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Probabilistic Cellular AutomataStrategic Interaction in Interacting Particle Systems

Probabilistic Cellular Automata: Strategic Interaction in Interacting Particle Systems [In the last decades, models inspired by statistical mechanics have been vastly used in the context of social sciences to model the behavior of interacting economic actors. In particular, parallel updating models such as Probabilistic Cellular Automata have been proved to be very useful to represent rational agents aiming at maximize their utility in the presence of social externalities. What PCA do not account for is strategic interaction, i.e., the fact that, when deciding, agents forecast the action of other agents. In this contribution, we compare models that differ in the presence of strategic interaction and memory of past actions. We will show that the emergent equilibria can be very different: Fixed points, cycles of period 2, and chaotic behavior may appear and, possibly, coexist for some values of the parameters, of the model.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Probabilistic Cellular AutomataStrategic Interaction in Interacting Particle Systems

Part of the Emergence, Complexity and Computation Book Series (volume 27)
Editors: Louis, Pierre-Yves; Nardi, Francesca R.

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing AG 2018
ISBN
978-3-319-65556-7
Pages
53 –67
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-65558-1_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In the last decades, models inspired by statistical mechanics have been vastly used in the context of social sciences to model the behavior of interacting economic actors. In particular, parallel updating models such as Probabilistic Cellular Automata have been proved to be very useful to represent rational agents aiming at maximize their utility in the presence of social externalities. What PCA do not account for is strategic interaction, i.e., the fact that, when deciding, agents forecast the action of other agents. In this contribution, we compare models that differ in the presence of strategic interaction and memory of past actions. We will show that the emergent equilibria can be very different: Fixed points, cycles of period 2, and chaotic behavior may appear and, possibly, coexist for some values of the parameters, of the model.]

Published: Feb 22, 2018

Keywords: Probabilistic Cellular Automata; Cournot Adjustment; Curie-Weiss Model; Strategic Case; Nash Equilibrium

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