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The all-pay auction with complete information

The all-pay auction with complete information In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economic Theory Springer Journals

The all-pay auction with complete information

Economic Theory , Volume 8 (2) – Feb 8, 2005

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References (35)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 by Springer-Verlag
Subject
Economics; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Microeconomics; Public Finance
ISSN
0938-2259
eISSN
1432-0479
DOI
10.1007/BF01211819
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium.

Journal

Economic TheorySpringer Journals

Published: Feb 8, 2005

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