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Political shirking and the last term problem: Evidence for a party-administered pension system

Political shirking and the last term problem: Evidence for a party-administered pension system Studies of political shirking have disagreed both over whether the voting behavior of Members of Congress changes in their last term, and over the manner in which last term shirking can be controlled: through electoral sorting, or through a pension system. This paper presents evidence that Members of Congress who leave the House to run for statewide office do alter their voting behavior between the two sessions of their last House term, and that this change includes an ideological shift toward their state party delegations. The results suggest that a party-driven pension system influences the voting of House members who aspire to higher office, but that the pension system is not sufficient to control the last term shirking likely to occur if term limitations were imposed on House members. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Public Choice Springer Journals

Political shirking and the last term problem: Evidence for a party-administered pension system

Public Choice , Volume 81 (2) – Jan 11, 2005

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References (26)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright
Subject
Economics; Public Finance; Political Science
ISSN
0048-5829
eISSN
1573-7101
DOI
10.1007/BF01053263
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Studies of political shirking have disagreed both over whether the voting behavior of Members of Congress changes in their last term, and over the manner in which last term shirking can be controlled: through electoral sorting, or through a pension system. This paper presents evidence that Members of Congress who leave the House to run for statewide office do alter their voting behavior between the two sessions of their last House term, and that this change includes an ideological shift toward their state party delegations. The results suggest that a party-driven pension system influences the voting of House members who aspire to higher office, but that the pension system is not sufficient to control the last term shirking likely to occur if term limitations were imposed on House members.

Journal

Public ChoiceSpringer Journals

Published: Jan 11, 2005

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