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Positional independence in preference aggregation

Positional independence in preference aggregation If, for strict preferences, a unique choice function (CF) is used to aggregate preferences position-wise then the resulting social welfare function (SWF) is dictatorial. This suggests that the task performed by non-dictatorial SWFs must be “more complex” than just selecting an alternative from a list using a single criterion. This is because the information required by non-dictatorial SWFs to aggregate preferences cannot be compressed into a CF. It is also shown that the attempt to reduce the working of a SWF to the working of a CF involves the adoption of certain positional requirements, whose relationship with the conditions in Arrow's theorem is established. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Social Choice and Welfare Springer Journals

Positional independence in preference aggregation

Social Choice and Welfare , Volume 20 (3) – Jun 1, 2003

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References (4)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Subject
Economics; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Public Finance; Political Economy; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Social Policy
ISSN
0176-1714
eISSN
1432-217X
DOI
10.1007/s003550200187
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

If, for strict preferences, a unique choice function (CF) is used to aggregate preferences position-wise then the resulting social welfare function (SWF) is dictatorial. This suggests that the task performed by non-dictatorial SWFs must be “more complex” than just selecting an alternative from a list using a single criterion. This is because the information required by non-dictatorial SWFs to aggregate preferences cannot be compressed into a CF. It is also shown that the attempt to reduce the working of a SWF to the working of a CF involves the adoption of certain positional requirements, whose relationship with the conditions in Arrow's theorem is established.

Journal

Social Choice and WelfareSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 1, 2003

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