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Thinking about future/democracy: towards a political theory of futurity

Thinking about future/democracy: towards a political theory of futurity Today, representative politics are often perceived as being primarily concerned with short-term goals. Moreover, the future appears to be pre-determined by economic or technological necessities. This ‘closing’ of the future, however, becomes increasingly problematic in the face of global existential crises, such as environmental depletion and climate change. These catastrophic developments could only be mitigated by immediate, decisive political interventions, which would amount to systemic changes that redirect technological research and economic activities. This article seeks to outline how political theory and philosophy can contribute to “(re-)Politicizing the Future”. I argue that political thought should take temporality, and in particular futurity, as a central conceptual and methodological concern. Drawing on the works of prominent twenti- eth century thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Stanley Cavell, and Jacques Derrida, I want to develop a deepened analytical understanding of the possibility for a ‘future directed’ political thought which highlights intrinsic connections between sustainability and democracy. Keywords Contingency · History · Futurity · “Democracy to Come” · Derrida · Cavell Introduction (Habermas 1985: 7). The disappearance of possible futures that would be profoundly different from the present has been Politics is concerned with the future—this seems to be too propagated as both a political reality and a normative stand- obvious to need stating. Whether in debates about the build- point since at least the early 1980s, and is often linked to the ing of a new road, the overhaul of national pension systems, rise of neoliberal forms of government (see, e.g., Fukuyama or the forging of transnational agreements on climate change 1992; Séville 2017). From Margaret Thatcher’s famous proc- mitigation, all these disparate forms of political decision- lamation that ‘There is no Alternative’ to current austerity making carry implicit or explicit visions of preferable reforms, the political future is presented as pre-determined futures. For many, however, this truism sounds increasingly by economic or technological necessities. This ‘closing’ of hollow. It appears as if representative politics in contempo- the future at first sight would seem to be at odds with the rary liberal-capitalist countries is concerned primarily with obvious acceleration of late modern societies, where things short-term goals. Even social movements are often criticized appear to be in constant flux. However, while acceleration for lacking positive visions of a future that would radi- and rapid change are often regarded as hallmarks of moder- cally differ from the current status-quo. Western societies nity, these are highly uneven and aporetic processes. Some seem to have lost their abilities to imagine utopian futures theorists argue that the acceleration of other parts of society leads to a ‘hyper-accelerated standstill’ or to ‘polar iner- tia’ in the political sphere (see, e.g., Rosa 2003: 17, 21). In Handled by Anne-Katrin Holfelder, Institute for Advanced the face of rapid movements and shifts in areas such as finan- Sustainability Studies, Germany. cial markets or scientific research, representative democratic * Rosine Kelz politics appears to have lost the ability to actively steer social rosine.kelz@iass-potsdam.de developments. The need for future directed political action and thinking, however, becomes ever more pressing. From Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies E.V (IASS), the extraction of fossil fuels and the use of nuclear power Berliner Str. 130, 14467 Potsdam, Germany Vol.:(0123456789) 1 3 Sustainability Science to genome editing—the use of contemporary technologies contrast, the idea of democracy presupposes its own con- has consequences which stretch far into the future. At the tingent political foundation. Making contingency explicit, same time, capacities for modeling and thus anticipating the in turn, allows for a continuous renegotiation of possible possible effects of actions on a global scale have increased futures. Moreover, as I will discuss in Section I, affirming rapidly in the past decades. We are currently confronted with contingency entails a specific relationship to the past—and dystopian scenarios of environmental depletion and a rap- to the role of history in understanding the present and the idly changing climate, but current liberal democratic gov- future—that enables us to learn from past events without ernments often seem to lack the political will to implement understanding history as determining the future. Section II systemic changes that would make it possible to avoid the concentrates on the notion that the concept of democracy most disastrous pathways. is closely linked to a particular understanding of futurity. Even though there is thus an obvious need to theorize how A democratic commitment to an open future, in turn, also politics relates to the creation of future(s), current political implies a commitment to at least a “thin” notion of sustain- theory often appears strangely uninterested in the temporal ability. In Section III, the relationship between democracy character of the political sphere. What is called for, then, and sustainability is explored further. I argue that while a is political thought that contributes to a project of actively societal turn to more sustainable social and economic prac- (re-)politicizing societal and political notions of the future. tices would involve the willingness of individuals to make As the ‘Politicizing the Future’ project members argue, this substantive changes in their daily lives, these commitments would involve a number of diverse practices which enable are political in nature. Instead of sliding into a neoliberal the proliferation of multiple alternative possible futures in logic of individualized ‘sustainable consumption’, what the present. These practices are intrinsically linked to the is called for is an understanding of moral autonomy that pluralization and deepening of democratic processes. How- involves a deepening of shared, democratic practices. ever, even though one explicit normative goal of this project is to ‘open up’ the realm of thinkable futures, not all visions of future are equally valued. The normative dimension also Against linear time? History, teleology, entails a notion of strong sustainability, allowing for future and the closing of the future generations to exist in a world with a livable natural and just social environment. Thus, Politicizing the Future involves a In the grand philosophical systems of the European ‘de-colonization’ of the future, where present people have Enlightenment the future plays an important role. With to refrain from using up resources and creating ecological modernity, a notion of history emerged that sought to and socio-political issues that would disadvantage those who encompass the whole of humanity’s existence into one come after them (Knappe et al. 2018, this issue). The aim cohesive narrative of universal progress—from the ancient of this article is, therefore, twofold. First, I want to show past to an endpoint in the future (Koselleck 2002). Build- that there are resources in political and moral thought to ing on the eschatological tradition in Western thought, highlight the importance of temporality and futurity, which early modern philosophers start to understand history as can be useful for current debates in sustainability studies. “the fulfillment of a telos that one can rationally antici- Second, this paper seeks to further explore the normative pate in advance in the form of an idea”. Humankind then connections between futurity, democracy, and sustainability, either has to “hope to approximate” this idea, as in Kantian which are proposed by the members of the ‘Politicizing the teleology, or “work towards actualizing” it, as in Hege- Future’ project. lian–Marxist teleology (Cheah and Guerlac 2009: 15). In The notion of (political) contingency is an excellent start- both systems, it is imagined that humans develop towards ing point to explore the connections between a commitment an increasingly rational state by accumulating knowledge to an open future and the concept of democracy. By political and understanding. This, in turn, allows for individual contingency, I mean the simple fact that even though the and societal emancipation. For Kant, for example, it is an way a society is organized is not random, it could always be “inborn duty” to influence “posterity in such a way that otherwise (Marchart 2010: 80). As political systems are cre- it will make constant progress” (Kant 1991b: 88–89). As ated by overlapping processes, whose beginnings cannot be Kant explains elsewhere “It will require a long, perhaps clearly determined and whose developments do not follow incalculable series of generations, each passing its enlight- necessary pathways, contingency is a feature of any form enment to the next, before the germs implanted by nature of societal organization. However, many forms of rule disa- in our species can be developed to that degree which corre- vow their own contingency. Often, they seek to affirm their sponds to nature’s original intention. In addition, the point own necessity and immutability by appealing to something of time at which this degree of development is reached outside of the realm of politics, as, for example, a doctrine must be the goal of man’s aspiration … or else his natu- of divine right, or the unyielding laws of the market. By ral capacities would necessarily appear by and large to 1 3 Sustainability Science be purposeless and wasted” (Kant 1991a: 43). The linear also allow people to reject their moral responsibility for the historical progress of humankind is presented here at the roles they play in totalitarian regimes. same time as the unfolding of a natural capacity and as In the wake of the catastrophes of totalitarianism, Arendt necessitating active human engagement. The latter is a argues, history can no longer be understood in a linear man- moral duty, because it is intended by nature. For Kant, we ner. We are left with “a fragmented past, which has lost not only have an obvious ‘natural’ responsibility for future its certainty of evaluation” (Arendt 1978: 212). This frag- generations, the way in which future generations should mentation, together with a critique of teleology, however, develop can already be known in the present. can lead us to a productive re-evaluation of the concept of In the course of the twentieth century, however, the idea history. To do so, Arendt refers back to Greek and Roman of progress and the notion that one can deduce the future notions of history which, in her understanding, retain causal- from an analysis of history has become increasingly sus- ity and context, but find them within the “light provided by pect. On the one hand, progress appeared to be palpable the event itself, illuminating a specific segment of human in the rapid development of science and industry. On the affairs”. Contrary to the modern view of history, there is no other hand, however, these transformations were often expe- independent existence of causality and meaning “of which rienced as deeply disruptive and unpredictable. In addi- the event would be only the more or less accidental though tion, in the light of struggles against (neo-)colonial rule, adequate expression” (Arendt 2006a: 64). As Reinhart the ingrained Eurocentrism of Western notions of progress Koselleck explains, Ancient Greek and Roman notions of started to become more widely recognized (see e.g., Allen relative progression are always restricted to specific areas. 2016). Attempts to provide a single, encompassing narra- These partial, local notions of ‘progress’ are established tive of humankind’s development had failed to acknowledge by looking back on past developments, but do not make it that economic growth in Europe had depended on colonial possible to predict the future (Koselleck 2002: 221). Such expansion. Europe has externalized many social and eco- an understanding of history, Arendt maintains, can loosen logical ‘costs’ of industrial growth into other world regions the power the past holds over political actors while retain- (Chakrabarty, 2012). Not only did universalistic theories ing historical stories and events as shared reference points not fully account for the massive oppression, violence, and and examples for political discourse. This is important, destruction that accompanied European ‘modernization’, because political action, for Arendt, has to be inspired by Eurocentric ideas of progress themselves have been recog- and directed towards a shared, human-made world, and sto- nized to be at least partly responsible for the rise of imperi- ries of the past make up an important part of this shared alism, totalitarianism, and environmental depletion. In the frame of reference. While political imagination and action wake of two catastrophic World Wars and the Holocaust, thus remain guided by examples from the past, they are freed however, the notion of continuous linear progress started from historical necessity. to sound hollow even within Western societies. As Adorno Engaging with the past without seeking to extrapolate a famously wrote, Auschwitz “makes all talk of progress unified narrative of historical progress also makes it pos- towards freedom seem ludicrous” (Adorno 2006: 7). sible to explore past events from different perspectives. Hannah Arendt is one of the best known among the Euro- This includes the stories of people who were colonized pean political thinkers who were led by the shocks of the or enslaved, who suffered from oppression and violence. first half of the twentieth century to re-evaluate notions of Their experiences often could not be articulated and pre- causality and history in political philosophy. She criticizes served within the progressive framework. It can also entail that political philosophy has disregarded the importance of unearthing the hopes and possibilities suggested in moments singular actors and events. For her, this sentiment cumu- of upheaval or revolt which did not come to fruition. While lated in Marx’s Hegelian understanding of history. Marx, such practices of re-appropriating the past need to be care- as Arendt reads him, retains a ‘Platonic’ hostility towards ful not to slide into revisionism, they can help to highlight human affairs and particularity, because he bestows impor - that even though the present is not arbitrary, it is contingent. tance and dignity not on the acts of individuals but “upon Things could have been otherwise—there were avenues not mere time-sequence” (Arendt 2006a: 65). For Arendt, then, a taken, and possibilities not fully explored. Importantly, I do teleological understanding of history is linked to an inability not suggest that we abandon a ‘realist’ intuition about the to understand oneself as a singular actor, capable of bringing past. There are knowable historical facts. However, we have about unexpected events, and thus radical political change. to acknowledge that because the world is infinitely complex, This had devastating consequences in the early twentieth any human interpretation will only ever capture a partial, century, where people considered themselves as mere ‘cogs particular perspective of any event (Hoy 2012: 99–100). To in the machine’, with no personal responsibility for the ‘pro- stress that our understanding of the past is partial and that gress’ of historical forces (Arendt 2006b: 25–26). The con- things did not necessarily have to develop the way that they sequence of this mindset is not only political quietism; it can turned out, might also make it easier to acknowledge the 1 3 Sustainability Science complexity and contingency of our current economic, social, has also shaped contemporary notions of the role of liberal and political status-quo. This is important for an understand- democratic regimes in the global system of nation states. ing of democracy which takes the Greek notion of doxa, Today, liberal representative democracies seem to strug- as the possibility of different viewpoints or opinions that gle with adapting to the reality of anthropogenic climate equally hold truth, seriously. Democratic politics involves change. One could interpret these difficulties as an inabil - an understanding that there can be not one, single correct ity of contemporary forms of political representation to understanding of the human world. As Cornelius Castoriadis come to terms with changing environmental realities. In phrases it, “[i]f a full and certain knowledge (episteme) of this sense, calls for a transformations to more environmen- the human domain were possible, politics would immedi- tally sustainable forms of energy production and consump- ately come to an end, and democracy would be both impos- tion can also be taken as an occasion for the ‘democratiza- sible and absurd: democracy implies that all citizens have tion’ of contemporary democratic regimes. the possibility of attaining a correct doxa and that nobody In the context of recent ecological crises, caused possesses an episteme of things political” (Castoriadis 1997: among other factors by the reliance of fossil fuels, the 274). question of how democracies could better engage with While at first sight, it might seem counterintuitive to the ‘non-human’ world has regained traction in political begin an article devoted to “Politicizing the Future” with a theory. Current challenges to a traditionally anthropo- discussion of concepts of history and a critique of progress, centric understanding of democracy raise the question of this section hopefully has shown that by rethinking these whether non-human beings, things, and relatively abstract notions, we can move from a pre-determined to an open entities such as “nature” need to be able to hold rights or future. In the next section, I will concentrate more concretely be otherwise represented in democratic regimes, and how on establishing a link between futurity and the concept of this could be best accomplished (see, e.g., Bennett 2010; democracy—thus strengthening the connection between an Povinelli 2016; Derrida 2008). Questions about who can understanding of future(s) as open and multiple and a nor- belong to the community of citizens, and whose voices and mative commitment to democracy. needs should be represented, are not new, however. Liberal representative governments have repeatedly faced chal- lenges to their definitions of membership and their (territo- Democracy as futurity rial) boundaries. Here, examples from the past, such as the movement for women’s right to vote, might come to mind. There are many, often mutually exclusive, notions of what Or, we could think of ongoing debates about migration, ‘democracy’ entails. This openness is an essential aspect where the rights of people to enter state territories and of democracy. To stay democratic, democracies need to possible paths to citizenship have become issues of fierce remain unable to find conceptual, legal, and institutional political contestation. As ‘empirically existing’ regimes closure. One reason for this is that democracies, like any never rest on firm foundations, such questions cannot be other form of political regime, exist in specific points in ultimately settled, and thus any democratic community space and time, under specific ‘material’ circumstances. needs to remain open to future challenges to their defini- While governments can, to an extent, steer how natural tions of membership. This, however, brings an unresolv- resources are used or which technologies are developed, able question to the fore which lies at the heart of the while they can decide how to prepare for and react to concept of democracy: are we in political community with natural disasters such as droughts or earthquakes, these those who are most similar to ‘us’, or should political com- forces also shape social and political relations. In short, munity be sought with those who are (maybe radically) with differing historical, cultural, and material circum- different? As Jacques Derrida (2005a) seeks to retrace in stances, different forms of democracy emerge. For exam- his book on the “Politics of Friendship”, a logic of politi- ple, as Timothy Mitchell argues, industrialized liberal cal friendship as fraternity has been long inscribed in the democracies of the second half of the twentieth century notion of politics in the Western tradition. In his reading, relied heavily on fossil fuels, in particular oil. The avail- this also links understandings of political community and ability of cheap energy altered living standards for large citizenship to notions of autochthony or (genetic) same- proportions of the population in the global north. Fossil ness, where a connection is drawn between ‘blood’, land fuel extraction industries played an important role in the and nation (Derrida 2005a: 106). The creation of a homog- development of labor relations, and influenced the forms enous ‘we’, however, relies on the construction of external in which relevant sectors of the working class and industry and internal ‘others’ against whom community needs to organized politically and were represented in government be defended. This logic is deeply inscribed within today’s (Mitchell 2009). Moreover, reliance on fossil fuels has had system of liberal democratic nation states. For Derrida, profound impacts on international politics, which in turn however, it is not in keeping with both the ‘promise’ of 1 3 Sustainability Science the concept of democracy, and the realities of today’s glo- can be called into question (Derrida 2005b: 22, 24–25, 87). balized world. There is also a second, related form in However, Derrida is somewhat ambiguous on how democ- which Derrida discusses the issue of homogenization as an racies should deal with the danger of non-democratic chal- irresolvable issue within political communities. Democ- lengers. He states, for example, that while “[t]he coming racy cannot exist without “the calculation of majorities, of the event is what cannot and should not be prevented”, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, because “it is another name for the future itself”, this “does all equal” (Derrida 2005a: 22). This threatens the pos- not mean that it is good—good in itself—for everything and sibility to see the singularity of each being—and there anything to arrive”. One should try to prevent those things can also be no democracy “without respect for irreducible from coming to pass “that one thinks will block the future singularity or alterity”. “These two laws”, Derrida writes or that bring death with them: events that would put an end “are irreducible one to the other. Tragically irreconcil- to the possibility of the event” (Derrida 2002: 194). That able and forever wounding” (Derrida 2005a: 22). A politi- we should try to prevent something from coming to pass, cal need to ‘count’ and to homogenize is thus confronted however, does not mean that it can be ruled out. Indeed, it with the ethical necessity to respect alterity and to leave is the ever looming possibility of a catastrophic ending that the political community open to the arrival of ‘others’. makes continuous political engagement necessary. One is From these irreducible aporiae, however, “political desire” driven to participate in politics, not only because one could arises. Democracy’s necessary “inadequacy to itself” is always ‘better’ democracy, and renegotiate compromises what keeps the political realm alive, because it calls for inherent in the tenuous nature of democratic community— continuous contestation (Derrida 2005a: 22). the very aliveness of democratic politics is also fueled by the With his phrase ‘democracy to come’ Derrida seeks possibility of its destruction. If future is really understood to express the integral connection between the concept of as open, as that what cannot be known in advance, what democracy and futurity. It expresses not only the necessity ‘comes’ to us, but is not determined or planned by us, then for constant renegotiation, but also the possibility of radical future can never be ‘safe’. As Derrida writes in his early text change. Not despite but because of the tensions inherent in Of Grammatology, “[t]he future can only be anticipated in its conceptual history, Derrida understands democracy as an the form of an absolute danger. It is that which breaks abso- (unfulfillable) promise. Inscribed in the concept of democ- lutely with constituted normality and can only announce, racy is the belief in an endless process of perfectibility. While present itself as a kind of monstrosity” (Derrida 1974: 14). this implies that the actual ‘arrival’ of a ‘perfect’ democracy It is in such reminders of possible disastrous futures needs to remain impossible, it also means that the promise that I understand ‘democracy to come’ to also involve an entails an injunction for action in the present. Such a perfec- appeal for at least a ‘thin’ commitment to sustainability. Like tionist understanding of democracy remains close to (Kan- ‘democracy’, ‘sustainability’ is a notoriously underdeter- tian) teleology. Derrida, however, seeks to avoid a strong mined concept. ‘Sustainability’ might be better understood understanding of teleology by insisting on the radical open- as a discourse, where competing definitions are negotiated. ness of the future. Because a ‘real’ future remains unknow- Originally, the term ‘sustainability’ had an explicitly eco- able and incalculable, democracy as a ‘regulative ideal’ also nomic connotation, and was used to describe practices that needs to remain underdetermined. However, Derrida does would not use up a (natural) resource (e.g., a forest), but not leave his understanding of ‘democracy to come’ entirely use it in a way, where it can replenish, and thus be con- open. Because of the importance of alterity and difference served for future use (Muraca 2010: 25). In recent, broader and the ethical responsibility towards excluded ‘others’, definitions, however, notions of sustainability include issues which is neglected in current liberal democratic regimes, the of social justice and normative arguments for ecological sphere of democracy needs to be broadened beyond ‘classi- conservation as a good in itself. In these formulations, a cal’ modern notions of nation, state and citizenship. Democ- possible overlap with the notion of ‘democracy to come’ racy, then, is better understood as a practice that can arise in becomes apparent. Both concepts are related to an open various socio-political arenas, where one can encounter oth- future, where as many pathways as possible need to be held ers under the heading of equality, justice, equity and respect. open. By fostering diversity (of forms of life, of ecosystems, Derrida is well aware that democracy’s necessary open- of cultures, of languages) today, sustainable practices seek ness to dissenting voices and ‘newcomers’ can be danger- to enable a multiplicity of possible futures for a multiplic- ous. The notion that democracy is “self-criticizable” entails ity of living beings. With ‘thin’ sustainability, then, I do that in a democratic regime, the very value of democracy Arguably, European societies have never possessed a great level of internal cultural and linguistic homogeneity, despite modern efforts to create more homogeneous peoples in the process of ‘nation-building’. For a detailed discussion of the connection between sustainability, Hobsbawm (1992). diversity, and Derrida’s thought, see, for example, Lynes (2018). 1 3 Sustainability Science not mean a purely ‘economic’ definition of sustainability, allowing the self to become more autonomous, it otherwise but that the precise content of what sustainable practices leaves the content of the ‘good’ relatively open. In this con- amount to cannot be spelled out a priori, because this has text, autonomy connotes the ability to assume a position to be open to negotiation in the democratic political sphere. from which current societal norms can be critically assessed, However, paradoxically, for this to be possible, some condi- and one’s own unique stance in relation with these norms can tions of sustainability also need to be met. This includes an be formulated. At the same time, however, personal auton- understanding of sustainability as social justice, because, as omy can only be understood within the context of the deeply Arendt forcefully argues in On Revolution (1963), a func- relational character of our existence. When we approach the tioning democratic political sphere needs at least a minimum role of singular persons in bringing about more sustainable of economic and social equality, so that everybody is able to every-day practices, it is, therefore, important to avoid fall- engage in politics with the common good in mind. ing into a ‘neoliberal’ rhetoric of self-responsibility that dis- While I ended section I by pointing out that democracy regards social constraints and dependencies. For example, needs to allow for a variety of diverging view points to exist the decision whether I drive to work by car, ride my bike, or about the “world”, in this section, I made the argument that use public transport can be framed in terms of autonomous democracies also need to acknowledge that there are differ - decision-making—I decide for myself in accordance with ent justified opinions about what democracy itself should my individual beliefs and needs which type of transportation entail. This openness interweaves the notion of democracy I prefer. By extension, this can imply that the problem of car with the notion of futurity. Democracy has the structure of exhaust pollution comes down to the decisions of individu- a promise, of its own perfectibility, whose ‘content’ needs als and it is thus up to each of them alone to bring about to remain ‘open’, because of the complexity of competing cleaner air. Societal norms and narratives, however, link my demands and the incalculability of the future. In my under- private transportation choices to broader notions of social standing, a ‘futural’ notion of democracy highlights the identity or economic status and can even make them into vis- inherent connection between democracy and at least a ‘thin’ ible signs of my political affiliations. Instead of making my conception of sustainability. If the realm of democracy needs decision about transportation in isolation, I am well aware to be constantly rethought, and broadened beyond the level of the opinions of my partner, friends and colleagues, and of representative liberal nation states, however, we have to their understanding of an acceptable choice will influence ask how democratic practices can take form in our daily mine, even though I might not always be aware of this. When lives. In the final section, I therefore turn my attention to the we start our inquiry from the perspective of the acting indi- role of personal agency. vidual, then, this still needs to involve that we understand individuals as socially embedded. These interactions between one’s relationship to others Cavell’s moral perfectionism, agency, and one’s understanding of self are topics Stanley Cavell and democratic sustainability seeks to explore in his engagements with ordinary language philosophy and perfectionist moral thought. Ordinary lan- So far, we have investigated the connections between futu- guage philosophers maintain that the meaning of words is rity, democracy, and sustainability by looking more closely not established via a connection between a word and an at notions of democracy and temporality. If, however, unex- object in the external world directly, but via the agreement pected events are brought into being not by ‘mere time- between the speakers of a language. This necessarily situates sequence’, but by complex interactions between singular a speaker within a social world, shared with other speak- actors, we also have to consider what motivates people to ers. Communication and agreement with others become the become active in the political realm. Such motivations, I contingent ground of meaning (Cavell 1976: 50). Learning argue, are often rooted within one’s personal ‘moral’ con- a language, then, involves understanding how other speak- cerns and beliefs. I take sustainability here as one of the ers use specific concepts in context. If learning how words possible ethical concerns that can motivate political engage- are used by others was all there was to learning a language; ment. At the same time, sustainability can also be under- however, language would be static, and thus unable to grasp stood as a democratic practice in itself. To make this argu- the ever-changing world. Instead, Cavell argues that per- ment, I turn from Derrida’s notion of ‘democracy to come’ sonal agency plays an important role in the functioning of as a perfectionist understanding of democracy to Stanley language. Speakers can only be said to have fully grasped the Cavell’s discussion of the perfectionist moral self. Tradition- meaning of a concept if they are able to use it creatively—in ally, moral perfectionism is based on an idea of the ‘good’, a new setting, for example. By applying concepts in different which can be used to orientate our actions. In Cavell’s under- ways or in new circumstances, every speaker can take part in standing, however, perfectionism involves the cultivation of the evolution of language. Using words creatively, speakers the self. While this activity is future oriented and aims at also reveal something about themselves—they show their 1 3 Sustainability Science individuality. However, when a speaker makes a creative The general will “is an autonomous will, one that is at once projection, there is no guarantee that others will understand subject and object to itself and, as such, one that allows for or accept their novel use of the familiar concept. If under- the reflective activity of self-appraisal and self-interpre- standing fails, the limits of one’s agreement with others are tation” (Norris 2017: 106 my emphasis). Importantly, for revealed—and this can be threatening to the self. We need Rousseau, it is possible that an aggregate of private wills is others, not only for our very physical survival, but also to mistaken for the general will of a community. Then, even make sense of the world. Accepting and allowing for one’s though a majority agrees on this point, their wills do not dependency and vulnerability, however, make it possible to actually express what would be good for the community as more deeply grasp the relational aspect of one’s existence. a whole. In Cavell’s work, this notion of a shared general This, for Cavell, is an important aspect of developing one’s will, where one assumes to speak for others, become closely moral agency. However, because there are risks involved in linked to the agreement between speakers that is necessary challenging (linguistic or social) convention, Cavell argues for conversation. As Andrew Norris explains “[n]either the that this kind of agency has to be actively chosen. Yet, fail- linguistic nor the political community are … aggregations ing to do so would not only ossify society, it would also rob of discrete individual choices all the way down. For us to one of the opportunity to ‘get to know’ oneself better and speak the same language or to stand in a distinctively politi- thus become a more autonomous self. cal relationship with one another we must, … feel or respond Cavell develops his notion of selfhood by engaging with together, be in intimate attunement with one another” (Nor- the idea of moral perfectionism. His version of perfection- ris 2017: 116). To develop one’s political voice, then, is also ism is linked to a notion of futurity similar to Derrida’s. For a quest to find out if, or in how far, one can speak for oth- Cavell, leading a good, moral life entails continuous work ers—it is a claim to community. to better understand or know oneself and one’s situatedness There is a futural aspect to Cavell’s interlacing of moral in the social world. A “moral creature” is, therefore, one and political thought. When finding herself estranged from “that demands and recognizes the intelligibility of others herself and her community, a person, turning to perfectionist to himself or herself, and of himself or herself to others” ethics, imagines a possible better future self and the com- (Cavell 1990: xxxi). The wish to become intelligible or to munity that would need to exist for such a self to be possible. ‘define’ one’s own stance in relation with one’s community The possibility to imagine a better future self then sets in often arises when one finds oneself in a situation, where motion a process of transformation, in which not only the one can no longer agree with some of the core practices or ‘current’ self changes, but also the imagined future self. This norms of one’s society. For example, a person could realize is the case, because the perspective on what a ‘better’ self that accepted definitions of concepts such as sustainability or would entail develops as the person gets to ‘know’ herself democracy do not fit with her society’s actual practices and and her relationship to her community better. Importantly, that she cannot accept this discrepancy. Or maybe, she feels for Cavell, just as one can never know everything about that the conventional definition of democracy is not fully the world or about another person, one can also never fully able to express her own understanding of what ‘real democ- ‘know’ oneself. The perfectionist quest of ‘getting to know racy’ would entail. Such experiences can lead to a sense of oneself’ thus cannot come to an end. In this understand- estrangement, not only from one’s community, but also from ing, the very temporality of selfhood is highlighted. The oneself. There might be “a sense of disappointment or dis- self becomes rethought as an open-ended process of dis- satisfaction with oneself, one’s language, and one’s relation- covery and re-articulation, not as a fixed identity. Similar to ships with others”. This might be experienced as “a feeling Derrida’s understanding of ‘democracy to come’, Cavell’s of aversion” towards oneself and/or others, where a person perfectionist future self, therefore, needs to remain without feels the others can no longer speak for her, or she for them ‘content’. Nevertheless, Cavell also offers some ideas about (Flathman 2006: 103–104). Overcoming this estrangement, how perfectionist moral thought that takes our reliance on Cavell argues, is an endeavor that links an attempt to know the natural and social environment seriously could proceed. and develop one’s own sense of self together with finding In the context of an essay on animals, he draws on Thoreau one’s political voice. Cavell’s notion of political voice draws to give voice to the perception that the very “assertion of the on Rousseau, who distinguishes between the private will will to live in the world”, which requires ‘feeding’ oneself and the general will. The private will expresses desires an (both in a metaphorical and a literal sense) is “without cer- individual has ‘for herself’—it is not necessarily connected tain justification”. Living in Walden, Thoreau experiences to her membership in a community. This will, Rousseau that “there are debts in living, conditions of existence, uses argued, often fueled by basic desires or ‘appetites’ such as to which he puts, or fails to put, the peaceable space cleared hunger or lust, and has usually not been examined closely. for him before he cleared it, that are uncountable. What By contrast, the general will enable us “to speak for one makes them insupportable is the degree to which they are another”, and thus form a democratic political community. unnecessary. Then, the quest in which an adventurous life 1 3 Sustainability Science may well be spent in search, or experiment, is to replace the current norms of our societies. In a highly industrialized, false by true necessaries, or means, to what one truly finds globalized world, where our daily actions have effects on a good (a quest as ancient as Plato’s Republic)”(Cavell 2008: variety of living beings, on ecosystems and climate patters, 117). For Cavell, Thoreau’s point is that a sense of debt, over large time spans and across continents, however, it also resulting from the injury one causes others, is an irreduc- means that the question of who belongs to ‘our’ community ible part of human existence. To meet one’s bodily needs, has to be re-posed. one always uses some natural resources and is implicated in the killing of living beings. Moreover, in contemporary societies, one often depends on the labor of others to fulfil Conclusion one’s own needs and desires. While to an extent this cannot be helped, we need to ask ourselves, Cavell argues, what When we try to imagine different, better futures, and ways we truly need, and where we might be involved in the kill- to get there, we cannot proceed as if from a tabula rasa. ing or exploitation of others to satisfy desires that are not The inheritance of European modernity include notions essential to our existence. Moreover, the question of ‘true of justice, freedom, and democracy on which ideas of the needs’ always also involves the question of justice, where it future can build, governmental institutions, and economic appears unjustifiable that some human beings would require systems with which we have to reckon, as well as deeply so much more resources than others. However, to define rooted histories of colonization, imperialism, social and eco- what is ‘essential’ for one’s life, Cavell cautions, is not a logical exploitation, and structural injustice which we have straightforward or simple task. to address. While it is important to highlight how forms of This reading of Thoreau is reminiscent of degrowth posi- inequality, oppression and discrimination are institutional- tions within the sustainability discourse, which have focused ized and have shaped our material environment, a critical on overcoming a logic of economic growth, decoupled from and open engagement with the past and present forms of need or necessity (see e.g. Asara et al. 2015). They criticize violence should also acknowledge the contingency of the the prevalence of the progressive narrative of the expan- present. Things could have been otherwise, and thus can sive market, which retains the idea of a colonizable world. be different in the future. Embracing contingency also Many proponents of ‘degrowth’ argue that it is necessary involves interrogating one’s own stance towards the com- to ‘re-politicize’ the sustainability debate. This involves munities one is a part of, often without one’s own choosing. questioning the notion of ‘the market’ as an unconditional As Cavell reminds us, even if we were utterly dismayed with ontological ground, not only for the political, but also for the current practices and believes of the society we live in, the individual. The ‘neoliberal’ market logic at the same we cannot simply ‘wash our hands off it’. A life lived and time overstates and understates the role of the individual. By understood completely independent of others must remain postulating a sovereign, self-interested subject, it excludes an illusion. Cavell argues that we cannot ‘opt out’ of our the role of social relationships and structural constraints on relationships with others, without taking the risk of losing individual decision-making processes. At the same time, it our connection to the world and thus also to ourselves as understates the ability of individuals to arrive at a systemic agents in the world. As relational beings we have to engage critique of socio-economic structures and bring about sub- with the situation in which we find ourselves. We, therefore, stantial change via political action. By opening political have to interrogate our stance towards our society and seek spaces in which the “naturalization of the need of economic to discover a shared political voice. This might also involve growth and capitalism as the only reasonable and possible the rethinking of what we understand as democratic prac- form of organization of socionatural metabolism” can be tices and the ‘re-politization’ of areas of society that are criticized, then, the degrowth movement maintains that other currently seen as outside the realm of democratic decision- forms of political, social and economic organization of soci- making. Not only are we always already members of social eties can be developed (Swyngedouw 2014: 91). As I under- or political groups, however, any community is also always stand it, the idea of true needs and the notion of degrowth somewhat open to its outside. Derrida’s approach empha- are critical of Eurocentric notions of progress, without nec- sizes that the boundaries of one’s community have to remain essarily seeking to establish an ethos of austerity. Instead of contestable. To engage with the ways, political categories having ‘less’ for everyone, what is aspired to is a ‘more’ in and boundaries have been historically constructed, enable us diversity, where different kinds of lives are encouraged to to highlight their contingency, and open up and rethink cur- flourish (not only those useable for the capitalist market), rent concepts of membership and representation. Accepting and diverse and new forms of living together, of engaging the permeability of social structures, their necessary open- politically and economically, are explored. Asking what we ness to newcomers, including future generations, allows us ‘truly’ need, and where our consumption habits go at the to imagine democratic politics in a more open fashion. The expense of others, also includes a critical engagement with technologically extended temporal and spatial reach of our 1 3 Sustainability Science Derrida J (1974) Of grammatology. John Hopkins University Press, actions today might make it necessary to reconsider what Baltimore justice and democracy could mean in relation to those who Derrida J (2002) Negotiations: interventions and interviews, 1971– come after us. We have to ask how we can account for the 2001. Stanford University Press, Stanford fact that the political decisions (and ‘private’ consumption- Derrida J (2005) The politics of friendship. Verso, London and New York patterns) of a small privileged group of people have negative Derrida J (2008) The animal that therefore I am. Fordham University effects that disproportionally affect those who are not, or Press, New York only marginally, involved in decision-making processes and Flathman R (2006) Perfectionism without perfection: cavell, mont- who do not, or only marginally, take part in current problem- aigne, and the conditions of morals and politics. In: Norris A (ed) The claim to community. Essays on stanley cavell and political atic patterns of consumption—like many people living in the philosophy. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp 98–127 global south today, most non-human life forms, and future Fukuyama F (1992) The end of history and the last man. Free Press, generations. Refiguring notions of political responsibility in New York this light is what I understand as an ongoing task of a ‘futur- Habermas J (1985) Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Hobsbawm EJ (1992) Nation and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge ized’ political theory. 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Verlag Karl Asara V, Otero I, Demaria F et al (2015) Socially sustainable degrowth Alber, Freiburg/München as a social-ecological transformation: repoliticizing sustainability. Norris A (2017) Becoming who we are. politics and practical phi- Sustainab Sci 10:375–384 losophy in the work of stanley cavell. Oxford University Press, Bennett J (2010) Vibrant matter. A political ecology of things.Duke New York University Press, Durham and London Povinelli E (2016) Geoontologies. A requiem to late liberalism. Duke Castoriadis C (1997) The castoriadis reader. Blackwell Publishers, University Press, Durham Oxford Rosa H (2003) Social acceleration: ethical and political consequences Cavell S (1990) Conditions handsome and unhandsome: the constitu- of a desynchronized high-speed society. Constellations 10:3–33 tion of emersonian perfectionism. University of Chicago Press, Séville A (2017) “There is no Alternative” Politik zwischen Demokra- Chicago tie und Sachzwang. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt and New York Cavell S (2008) Companionable thinking. Columbia University Press, Swyngedouw E (2014) Depoliticization (‘the political’). In: D’Alisa, New York Demaria and Kallis (eds) Degrowth: a vocabulary for a new era. Cavell S (1976) Must we mean what we say? A book of essays. Cam- Routledge, London bridge University Press, Cambridge Chakrabarty D (2012) Postcolonial studies and the challenge of climate Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to change. New Literary History 43:1–18 jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cheah P, Guerlac S (2009) Introduction: derrida and the time of the political. In: Cheah P, Guerlac S (eds) Derrida and the time of the political. Duke University Press, Durham and London 1 3 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Sustainability Science Springer Journals

Thinking about future/democracy: towards a political theory of futurity

Kelz, Rosine
Sustainability Science , Volume OnlineFirst – May 6, 2019
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Springer Journals
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Copyright © 2019 by The Author(s)
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Environment; Environmental Management; Climate Change Management and Policy; Environmental Economics; Landscape Ecology; Sustainable Development; Public Health
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1862-4065
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10.1007/s11625-019-00697-6
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Abstract

Today, representative politics are often perceived as being primarily concerned with short-term goals. Moreover, the future appears to be pre-determined by economic or technological necessities. This ‘closing’ of the future, however, becomes increasingly problematic in the face of global existential crises, such as environmental depletion and climate change. These catastrophic developments could only be mitigated by immediate, decisive political interventions, which would amount to systemic changes that redirect technological research and economic activities. This article seeks to outline how political theory and philosophy can contribute to “(re-)Politicizing the Future”. I argue that political thought should take temporality, and in particular futurity, as a central conceptual and methodological concern. Drawing on the works of prominent twenti- eth century thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Stanley Cavell, and Jacques Derrida, I want to develop a deepened analytical understanding of the possibility for a ‘future directed’ political thought which highlights intrinsic connections between sustainability and democracy. Keywords Contingency · History · Futurity · “Democracy to Come” · Derrida · Cavell Introduction (Habermas 1985: 7). The disappearance of possible futures that would be profoundly different from the present has been Politics is concerned with the future—this seems to be too propagated as both a political reality and a normative stand- obvious to need stating. Whether in debates about the build- point since at least the early 1980s, and is often linked to the ing of a new road, the overhaul of national pension systems, rise of neoliberal forms of government (see, e.g., Fukuyama or the forging of transnational agreements on climate change 1992; Séville 2017). From Margaret Thatcher’s famous proc- mitigation, all these disparate forms of political decision- lamation that ‘There is no Alternative’ to current austerity making carry implicit or explicit visions of preferable reforms, the political future is presented as pre-determined futures. For many, however, this truism sounds increasingly by economic or technological necessities. This ‘closing’ of hollow. It appears as if representative politics in contempo- the future at first sight would seem to be at odds with the rary liberal-capitalist countries is concerned primarily with obvious acceleration of late modern societies, where things short-term goals. Even social movements are often criticized appear to be in constant flux. However, while acceleration for lacking positive visions of a future that would radi- and rapid change are often regarded as hallmarks of moder- cally differ from the current status-quo. Western societies nity, these are highly uneven and aporetic processes. Some seem to have lost their abilities to imagine utopian futures theorists argue that the acceleration of other parts of society leads to a ‘hyper-accelerated standstill’ or to ‘polar iner- tia’ in the political sphere (see, e.g., Rosa 2003: 17, 21). In Handled by Anne-Katrin Holfelder, Institute for Advanced the face of rapid movements and shifts in areas such as finan- Sustainability Studies, Germany. cial markets or scientific research, representative democratic * Rosine Kelz politics appears to have lost the ability to actively steer social rosine.kelz@iass-potsdam.de developments. The need for future directed political action and thinking, however, becomes ever more pressing. From Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies E.V (IASS), the extraction of fossil fuels and the use of nuclear power Berliner Str. 130, 14467 Potsdam, Germany Vol.:(0123456789) 1 3 Sustainability Science to genome editing—the use of contemporary technologies contrast, the idea of democracy presupposes its own con- has consequences which stretch far into the future. At the tingent political foundation. Making contingency explicit, same time, capacities for modeling and thus anticipating the in turn, allows for a continuous renegotiation of possible possible effects of actions on a global scale have increased futures. Moreover, as I will discuss in Section I, affirming rapidly in the past decades. We are currently confronted with contingency entails a specific relationship to the past—and dystopian scenarios of environmental depletion and a rap- to the role of history in understanding the present and the idly changing climate, but current liberal democratic gov- future—that enables us to learn from past events without ernments often seem to lack the political will to implement understanding history as determining the future. Section II systemic changes that would make it possible to avoid the concentrates on the notion that the concept of democracy most disastrous pathways. is closely linked to a particular understanding of futurity. Even though there is thus an obvious need to theorize how A democratic commitment to an open future, in turn, also politics relates to the creation of future(s), current political implies a commitment to at least a “thin” notion of sustain- theory often appears strangely uninterested in the temporal ability. In Section III, the relationship between democracy character of the political sphere. What is called for, then, and sustainability is explored further. I argue that while a is political thought that contributes to a project of actively societal turn to more sustainable social and economic prac- (re-)politicizing societal and political notions of the future. tices would involve the willingness of individuals to make As the ‘Politicizing the Future’ project members argue, this substantive changes in their daily lives, these commitments would involve a number of diverse practices which enable are political in nature. Instead of sliding into a neoliberal the proliferation of multiple alternative possible futures in logic of individualized ‘sustainable consumption’, what the present. These practices are intrinsically linked to the is called for is an understanding of moral autonomy that pluralization and deepening of democratic processes. How- involves a deepening of shared, democratic practices. ever, even though one explicit normative goal of this project is to ‘open up’ the realm of thinkable futures, not all visions of future are equally valued. The normative dimension also Against linear time? History, teleology, entails a notion of strong sustainability, allowing for future and the closing of the future generations to exist in a world with a livable natural and just social environment. Thus, Politicizing the Future involves a In the grand philosophical systems of the European ‘de-colonization’ of the future, where present people have Enlightenment the future plays an important role. With to refrain from using up resources and creating ecological modernity, a notion of history emerged that sought to and socio-political issues that would disadvantage those who encompass the whole of humanity’s existence into one come after them (Knappe et al. 2018, this issue). The aim cohesive narrative of universal progress—from the ancient of this article is, therefore, twofold. First, I want to show past to an endpoint in the future (Koselleck 2002). Build- that there are resources in political and moral thought to ing on the eschatological tradition in Western thought, highlight the importance of temporality and futurity, which early modern philosophers start to understand history as can be useful for current debates in sustainability studies. “the fulfillment of a telos that one can rationally antici- Second, this paper seeks to further explore the normative pate in advance in the form of an idea”. Humankind then connections between futurity, democracy, and sustainability, either has to “hope to approximate” this idea, as in Kantian which are proposed by the members of the ‘Politicizing the teleology, or “work towards actualizing” it, as in Hege- Future’ project. lian–Marxist teleology (Cheah and Guerlac 2009: 15). In The notion of (political) contingency is an excellent start- both systems, it is imagined that humans develop towards ing point to explore the connections between a commitment an increasingly rational state by accumulating knowledge to an open future and the concept of democracy. By political and understanding. This, in turn, allows for individual contingency, I mean the simple fact that even though the and societal emancipation. For Kant, for example, it is an way a society is organized is not random, it could always be “inborn duty” to influence “posterity in such a way that otherwise (Marchart 2010: 80). As political systems are cre- it will make constant progress” (Kant 1991b: 88–89). As ated by overlapping processes, whose beginnings cannot be Kant explains elsewhere “It will require a long, perhaps clearly determined and whose developments do not follow incalculable series of generations, each passing its enlight- necessary pathways, contingency is a feature of any form enment to the next, before the germs implanted by nature of societal organization. However, many forms of rule disa- in our species can be developed to that degree which corre- vow their own contingency. Often, they seek to affirm their sponds to nature’s original intention. In addition, the point own necessity and immutability by appealing to something of time at which this degree of development is reached outside of the realm of politics, as, for example, a doctrine must be the goal of man’s aspiration … or else his natu- of divine right, or the unyielding laws of the market. By ral capacities would necessarily appear by and large to 1 3 Sustainability Science be purposeless and wasted” (Kant 1991a: 43). The linear also allow people to reject their moral responsibility for the historical progress of humankind is presented here at the roles they play in totalitarian regimes. same time as the unfolding of a natural capacity and as In the wake of the catastrophes of totalitarianism, Arendt necessitating active human engagement. The latter is a argues, history can no longer be understood in a linear man- moral duty, because it is intended by nature. For Kant, we ner. We are left with “a fragmented past, which has lost not only have an obvious ‘natural’ responsibility for future its certainty of evaluation” (Arendt 1978: 212). This frag- generations, the way in which future generations should mentation, together with a critique of teleology, however, develop can already be known in the present. can lead us to a productive re-evaluation of the concept of In the course of the twentieth century, however, the idea history. To do so, Arendt refers back to Greek and Roman of progress and the notion that one can deduce the future notions of history which, in her understanding, retain causal- from an analysis of history has become increasingly sus- ity and context, but find them within the “light provided by pect. On the one hand, progress appeared to be palpable the event itself, illuminating a specific segment of human in the rapid development of science and industry. On the affairs”. Contrary to the modern view of history, there is no other hand, however, these transformations were often expe- independent existence of causality and meaning “of which rienced as deeply disruptive and unpredictable. In addi- the event would be only the more or less accidental though tion, in the light of struggles against (neo-)colonial rule, adequate expression” (Arendt 2006a: 64). As Reinhart the ingrained Eurocentrism of Western notions of progress Koselleck explains, Ancient Greek and Roman notions of started to become more widely recognized (see e.g., Allen relative progression are always restricted to specific areas. 2016). Attempts to provide a single, encompassing narra- These partial, local notions of ‘progress’ are established tive of humankind’s development had failed to acknowledge by looking back on past developments, but do not make it that economic growth in Europe had depended on colonial possible to predict the future (Koselleck 2002: 221). Such expansion. Europe has externalized many social and eco- an understanding of history, Arendt maintains, can loosen logical ‘costs’ of industrial growth into other world regions the power the past holds over political actors while retain- (Chakrabarty, 2012). Not only did universalistic theories ing historical stories and events as shared reference points not fully account for the massive oppression, violence, and and examples for political discourse. This is important, destruction that accompanied European ‘modernization’, because political action, for Arendt, has to be inspired by Eurocentric ideas of progress themselves have been recog- and directed towards a shared, human-made world, and sto- nized to be at least partly responsible for the rise of imperi- ries of the past make up an important part of this shared alism, totalitarianism, and environmental depletion. In the frame of reference. While political imagination and action wake of two catastrophic World Wars and the Holocaust, thus remain guided by examples from the past, they are freed however, the notion of continuous linear progress started from historical necessity. to sound hollow even within Western societies. As Adorno Engaging with the past without seeking to extrapolate a famously wrote, Auschwitz “makes all talk of progress unified narrative of historical progress also makes it pos- towards freedom seem ludicrous” (Adorno 2006: 7). sible to explore past events from different perspectives. Hannah Arendt is one of the best known among the Euro- This includes the stories of people who were colonized pean political thinkers who were led by the shocks of the or enslaved, who suffered from oppression and violence. first half of the twentieth century to re-evaluate notions of Their experiences often could not be articulated and pre- causality and history in political philosophy. She criticizes served within the progressive framework. It can also entail that political philosophy has disregarded the importance of unearthing the hopes and possibilities suggested in moments singular actors and events. For her, this sentiment cumu- of upheaval or revolt which did not come to fruition. While lated in Marx’s Hegelian understanding of history. Marx, such practices of re-appropriating the past need to be care- as Arendt reads him, retains a ‘Platonic’ hostility towards ful not to slide into revisionism, they can help to highlight human affairs and particularity, because he bestows impor - that even though the present is not arbitrary, it is contingent. tance and dignity not on the acts of individuals but “upon Things could have been otherwise—there were avenues not mere time-sequence” (Arendt 2006a: 65). For Arendt, then, a taken, and possibilities not fully explored. Importantly, I do teleological understanding of history is linked to an inability not suggest that we abandon a ‘realist’ intuition about the to understand oneself as a singular actor, capable of bringing past. There are knowable historical facts. However, we have about unexpected events, and thus radical political change. to acknowledge that because the world is infinitely complex, This had devastating consequences in the early twentieth any human interpretation will only ever capture a partial, century, where people considered themselves as mere ‘cogs particular perspective of any event (Hoy 2012: 99–100). To in the machine’, with no personal responsibility for the ‘pro- stress that our understanding of the past is partial and that gress’ of historical forces (Arendt 2006b: 25–26). The con- things did not necessarily have to develop the way that they sequence of this mindset is not only political quietism; it can turned out, might also make it easier to acknowledge the 1 3 Sustainability Science complexity and contingency of our current economic, social, has also shaped contemporary notions of the role of liberal and political status-quo. This is important for an understand- democratic regimes in the global system of nation states. ing of democracy which takes the Greek notion of doxa, Today, liberal representative democracies seem to strug- as the possibility of different viewpoints or opinions that gle with adapting to the reality of anthropogenic climate equally hold truth, seriously. Democratic politics involves change. One could interpret these difficulties as an inabil - an understanding that there can be not one, single correct ity of contemporary forms of political representation to understanding of the human world. As Cornelius Castoriadis come to terms with changing environmental realities. In phrases it, “[i]f a full and certain knowledge (episteme) of this sense, calls for a transformations to more environmen- the human domain were possible, politics would immedi- tally sustainable forms of energy production and consump- ately come to an end, and democracy would be both impos- tion can also be taken as an occasion for the ‘democratiza- sible and absurd: democracy implies that all citizens have tion’ of contemporary democratic regimes. the possibility of attaining a correct doxa and that nobody In the context of recent ecological crises, caused possesses an episteme of things political” (Castoriadis 1997: among other factors by the reliance of fossil fuels, the 274). question of how democracies could better engage with While at first sight, it might seem counterintuitive to the ‘non-human’ world has regained traction in political begin an article devoted to “Politicizing the Future” with a theory. Current challenges to a traditionally anthropo- discussion of concepts of history and a critique of progress, centric understanding of democracy raise the question of this section hopefully has shown that by rethinking these whether non-human beings, things, and relatively abstract notions, we can move from a pre-determined to an open entities such as “nature” need to be able to hold rights or future. In the next section, I will concentrate more concretely be otherwise represented in democratic regimes, and how on establishing a link between futurity and the concept of this could be best accomplished (see, e.g., Bennett 2010; democracy—thus strengthening the connection between an Povinelli 2016; Derrida 2008). Questions about who can understanding of future(s) as open and multiple and a nor- belong to the community of citizens, and whose voices and mative commitment to democracy. needs should be represented, are not new, however. Liberal representative governments have repeatedly faced chal- lenges to their definitions of membership and their (territo- Democracy as futurity rial) boundaries. Here, examples from the past, such as the movement for women’s right to vote, might come to mind. There are many, often mutually exclusive, notions of what Or, we could think of ongoing debates about migration, ‘democracy’ entails. This openness is an essential aspect where the rights of people to enter state territories and of democracy. To stay democratic, democracies need to possible paths to citizenship have become issues of fierce remain unable to find conceptual, legal, and institutional political contestation. As ‘empirically existing’ regimes closure. One reason for this is that democracies, like any never rest on firm foundations, such questions cannot be other form of political regime, exist in specific points in ultimately settled, and thus any democratic community space and time, under specific ‘material’ circumstances. needs to remain open to future challenges to their defini- While governments can, to an extent, steer how natural tions of membership. This, however, brings an unresolv- resources are used or which technologies are developed, able question to the fore which lies at the heart of the while they can decide how to prepare for and react to concept of democracy: are we in political community with natural disasters such as droughts or earthquakes, these those who are most similar to ‘us’, or should political com- forces also shape social and political relations. In short, munity be sought with those who are (maybe radically) with differing historical, cultural, and material circum- different? As Jacques Derrida (2005a) seeks to retrace in stances, different forms of democracy emerge. For exam- his book on the “Politics of Friendship”, a logic of politi- ple, as Timothy Mitchell argues, industrialized liberal cal friendship as fraternity has been long inscribed in the democracies of the second half of the twentieth century notion of politics in the Western tradition. In his reading, relied heavily on fossil fuels, in particular oil. The avail- this also links understandings of political community and ability of cheap energy altered living standards for large citizenship to notions of autochthony or (genetic) same- proportions of the population in the global north. Fossil ness, where a connection is drawn between ‘blood’, land fuel extraction industries played an important role in the and nation (Derrida 2005a: 106). The creation of a homog- development of labor relations, and influenced the forms enous ‘we’, however, relies on the construction of external in which relevant sectors of the working class and industry and internal ‘others’ against whom community needs to organized politically and were represented in government be defended. This logic is deeply inscribed within today’s (Mitchell 2009). Moreover, reliance on fossil fuels has had system of liberal democratic nation states. For Derrida, profound impacts on international politics, which in turn however, it is not in keeping with both the ‘promise’ of 1 3 Sustainability Science the concept of democracy, and the realities of today’s glo- can be called into question (Derrida 2005b: 22, 24–25, 87). balized world. There is also a second, related form in However, Derrida is somewhat ambiguous on how democ- which Derrida discusses the issue of homogenization as an racies should deal with the danger of non-democratic chal- irresolvable issue within political communities. Democ- lengers. He states, for example, that while “[t]he coming racy cannot exist without “the calculation of majorities, of the event is what cannot and should not be prevented”, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, because “it is another name for the future itself”, this “does all equal” (Derrida 2005a: 22). This threatens the pos- not mean that it is good—good in itself—for everything and sibility to see the singularity of each being—and there anything to arrive”. One should try to prevent those things can also be no democracy “without respect for irreducible from coming to pass “that one thinks will block the future singularity or alterity”. “These two laws”, Derrida writes or that bring death with them: events that would put an end “are irreducible one to the other. Tragically irreconcil- to the possibility of the event” (Derrida 2002: 194). That able and forever wounding” (Derrida 2005a: 22). A politi- we should try to prevent something from coming to pass, cal need to ‘count’ and to homogenize is thus confronted however, does not mean that it can be ruled out. Indeed, it with the ethical necessity to respect alterity and to leave is the ever looming possibility of a catastrophic ending that the political community open to the arrival of ‘others’. makes continuous political engagement necessary. One is From these irreducible aporiae, however, “political desire” driven to participate in politics, not only because one could arises. Democracy’s necessary “inadequacy to itself” is always ‘better’ democracy, and renegotiate compromises what keeps the political realm alive, because it calls for inherent in the tenuous nature of democratic community— continuous contestation (Derrida 2005a: 22). the very aliveness of democratic politics is also fueled by the With his phrase ‘democracy to come’ Derrida seeks possibility of its destruction. If future is really understood to express the integral connection between the concept of as open, as that what cannot be known in advance, what democracy and futurity. It expresses not only the necessity ‘comes’ to us, but is not determined or planned by us, then for constant renegotiation, but also the possibility of radical future can never be ‘safe’. As Derrida writes in his early text change. Not despite but because of the tensions inherent in Of Grammatology, “[t]he future can only be anticipated in its conceptual history, Derrida understands democracy as an the form of an absolute danger. It is that which breaks abso- (unfulfillable) promise. Inscribed in the concept of democ- lutely with constituted normality and can only announce, racy is the belief in an endless process of perfectibility. While present itself as a kind of monstrosity” (Derrida 1974: 14). this implies that the actual ‘arrival’ of a ‘perfect’ democracy It is in such reminders of possible disastrous futures needs to remain impossible, it also means that the promise that I understand ‘democracy to come’ to also involve an entails an injunction for action in the present. Such a perfec- appeal for at least a ‘thin’ commitment to sustainability. Like tionist understanding of democracy remains close to (Kan- ‘democracy’, ‘sustainability’ is a notoriously underdeter- tian) teleology. Derrida, however, seeks to avoid a strong mined concept. ‘Sustainability’ might be better understood understanding of teleology by insisting on the radical open- as a discourse, where competing definitions are negotiated. ness of the future. Because a ‘real’ future remains unknow- Originally, the term ‘sustainability’ had an explicitly eco- able and incalculable, democracy as a ‘regulative ideal’ also nomic connotation, and was used to describe practices that needs to remain underdetermined. However, Derrida does would not use up a (natural) resource (e.g., a forest), but not leave his understanding of ‘democracy to come’ entirely use it in a way, where it can replenish, and thus be con- open. Because of the importance of alterity and difference served for future use (Muraca 2010: 25). In recent, broader and the ethical responsibility towards excluded ‘others’, definitions, however, notions of sustainability include issues which is neglected in current liberal democratic regimes, the of social justice and normative arguments for ecological sphere of democracy needs to be broadened beyond ‘classi- conservation as a good in itself. In these formulations, a cal’ modern notions of nation, state and citizenship. Democ- possible overlap with the notion of ‘democracy to come’ racy, then, is better understood as a practice that can arise in becomes apparent. Both concepts are related to an open various socio-political arenas, where one can encounter oth- future, where as many pathways as possible need to be held ers under the heading of equality, justice, equity and respect. open. By fostering diversity (of forms of life, of ecosystems, Derrida is well aware that democracy’s necessary open- of cultures, of languages) today, sustainable practices seek ness to dissenting voices and ‘newcomers’ can be danger- to enable a multiplicity of possible futures for a multiplic- ous. The notion that democracy is “self-criticizable” entails ity of living beings. With ‘thin’ sustainability, then, I do that in a democratic regime, the very value of democracy Arguably, European societies have never possessed a great level of internal cultural and linguistic homogeneity, despite modern efforts to create more homogeneous peoples in the process of ‘nation-building’. For a detailed discussion of the connection between sustainability, Hobsbawm (1992). diversity, and Derrida’s thought, see, for example, Lynes (2018). 1 3 Sustainability Science not mean a purely ‘economic’ definition of sustainability, allowing the self to become more autonomous, it otherwise but that the precise content of what sustainable practices leaves the content of the ‘good’ relatively open. In this con- amount to cannot be spelled out a priori, because this has text, autonomy connotes the ability to assume a position to be open to negotiation in the democratic political sphere. from which current societal norms can be critically assessed, However, paradoxically, for this to be possible, some condi- and one’s own unique stance in relation with these norms can tions of sustainability also need to be met. This includes an be formulated. At the same time, however, personal auton- understanding of sustainability as social justice, because, as omy can only be understood within the context of the deeply Arendt forcefully argues in On Revolution (1963), a func- relational character of our existence. When we approach the tioning democratic political sphere needs at least a minimum role of singular persons in bringing about more sustainable of economic and social equality, so that everybody is able to every-day practices, it is, therefore, important to avoid fall- engage in politics with the common good in mind. ing into a ‘neoliberal’ rhetoric of self-responsibility that dis- While I ended section I by pointing out that democracy regards social constraints and dependencies. For example, needs to allow for a variety of diverging view points to exist the decision whether I drive to work by car, ride my bike, or about the “world”, in this section, I made the argument that use public transport can be framed in terms of autonomous democracies also need to acknowledge that there are differ - decision-making—I decide for myself in accordance with ent justified opinions about what democracy itself should my individual beliefs and needs which type of transportation entail. This openness interweaves the notion of democracy I prefer. By extension, this can imply that the problem of car with the notion of futurity. Democracy has the structure of exhaust pollution comes down to the decisions of individu- a promise, of its own perfectibility, whose ‘content’ needs als and it is thus up to each of them alone to bring about to remain ‘open’, because of the complexity of competing cleaner air. Societal norms and narratives, however, link my demands and the incalculability of the future. In my under- private transportation choices to broader notions of social standing, a ‘futural’ notion of democracy highlights the identity or economic status and can even make them into vis- inherent connection between democracy and at least a ‘thin’ ible signs of my political affiliations. Instead of making my conception of sustainability. If the realm of democracy needs decision about transportation in isolation, I am well aware to be constantly rethought, and broadened beyond the level of the opinions of my partner, friends and colleagues, and of representative liberal nation states, however, we have to their understanding of an acceptable choice will influence ask how democratic practices can take form in our daily mine, even though I might not always be aware of this. When lives. In the final section, I therefore turn my attention to the we start our inquiry from the perspective of the acting indi- role of personal agency. vidual, then, this still needs to involve that we understand individuals as socially embedded. These interactions between one’s relationship to others Cavell’s moral perfectionism, agency, and one’s understanding of self are topics Stanley Cavell and democratic sustainability seeks to explore in his engagements with ordinary language philosophy and perfectionist moral thought. Ordinary lan- So far, we have investigated the connections between futu- guage philosophers maintain that the meaning of words is rity, democracy, and sustainability by looking more closely not established via a connection between a word and an at notions of democracy and temporality. If, however, unex- object in the external world directly, but via the agreement pected events are brought into being not by ‘mere time- between the speakers of a language. This necessarily situates sequence’, but by complex interactions between singular a speaker within a social world, shared with other speak- actors, we also have to consider what motivates people to ers. Communication and agreement with others become the become active in the political realm. Such motivations, I contingent ground of meaning (Cavell 1976: 50). Learning argue, are often rooted within one’s personal ‘moral’ con- a language, then, involves understanding how other speak- cerns and beliefs. I take sustainability here as one of the ers use specific concepts in context. If learning how words possible ethical concerns that can motivate political engage- are used by others was all there was to learning a language; ment. At the same time, sustainability can also be under- however, language would be static, and thus unable to grasp stood as a democratic practice in itself. To make this argu- the ever-changing world. Instead, Cavell argues that per- ment, I turn from Derrida’s notion of ‘democracy to come’ sonal agency plays an important role in the functioning of as a perfectionist understanding of democracy to Stanley language. Speakers can only be said to have fully grasped the Cavell’s discussion of the perfectionist moral self. Tradition- meaning of a concept if they are able to use it creatively—in ally, moral perfectionism is based on an idea of the ‘good’, a new setting, for example. By applying concepts in different which can be used to orientate our actions. In Cavell’s under- ways or in new circumstances, every speaker can take part in standing, however, perfectionism involves the cultivation of the evolution of language. Using words creatively, speakers the self. While this activity is future oriented and aims at also reveal something about themselves—they show their 1 3 Sustainability Science individuality. However, when a speaker makes a creative The general will “is an autonomous will, one that is at once projection, there is no guarantee that others will understand subject and object to itself and, as such, one that allows for or accept their novel use of the familiar concept. If under- the reflective activity of self-appraisal and self-interpre- standing fails, the limits of one’s agreement with others are tation” (Norris 2017: 106 my emphasis). Importantly, for revealed—and this can be threatening to the self. We need Rousseau, it is possible that an aggregate of private wills is others, not only for our very physical survival, but also to mistaken for the general will of a community. Then, even make sense of the world. Accepting and allowing for one’s though a majority agrees on this point, their wills do not dependency and vulnerability, however, make it possible to actually express what would be good for the community as more deeply grasp the relational aspect of one’s existence. a whole. In Cavell’s work, this notion of a shared general This, for Cavell, is an important aspect of developing one’s will, where one assumes to speak for others, become closely moral agency. However, because there are risks involved in linked to the agreement between speakers that is necessary challenging (linguistic or social) convention, Cavell argues for conversation. As Andrew Norris explains “[n]either the that this kind of agency has to be actively chosen. Yet, fail- linguistic nor the political community are … aggregations ing to do so would not only ossify society, it would also rob of discrete individual choices all the way down. For us to one of the opportunity to ‘get to know’ oneself better and speak the same language or to stand in a distinctively politi- thus become a more autonomous self. cal relationship with one another we must, … feel or respond Cavell develops his notion of selfhood by engaging with together, be in intimate attunement with one another” (Nor- the idea of moral perfectionism. His version of perfection- ris 2017: 116). To develop one’s political voice, then, is also ism is linked to a notion of futurity similar to Derrida’s. For a quest to find out if, or in how far, one can speak for oth- Cavell, leading a good, moral life entails continuous work ers—it is a claim to community. to better understand or know oneself and one’s situatedness There is a futural aspect to Cavell’s interlacing of moral in the social world. A “moral creature” is, therefore, one and political thought. When finding herself estranged from “that demands and recognizes the intelligibility of others herself and her community, a person, turning to perfectionist to himself or herself, and of himself or herself to others” ethics, imagines a possible better future self and the com- (Cavell 1990: xxxi). The wish to become intelligible or to munity that would need to exist for such a self to be possible. ‘define’ one’s own stance in relation with one’s community The possibility to imagine a better future self then sets in often arises when one finds oneself in a situation, where motion a process of transformation, in which not only the one can no longer agree with some of the core practices or ‘current’ self changes, but also the imagined future self. This norms of one’s society. For example, a person could realize is the case, because the perspective on what a ‘better’ self that accepted definitions of concepts such as sustainability or would entail develops as the person gets to ‘know’ herself democracy do not fit with her society’s actual practices and and her relationship to her community better. Importantly, that she cannot accept this discrepancy. Or maybe, she feels for Cavell, just as one can never know everything about that the conventional definition of democracy is not fully the world or about another person, one can also never fully able to express her own understanding of what ‘real democ- ‘know’ oneself. The perfectionist quest of ‘getting to know racy’ would entail. Such experiences can lead to a sense of oneself’ thus cannot come to an end. In this understand- estrangement, not only from one’s community, but also from ing, the very temporality of selfhood is highlighted. The oneself. There might be “a sense of disappointment or dis- self becomes rethought as an open-ended process of dis- satisfaction with oneself, one’s language, and one’s relation- covery and re-articulation, not as a fixed identity. Similar to ships with others”. This might be experienced as “a feeling Derrida’s understanding of ‘democracy to come’, Cavell’s of aversion” towards oneself and/or others, where a person perfectionist future self, therefore, needs to remain without feels the others can no longer speak for her, or she for them ‘content’. Nevertheless, Cavell also offers some ideas about (Flathman 2006: 103–104). Overcoming this estrangement, how perfectionist moral thought that takes our reliance on Cavell argues, is an endeavor that links an attempt to know the natural and social environment seriously could proceed. and develop one’s own sense of self together with finding In the context of an essay on animals, he draws on Thoreau one’s political voice. Cavell’s notion of political voice draws to give voice to the perception that the very “assertion of the on Rousseau, who distinguishes between the private will will to live in the world”, which requires ‘feeding’ oneself and the general will. The private will expresses desires an (both in a metaphorical and a literal sense) is “without cer- individual has ‘for herself’—it is not necessarily connected tain justification”. Living in Walden, Thoreau experiences to her membership in a community. This will, Rousseau that “there are debts in living, conditions of existence, uses argued, often fueled by basic desires or ‘appetites’ such as to which he puts, or fails to put, the peaceable space cleared hunger or lust, and has usually not been examined closely. for him before he cleared it, that are uncountable. What By contrast, the general will enable us “to speak for one makes them insupportable is the degree to which they are another”, and thus form a democratic political community. unnecessary. Then, the quest in which an adventurous life 1 3 Sustainability Science may well be spent in search, or experiment, is to replace the current norms of our societies. In a highly industrialized, false by true necessaries, or means, to what one truly finds globalized world, where our daily actions have effects on a good (a quest as ancient as Plato’s Republic)”(Cavell 2008: variety of living beings, on ecosystems and climate patters, 117). For Cavell, Thoreau’s point is that a sense of debt, over large time spans and across continents, however, it also resulting from the injury one causes others, is an irreduc- means that the question of who belongs to ‘our’ community ible part of human existence. To meet one’s bodily needs, has to be re-posed. one always uses some natural resources and is implicated in the killing of living beings. Moreover, in contemporary societies, one often depends on the labor of others to fulfil Conclusion one’s own needs and desires. While to an extent this cannot be helped, we need to ask ourselves, Cavell argues, what When we try to imagine different, better futures, and ways we truly need, and where we might be involved in the kill- to get there, we cannot proceed as if from a tabula rasa. ing or exploitation of others to satisfy desires that are not The inheritance of European modernity include notions essential to our existence. Moreover, the question of ‘true of justice, freedom, and democracy on which ideas of the needs’ always also involves the question of justice, where it future can build, governmental institutions, and economic appears unjustifiable that some human beings would require systems with which we have to reckon, as well as deeply so much more resources than others. However, to define rooted histories of colonization, imperialism, social and eco- what is ‘essential’ for one’s life, Cavell cautions, is not a logical exploitation, and structural injustice which we have straightforward or simple task. to address. While it is important to highlight how forms of This reading of Thoreau is reminiscent of degrowth posi- inequality, oppression and discrimination are institutional- tions within the sustainability discourse, which have focused ized and have shaped our material environment, a critical on overcoming a logic of economic growth, decoupled from and open engagement with the past and present forms of need or necessity (see e.g. Asara et al. 2015). They criticize violence should also acknowledge the contingency of the the prevalence of the progressive narrative of the expan- present. Things could have been otherwise, and thus can sive market, which retains the idea of a colonizable world. be different in the future. Embracing contingency also Many proponents of ‘degrowth’ argue that it is necessary involves interrogating one’s own stance towards the com- to ‘re-politicize’ the sustainability debate. This involves munities one is a part of, often without one’s own choosing. questioning the notion of ‘the market’ as an unconditional As Cavell reminds us, even if we were utterly dismayed with ontological ground, not only for the political, but also for the current practices and believes of the society we live in, the individual. The ‘neoliberal’ market logic at the same we cannot simply ‘wash our hands off it’. A life lived and time overstates and understates the role of the individual. By understood completely independent of others must remain postulating a sovereign, self-interested subject, it excludes an illusion. Cavell argues that we cannot ‘opt out’ of our the role of social relationships and structural constraints on relationships with others, without taking the risk of losing individual decision-making processes. At the same time, it our connection to the world and thus also to ourselves as understates the ability of individuals to arrive at a systemic agents in the world. As relational beings we have to engage critique of socio-economic structures and bring about sub- with the situation in which we find ourselves. We, therefore, stantial change via political action. By opening political have to interrogate our stance towards our society and seek spaces in which the “naturalization of the need of economic to discover a shared political voice. This might also involve growth and capitalism as the only reasonable and possible the rethinking of what we understand as democratic prac- form of organization of socionatural metabolism” can be tices and the ‘re-politization’ of areas of society that are criticized, then, the degrowth movement maintains that other currently seen as outside the realm of democratic decision- forms of political, social and economic organization of soci- making. Not only are we always already members of social eties can be developed (Swyngedouw 2014: 91). As I under- or political groups, however, any community is also always stand it, the idea of true needs and the notion of degrowth somewhat open to its outside. Derrida’s approach empha- are critical of Eurocentric notions of progress, without nec- sizes that the boundaries of one’s community have to remain essarily seeking to establish an ethos of austerity. Instead of contestable. To engage with the ways, political categories having ‘less’ for everyone, what is aspired to is a ‘more’ in and boundaries have been historically constructed, enable us diversity, where different kinds of lives are encouraged to to highlight their contingency, and open up and rethink cur- flourish (not only those useable for the capitalist market), rent concepts of membership and representation. Accepting and diverse and new forms of living together, of engaging the permeability of social structures, their necessary open- politically and economically, are explored. Asking what we ness to newcomers, including future generations, allows us ‘truly’ need, and where our consumption habits go at the to imagine democratic politics in a more open fashion. The expense of others, also includes a critical engagement with technologically extended temporal and spatial reach of our 1 3 Sustainability Science Derrida J (1974) Of grammatology. John Hopkins University Press, actions today might make it necessary to reconsider what Baltimore justice and democracy could mean in relation to those who Derrida J (2002) Negotiations: interventions and interviews, 1971– come after us. We have to ask how we can account for the 2001. Stanford University Press, Stanford fact that the political decisions (and ‘private’ consumption- Derrida J (2005) The politics of friendship. Verso, London and New York patterns) of a small privileged group of people have negative Derrida J (2008) The animal that therefore I am. 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