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Poor States, Power and the Politics of IMF Reform‘Pro-Poor’ Concessionary Lending: The PRGF

Poor States, Power and the Politics of IMF Reform: ‘Pro-Poor’ Concessionary Lending: The PRGF [The formal adoption of the PRGF in 1999 committed the IMF to a ‘pro-poor’ model of concessionary lending. This chapter first explores how the broad-based conservative shift in economic thinking in the 1980s manifested itself within the IMF, particularly around how Fund staff framed the need to aggressively eliminate ‘market distortive’ laws and institutional structures in LIDCs. The chapter then examines how IMF management and staff initially dismissed growing critiques of its LIDC policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Growing popular resistance from the mid-1990s to 1999 to the IMF and other liberalizing multilateral initiatives, combined with the fallout from the Asian crisis, provided an opening within the Fund to question the effectiveness of the Washington Consensus model. The chapter then traces the micro-dynamics, from 1997 to 1999, within the IMF that led to the PRGF.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Poor States, Power and the Politics of IMF Reform‘Pro-Poor’ Concessionary Lending: The PRGF

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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016
ISBN
978-1-137-57749-8
Pages
115 –141
DOI
10.1057/978-1-137-57750-4_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[The formal adoption of the PRGF in 1999 committed the IMF to a ‘pro-poor’ model of concessionary lending. This chapter first explores how the broad-based conservative shift in economic thinking in the 1980s manifested itself within the IMF, particularly around how Fund staff framed the need to aggressively eliminate ‘market distortive’ laws and institutional structures in LIDCs. The chapter then examines how IMF management and staff initially dismissed growing critiques of its LIDC policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Growing popular resistance from the mid-1990s to 1999 to the IMF and other liberalizing multilateral initiatives, combined with the fallout from the Asian crisis, provided an opening within the Fund to question the effectiveness of the Washington Consensus model. The chapter then traces the micro-dynamics, from 1997 to 1999, within the IMF that led to the PRGF.]

Published: Jun 3, 2016

Keywords: World Trade Organization; Poverty Reduction; Structural Adjustment; Structural Reform; North American Free Trade Agreement

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