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Tax compliance under different institutional settings in Italy and Sweden: an experimental analysis

Tax compliance under different institutional settings in Italy and Sweden: an experimental analysis Abstract In this paper, we study how people from different countries would react to institutional changes in terms of tax compliance. We choose an experimental setting and focus on two features of the tax system: efficiency and tax rate. We develop our analysis in two countries characterized by high tax burdens, but with relevant differences in terms of tax evasion and the quality of public services: Italy and Sweden. The main result is that participants from both countries react similarly to changes in efficiency and tax rates: tax compliance rises when efficiency increases, and tax compliance falls when the tax rate increases. However, the absolute level of tax compliance depends on the population’s composition in terms of social preferences (prosocials and individualists). This may suggest that, even if cultural factors matter, institutional features—especially efficiency—play a relevant role in determining taxpayers’ behavior. In particular, if the level of efficiency is high, both Italians and Swedes tend to pay taxes when the tax burden is high. We conclude the paper by discussing related policy implications. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "Economia Politica" Springer Journals

Tax compliance under different institutional settings in Italy and Sweden: an experimental analysis

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References (79)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
ISSN
1120-2890
eISSN
1973-820X
DOI
10.1007/s40888-018-0093-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we study how people from different countries would react to institutional changes in terms of tax compliance. We choose an experimental setting and focus on two features of the tax system: efficiency and tax rate. We develop our analysis in two countries characterized by high tax burdens, but with relevant differences in terms of tax evasion and the quality of public services: Italy and Sweden. The main result is that participants from both countries react similarly to changes in efficiency and tax rates: tax compliance rises when efficiency increases, and tax compliance falls when the tax rate increases. However, the absolute level of tax compliance depends on the population’s composition in terms of social preferences (prosocials and individualists). This may suggest that, even if cultural factors matter, institutional features—especially efficiency—play a relevant role in determining taxpayers’ behavior. In particular, if the level of efficiency is high, both Italians and Swedes tend to pay taxes when the tax burden is high. We conclude the paper by discussing related policy implications.

Journal

"Economia Politica"Springer Journals

Published: Aug 1, 2018

Keywords: Economic Policy; International Political Economy

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