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Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence

Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identified by Campbell (J Econ 12:259–272, 1976) and Baigent (J Econ 47(4):407–411, 1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (J Econ 5:478–486, 1972) type vanishes. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Social Choice and Welfare Springer Journals

Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence

Social Choice and Welfare , Volume 43 (4) – Mar 15, 2014

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References (25)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Economic Theory; Economics general
ISSN
0176-1714
eISSN
1432-217X
DOI
10.1007/s00355-014-0812-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identified by Campbell (J Econ 12:259–272, 1976) and Baigent (J Econ 47(4):407–411, 1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (J Econ 5:478–486, 1972) type vanishes.

Journal

Social Choice and WelfareSpringer Journals

Published: Mar 15, 2014

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