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/lp/springer-journals/theory-of-legal-evidence-evidence-in-legal-theory-why-are-we-bound-by-SrlrjcIRBh
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Copyright
- © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
- ISBN
- 978-3-030-83840-9
- Pages
- 69 –85
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_4
- Publisher site
- See Chapter on Publisher Site
Abstract
[The article aims at identifying the relationship between legal and epistemic normativity that determines the normative nature of legal evidence. For this task, the categorial tools developed on the grounds of contemporary metaethics are being applied, exposing the polysemic nature of the notion of normativity. It leads to the conclusion that legal normativity functions as metanormativity for epistemic normativity, as in the legal practice, evidence attains its epistemic significance within the course of the inferential interactions between participants of the ‘legal game’. Therefore if epistemic correctness is seen as a subset of legal correctness, at least within the legal evidence-finding process, different aims of both practices could reconcile. In this account epistemic normativity participates in forming the assertibility conditions for legal practice. Legal normativity, understood in terms of the mutual accountability of commitments of the participants of legal practice, gains objectivity in relation to its aim of arriving at a resolution based on factual findings. This objectivity, due to the history of past ascriptions and commitments, is able to give rise to the propositional content of evidence and thus it exceeds formal account of evidence based on coherence to legal standards only.]
Published: Jan 3, 2022
Keywords: Metaethics; Practical reasoning; Normativity of law; Epistemic normativity; Metanormativity; Evidence; Epistemic reasons; Analytical pragmatism; Robert Brandom