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The Political Economy of Capital Market Reforms in Southeast AsiaPolitical Parties and Reform Processes

The Political Economy of Capital Market Reforms in Southeast Asia: Political Parties and Reform... [The central claim of this book is that capital market reforms pose different challenges to politicians in different countries. Even when governments are motivated by comparable market and political forces to launch similar reforms, their incentives to harness these reforms to public-regarding policies differ dramatically. Furthermore, disparate incentives vis-à-vis similar capital market reforms are often coupled with divergent abilities to enact reform initiatives decisively and follow them through resolutely in the face of political and institutional obstacles. What accounts for the heterogeneous incentives of politicians and their different abilities to enact market reforms in line with their incentives and commit to maintaining reform processes? This chapter develops a theoretical model that emphasises the complex interaction between party system structures and party organisational attributes as an explanatory approach to examining the question.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

The Political Economy of Capital Market Reforms in Southeast AsiaPolitical Parties and Reform Processes

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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2011
ISBN
978-1-349-32248-0
Pages
26 –60
DOI
10.1057/9780230346468_2
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[The central claim of this book is that capital market reforms pose different challenges to politicians in different countries. Even when governments are motivated by comparable market and political forces to launch similar reforms, their incentives to harness these reforms to public-regarding policies differ dramatically. Furthermore, disparate incentives vis-à-vis similar capital market reforms are often coupled with divergent abilities to enact reform initiatives decisively and follow them through resolutely in the face of political and institutional obstacles. What accounts for the heterogeneous incentives of politicians and their different abilities to enact market reforms in line with their incentives and commit to maintaining reform processes? This chapter develops a theoretical model that emphasises the complex interaction between party system structures and party organisational attributes as an explanatory approach to examining the question.]

Published: Aug 31, 2015

Keywords: Political Party; Market Reform; Party System; Reform Process; Public Good Provision

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