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Prizes vs Wages with Envy and Pride Discussion Paper #05-18 of Monaster Center for Research in Economics
- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- 2012 Japanese Economic Association
- ISSN
- 1352-4739
- eISSN
- 1468-5876
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract We show that if agents are risk-neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk-averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).
Journal
The Japanese Economic Review – Springer Journals
Published: Mar 1, 2013
Keywords: economics, general; microeconomics; macroeconomics/monetary economics//financial economics; econometrics; development economics; economic history