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The Peacock’s Tail: Why is an Extremist So Sexy?

The Peacock’s Tail: Why is an Extremist So Sexy? Abstract In democracies, ideological politicians often win elections. This phenomenon contradicts the Median Voter Theorem. I propose a model of election to explain this puzzle. Ideology can be a signal of ability, and if the benefits of ability outweigh the costs of ideology the electorate will prefer ideological politicians. Meanwhile, politicians disguise their ideology even if such disguise is costly. Under certain conditions, the most extreme politician is the most likely to be elected. Further, stiffer electoral competition can harm the electorate. These results contrast sharply with the standard belief that politicians’ desire to gain office leads to their ideological convergence. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Japanese Economic Review Springer Journals

The Peacock’s Tail: Why is an Extremist So Sexy?

Murase, Hideaki
The Japanese Economic Review , Volume 55 (3): 10 – Sep 1, 2004
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References (30)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
2004 Japanese Economic Association
ISSN
1352-4739
eISSN
1468-5876
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-5876.2004.00284.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract In democracies, ideological politicians often win elections. This phenomenon contradicts the Median Voter Theorem. I propose a model of election to explain this puzzle. Ideology can be a signal of ability, and if the benefits of ability outweigh the costs of ideology the electorate will prefer ideological politicians. Meanwhile, politicians disguise their ideology even if such disguise is costly. Under certain conditions, the most extreme politician is the most likely to be elected. Further, stiffer electoral competition can harm the electorate. These results contrast sharply with the standard belief that politicians’ desire to gain office leads to their ideological convergence.

Journal

The Japanese Economic Review – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 1, 2004

Keywords: economics, general; microeconomics; macroeconomics/monetary economics//financial economics; econometrics; development economics; economic history

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