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Working Paper 19555
China is the most frequent target of antidumping (AD) filings and the sixth most frequent user of antidumping duties. In this paper, we investigate the factors that influence China’s decision to retaliate using AD filings from 1995 to 2015. We consider an AD filing by China to be retaliatory if it occurs within 1 year of an initial AD filing against them and determine the factors that explain retaliatory antidumping filings. We find that higher levels of China’s country-specific imports, lower growth rates of Chinese GDP, and China’s WTO membership increase the likelihood of retaliation. In contrast, higher import growth reduces AD retaliation.
Eastern Economic Journal – Springer Journals
Published: Sep 27, 2018
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