Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Chaim Fershtman, K. Judd (1984)
Equilibrium Incentives in OligopolyThe American Economic Review, 77
O Jeanne G Corneo (1994)
Oligopole Mixte Dans un March� CommunAnnales d’Economie et de Statistique, 33
X. Vives (1984)
Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrandJournal of Economic Theory, 34
Juan Bárcena-Ruiz (2007)
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price CompetitionJournal of Economics, 91
M. White (2001)
Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firmsEuropean Journal of Political Economy, 17
S. Sklivas (1987)
The Strategic Choice of Managerial IncentivesThe RAND Journal of Economics, 18
Giacomo Corneo, Oliver Jeanne (1994)
Oligopole mixte dans un marché communAnnals of economics and statistics
G. Fraja, F. Delbono (1990)
GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF MIXED OLIGOPOLYJournal of Economic Surveys, 4
Simon Anderson, A. Palma, Jacques-François Thisse (1997)
Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industryEuropean Economic Review, 41
G. Fraja, F. Delbono (1989)
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN OLIGOPOLY, 41
F. Barros (1995)
Incentive schemes as strategic variables: an application to a mixed duopolyInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 13
Attila Tasnádi (2006)
Price vs. quantity in oligopoly gamesInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 24
K. Basu (1995)
Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentivesEconomics Letters, 49
J. Vickers (1985)
Delegation and the Theory of the FirmThe Economic Journal, 95
Abstract This paper analyses the decisions of firms as to whether or not to hire managers when there is a public firm competing with a private firm in the product market. It is shown that under Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods both firms hire managers. This is in contrast with the result obtained under Cournot competition, where only the private firm hires a manager. Moreover, welfare is lower if both firms hire managers than if neither firm does. In contrast, under Cournot competition welfare is greater if both firms hire managers.
The Japanese Economic Review – Springer Journals
Published: Sep 1, 2009
Keywords: economics, general; microeconomics; macroeconomics/monetary economics//financial economics; econometrics; development economics; economic history
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.