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Powers, Time and Free WillThe Power to Will Freely: How to Re-Think About the Problem of Free Will Without Laws of Nature

Powers, Time and Free Will: The Power to Will Freely: How to Re-Think About the Problem of Free... [The problem of free will is ubiquitously articulated in terms of the (in)compatibility of free will with laws of nature. Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Robert Kane, and nearly all other contributors to the problem of free will, conceive it as a potential conflict between the laws of nature and free will. Despite dispositional defenses of compatibilism, the putatively dispositional principle of alternative possibilities among defenders of free will, as well as increased sympathy for dispositional and agent-causation versions of source incompatibilist free will, the standard debates remain beholden to a nomological definition of the free will problem. This is surprising since one of the upshots of the causal powers revolution has been the overthrow of laws of nature. Many exponents of the metaphysics of powers either reject laws of nature altogether, or regard them as abstract descriptions of the real work performed by causal powers. What remains unexplored for dispositionalists is to address the question: how to re-think about the problem of free will without the laws of nature? That is the aim of my essay. I will argue the shift to powers requires not only major revisions to the definitions of determinism, compatibilism, etc. put forth by van Inwagen and others, but also a re-thinking of the power of free will itself in light its manifestations.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Powers, Time and Free WillThe Power to Will Freely: How to Re-Think About the Problem of Free Will Without Laws of Nature

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 451)
Editors: Austin, Christopher J.; Marmodoro, Anna; Roselli, Andrea
Powers, Time and Free Will — Mar 29, 2022

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022. Chapters [2] and [4] are licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). For further details see licence information in the chapters.
ISBN
978-3-030-92485-0
Pages
137 –160
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_8
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[The problem of free will is ubiquitously articulated in terms of the (in)compatibility of free will with laws of nature. Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Robert Kane, and nearly all other contributors to the problem of free will, conceive it as a potential conflict between the laws of nature and free will. Despite dispositional defenses of compatibilism, the putatively dispositional principle of alternative possibilities among defenders of free will, as well as increased sympathy for dispositional and agent-causation versions of source incompatibilist free will, the standard debates remain beholden to a nomological definition of the free will problem. This is surprising since one of the upshots of the causal powers revolution has been the overthrow of laws of nature. Many exponents of the metaphysics of powers either reject laws of nature altogether, or regard them as abstract descriptions of the real work performed by causal powers. What remains unexplored for dispositionalists is to address the question: how to re-think about the problem of free will without the laws of nature? That is the aim of my essay. I will argue the shift to powers requires not only major revisions to the definitions of determinism, compatibilism, etc. put forth by van Inwagen and others, but also a re-thinking of the power of free will itself in light its manifestations.]

Published: Mar 29, 2022

Keywords: Free will; Laws of nature; Causal powers; Determinism

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