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The adverse effect of competition on consumers under foreign competition

The adverse effect of competition on consumers under foreign competition We examine undesirable competition in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly under foreign competition and indirect taxation. We find that entry of inefficient domestic firms benefits consumers, while that of efficient foreign firms may hurt consumers when the number of foreign firms is relatively small. This result is different from that obtained in Dinda and Mukherjee (2014) which ignore foreign competition. We thus identify another important factor, the nationality of entrant firms, that affects the effect of entry on consumers under the welfare-maximizing tax policy. Our main finding is robust to the introduction of increasing marginal costs across firms. However, we find that (i) when foreign firms act as leaders, entry of (either domestic or foreign) firms always benefits consumers, which indicates that the moves of domestic and foreign firms (simultaneously or sequentially) are critical to the welfare implications under foreign competition. This result is in contrast to the finding by Wang et al. (2019b); and (ii) when efficient firms are partially foreign owned, entry of both domestic and foreign firms may hurt consumers under certain conditions. Hence, factors such as the mode of competition and the degree of foreign ownership are important for the competition authorities to develop relevant policies in an open economy. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Japanese Economic Review Springer Journals

The adverse effect of competition on consumers under foreign competition

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References (43)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
ISSN
1352-4739
eISSN
1468-5876
DOI
10.1007/s42973-022-00122-1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We examine undesirable competition in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly under foreign competition and indirect taxation. We find that entry of inefficient domestic firms benefits consumers, while that of efficient foreign firms may hurt consumers when the number of foreign firms is relatively small. This result is different from that obtained in Dinda and Mukherjee (2014) which ignore foreign competition. We thus identify another important factor, the nationality of entrant firms, that affects the effect of entry on consumers under the welfare-maximizing tax policy. Our main finding is robust to the introduction of increasing marginal costs across firms. However, we find that (i) when foreign firms act as leaders, entry of (either domestic or foreign) firms always benefits consumers, which indicates that the moves of domestic and foreign firms (simultaneously or sequentially) are critical to the welfare implications under foreign competition. This result is in contrast to the finding by Wang et al. (2019b); and (ii) when efficient firms are partially foreign owned, entry of both domestic and foreign firms may hurt consumers under certain conditions. Hence, factors such as the mode of competition and the degree of foreign ownership are important for the competition authorities to develop relevant policies in an open economy.

Journal

The Japanese Economic Review – Springer Journals

Published: Nov 21, 2022

Keywords: Consumer surplus; Foreign competition; Strategic tax; Asymmetric oligopoly; Firm entry; D43; F23; H21; L13

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