Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/springer-journals/replicability-of-experimental-data-and-credibility-of-economic-theory-KmFem9aEfY
References (16)
-
J. Angrist, Jörn-Steffen Pischke (2010)
The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design is Taking the Con Out of EconometricsCognitive Social Science eJournal
-
B. O'Neill (1991)
Comments on Brown and Rosenthal's Reexamination [Testing the Minimax Hypothesis, A Reexamination of O'Neill's Game Experiment]Econometrica, 59
-
M. Kandori (2013)
Complexity and Institutions: Markets, Norms and Corporations -
B. O'Neill (1987)
Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 84 7
-
J. Goeree, Charles Holt, T. Palfrey (2002)
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value AuctionsJ. Econ. Theory, 104
-
A Cournot (1838)
Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth -
R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey (1995)
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form GamesGames and Economic Behavior, 10
-
D Hamermesh (2013)
Six Decades of Top Economics Publishing: Who and How?Journal of Economic Literature, 51
-
J Pischke J Angrist (2010)
The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design is Taking the Con Out of EconometricsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 24
-
D. Hamermesh (2012)
Six Decades of Top Economics Publishing: Who and How?NBER Working Paper Series
-
R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Roberto Weber (2000)
The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 x 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibriaJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42
-
M Kandori (2013)
?Theory and Reality in Economics: Insights from Three Allegories,? -
B O’Neil (1987)
Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-person Zerosum GamesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 84
-
James Brown, R. Rosenthal (1990)
Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game ExperimentEconometrica, 58
-
Colin Camerer, Anna Dreber, Eskil Forsell, Teck-Hua Ho, J. Huber, M. Johannesson, Michael Kirchler, Johan Almenberg, Adam Altmejd, Taizan Chan, Emma Heikensten, Felix Holzmeister, Taisuke Imai, Siri Isaksson, G. Nave, T. Pfeiffer, Michael Razen, Hang Wu (2016)
Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economicsScience, 351
-
B O’Neil (1991)
Comments on Brown and Rosenthal?s ReexaminationEconometrica, 59
- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- 2018 Japanese Economic Association
- ISSN
- 1352-4739
- eISSN
- 1468-5876
- DOI
- 10.1111/jere.12175
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract Finding a data set that supports a theory is not enough for the theory to gain credibility. Credibility of a theory is established only after the initial supporting finding can be replicated by a number of follow-up studies. Economics so far has paid little attention to replicability, presumably because the profession has been overly pessimistic about obtaining a high degree of replicability of non-trivial theoretical predictions. By using a large data set I have collected that involves more than 4,000 subjects, I show that there is hope for economic theory to gain credibility by means of replications of laboratory data.
Journal
The Japanese Economic Review – Springer Journals
Published: Mar 1, 2018
Keywords: economics, general; microeconomics; macroeconomics/monetary economics//financial economics; econometrics; development economics; economic history