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Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?

Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern? The paper suggests anexplanation for the geographical dimensionof tax evasion that focuses on thestructure of territorial government. Taxesadministered by the central government arenot differentiated by regions. Poor areasmay prefer a combination of lower taxes andlower levels of public services at both thecentral and the local level. This isespecially true when income and wealthlevels differ among the areas and thedemand for publicly provided goods iscorrelated to these levels. But the use ofnationally uniform tax schedules imposes awelfare burden on poorer areas. While thetax rates of local taxes can be adjusted tolocal preferences, tax evasion may betacitly accepted as a compensation for thewelfare loss deriving from too highcentrally set tax rates. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Public Choice Springer Journals

Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?

Public Choice , Volume 112 (4) – Oct 13, 2004

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References (16)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Public Finance; Political Science
ISSN
0048-5829
eISSN
1573-7101
DOI
10.1023/A:1019985022106
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The paper suggests anexplanation for the geographical dimensionof tax evasion that focuses on thestructure of territorial government. Taxesadministered by the central government arenot differentiated by regions. Poor areasmay prefer a combination of lower taxes andlower levels of public services at both thecentral and the local level. This isespecially true when income and wealthlevels differ among the areas and thedemand for publicly provided goods iscorrelated to these levels. But the use ofnationally uniform tax schedules imposes awelfare burden on poorer areas. While thetax rates of local taxes can be adjusted tolocal preferences, tax evasion may betacitly accepted as a compensation for thewelfare loss deriving from too highcentrally set tax rates.

Journal

Public ChoiceSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 13, 2004

There are no references for this article.