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The Politics of IMF LendingTheory, Evidence, and Reform

The Politics of IMF Lending: Theory, Evidence, and Reform [In this book, I demonstrated that the G5 have a central role in IMF policy-making. Furthermore, I argued that their preferences over IMF policies are predicated on the economic exposure of their domestic banks and exporters, which sometimes lobby them for protection following an economic shock in a developing or emerging market. As a result, changing economic linkages determine government preferences in the IMF’s large shareholders which, in turn, affects IMF policy outcomes. This is all possible because the IMF’s large shareholders have a much stronger grip on policy-making than is commonly recognized. While on the surface it appears that governments have a symbolic role only in IMF policy-making, a more detailed analysis of how the organization sets policies and makes decisions revealed that they have both the means and motivation to change the nature of program approval, lending, and conditionality.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

The Politics of IMF LendingTheory, Evidence, and Reform

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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2013
ISBN
978-1-349-44277-5
Pages
161 –169
DOI
10.1057/9781137263810_10
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In this book, I demonstrated that the G5 have a central role in IMF policy-making. Furthermore, I argued that their preferences over IMF policies are predicated on the economic exposure of their domestic banks and exporters, which sometimes lobby them for protection following an economic shock in a developing or emerging market. As a result, changing economic linkages determine government preferences in the IMF’s large shareholders which, in turn, affects IMF policy outcomes. This is all possible because the IMF’s large shareholders have a much stronger grip on policy-making than is commonly recognized. While on the surface it appears that governments have a symbolic role only in IMF policy-making, a more detailed analysis of how the organization sets policies and makes decisions revealed that they have both the means and motivation to change the nature of program approval, lending, and conditionality.]

Published: Oct 12, 2015

Keywords: Global Financial Crisis; Large Shareholder; Economic Shock; Loan Size; Borrowing Country

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