-030-46972-6
Pages
125 –133
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-46973-3_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[One of the central motivations for Husserl to develop his transcendental phenomenology is what he perceives as the crisis of the sciences of his time (physics in particular), which have forgotten their meaning-fundament by substituting the life-world with mathematically structured idealities and mistaking the latter for true being. It thus seems that Husserl would have had little sympathy for today’s attempts to draw metaphysical conclusions from highly mathematized scientific theories within the project known as scientific metaphysics. Nevertheless, I argue in this chapter that there is an important parallel between Husserl’s approach to science and the currently most influential version of scientific metaphysics. As a consequence, I will show that a certain line of criticism against Husserl’s phenomenology holds important lessons for the contemporary debate on scientific metaphysics.]

Published: Jun 24, 2020

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