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Studies in Legal LogicRule Consistency

Studies in Legal Logic: Rule Consistency Chapter 5 1. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and develop a theory about the consistency of rules. There are at least three reasons why the consistency of rules differs from the consistency of descriptive sentences. First, many rules have a conditional structure, but their consistency cannot be treated as the consistency of conditional sentences. Second, consistency of both sentences and rules is relative to a set of constraints that determinewhich states of affairs can go together. Part of the complications in connection with rule consistency is that rules themselves can function as constraints relative to which consistency has to be judged. And, finally, there can be exceptions to rules that block the application of applicable rules. Such exceptions can prevent threatening rule conflicts, thereby making seemingly inconsistent rules consistent. I will try to develop a theory of rule consistency that takes all these three aspects into account. To my knowledge, the consistency of rules has not received much attention yet in the literature about legal logic. A topic that may seem related and that has received attention is that of deontic consistency, also called normative consistency. This concerns questions as whether there can be logical http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Studies in Legal LogicRule Consistency

Part of the Law and Philosophy Library Book Series (volume 70)
Studies in Legal Logic — Jan 1, 2005
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer 2005
ISBN
978-1-4020-3517-3
Pages
135 –157
DOI
10.1007/1-4020-3552-7_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

Chapter 5 1. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and develop a theory about the consistency of rules. There are at least three reasons why the consistency of rules differs from the consistency of descriptive sentences. First, many rules have a conditional structure, but their consistency cannot be treated as the consistency of conditional sentences. Second, consistency of both sentences and rules is relative to a set of constraints that determinewhich states of affairs can go together. Part of the complications in connection with rule consistency is that rules themselves can function as constraints relative to which consistency has to be judged. And, finally, there can be exceptions to rules that block the application of applicable rules. Such exceptions can prevent threatening rule conflicts, thereby making seemingly inconsistent rules consistent. I will try to develop a theory of rule consistency that takes all these three aspects into account. To my knowledge, the consistency of rules has not received much attention yet in the literature about legal logic. A topic that may seem related and that has received attention is that of deontic consistency, also called normative consistency. This concerns questions as whether there can be logical

Published: Jan 1, 2005

Keywords: Logical Constraint; Rule Logic; Rule Consistency; Rule Conflict; Conditional Sentence

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