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Powers, Time and Free WillThe Problem of Radical Freedom

Powers, Time and Free Will: The Problem of Radical Freedom [Whether or not we are able to do x is on many philosophical accounts of our moral practice relevant for whether we are responsible for not doing x or for being excusable for not having done x. In this paper I will examine how such accounts are affected by whether a Humean or non-Humean account of laws is presupposed. More particularly, I will argue that (on one interpretation) Humean conceptions of laws, while able to avoid the consequence argument, run into what might be called “the problem of radical freedom”: Humean laws fail to constrain what we can do. By contrast, non-Humean laws (and Humean laws on a second interpretation) avoid the problem of radical freedom but have no easy way out of the consequence argument.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Powers, Time and Free WillThe Problem of Radical Freedom

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 451)
Editors: Austin, Christopher J.; Marmodoro, Anna; Roselli, Andrea
Hüttemann, Andreas
Powers, Time and Free Will — Mar 29, 2022
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022. Chapters [2] and [4] are licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). For further details see licence information in the chapters.
ISBN
978-3-030-92485-0
Pages
185 –198
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_10
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Whether or not we are able to do x is on many philosophical accounts of our moral practice relevant for whether we are responsible for not doing x or for being excusable for not having done x. In this paper I will examine how such accounts are affected by whether a Humean or non-Humean account of laws is presupposed. More particularly, I will argue that (on one interpretation) Humean conceptions of laws, while able to avoid the consequence argument, run into what might be called “the problem of radical freedom”: Humean laws fail to constrain what we can do. By contrast, non-Humean laws (and Humean laws on a second interpretation) avoid the problem of radical freedom but have no easy way out of the consequence argument.]

Published: Mar 29, 2022

Keywords: Responsibility; Humean accounts of laws; Radical freedom; Consequence argument

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