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Tools of the trade: practices and politics of researching the future in climate engineering

Tools of the trade: practices and politics of researching the future in climate engineering Making sense of the implications of climate engineering approaches (solar radiation management, SRM; and carbon dioxide removal, CDR) at planetary scales occurs via a host of methods that calculate, project, and imagine the future in distinct ways. We take a systemic and synthesizing view of some of the (inter)disciplinary methods by which these futures are derived: climate and integrated assessment modeling, ‘deductive’ modes of social science inquiry, deliberative stakeholder engage- ment, and foresight-based scenarios. We speak to the epistemologies, objectives, and user communities surrounding these research practices, highlighting that different modes of constructing and interpreting evidence about an unformed future yield different kinds of results and signals for actions to be taken. We show how different methods for exploring ‘futures’ form an evolving history of how the risks of CE have been assessed (or constructed), and conclude by echoing calls for a stronger shared understanding of the practices and politics that underpin future-oriented research. Keywords Futures · Climate engineering · Methodology · Research practice · Epistemology · Risk Future‑based evidence making described as backed by proofs-of-concept, co-optable from components of existing systems, and sufficiently viable at In the governance of climate change, understandings and small scales to merit discussion. They are, however, also decisions in the present are often informed by evidence often described as ‘immature’—not (yet) existing as opera- that speaks of the future. Engineering planetary sunshades tional systems, and lacking technical and societal support. (solar radiation management, SRM) or carbon sinks (carbon Advocacy and opposition thus has in the last decade been dioxide removal, CDR; or of late, negative emissions tech- shaped by calculations, projections, and imaginings that nologies, NETs) are the latest entrants to the landscape of richly depict the potential benefits and risks of these so- proposals for increasing humanity’s capacity to cope with called forms of ‘climate engineering’ (CE). In doing so, such the effects of climate change. These approaches are often depictions frame the viability and desirability of different approaches. We take as axiomatic that ‘futures’ are politically active Handled by Anne-Katrin Holfelder, Institute for Advanced resources. Insights into the shaping influences of concep- Sustainability Studies, Germany. tions of the future can be found in a rich literature on the * Sean Low sociologies of expectations (Borup et al. 2006), sociotechni- sean.low@iass-potsdam.de cal imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim 2015), or visions (Grin and Grunwald 2000)—generally in science and technology Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies, Berliner Str. debates, but also as these intersect with systemic governance 130, 14467 Potsdam, Germany issues such as security, health, and the global environment Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development, Utrecht (Granjou et al. 2017). The objective of this contribution University, Utrecht, Netherlands is to take a systemic and synthesizing view of the (inter) Program On Science, Technology and Society, Harvard disciplinary methods by which futures are derived in the University, Cambridge, USA discourse on climate engineering. We do so as a point of Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, University entry for better understanding how futures are mobilized of Oxford, Oxford, UK Vol.:(0123456789) 1 3 Sustainability Science by scientific practice in an increasingly significant area of future-oriented research in CE, and about the overall direc- climate and sustainability politics. In speaking of methods, tion of that work. we highlight communities of practice, shared objectives and The first differentiates between the processes of quantita- norms, epistemologies for generating evidence, and relative tive modeling approaches in natural and social science, and statuses of authority in the ecosystem of climate science and qualitative assessments generally deployed as part of social policy. A focus on methods also gives us an entry point into science scholarship. Modeling approaches use simulations understanding how specific concerns emerge in relation to based on advanced numeracy. These are simplified repre- CE—that is, how different methods cast CE in their image sentations of reality extrapolated from an understanding of by viewing it as a problem of, for example, changes in tem- systemic laws (underpinning processes and trends, incen- perature and precipitation, interstate conflict and coopera- tives and constraints) marshaled by quantitative variables tion, the balancing of costs and benefits, or public support and formulae, and that can be computed and aggregated in or rejection. high numbers of scenarios (of a future moment) or pathways Why does this matter? In a field where much attention (leading to a future moment)—see the sub-section on “Cli- is directed to imaginary technologies and scenarios of mate models and integrated assessment models”. The others usage, diverse disciplinary understandings inform how such are mixed-methods constructions (scenarios, frames, narra- objects are marshaled as evidence. But how does a method tives) that, apart from eschewing a reliance on numeracy, of evidence production shape the evidence it produces, or defy easy coherence. Some display a similar logic to simula- implicitly favor certain perspectives or actors? Our intent is tions, producing scenarios that extrapolate outcomes from to explore how different ways of making the future known systemic processes (see “Deductive reasoning in socio-polit- shape the knowledge base upon which climate governance ical inquiry”). Others rely on stakeholder engagements, and depends. For when particular futures gain a hold on the on the proposed value of including a diverse range of disci- imagination of scientists, politicians and publics, they can plinary and political perspectives, for exploring challenges come to structure expectations about what constitutes feasi- (see  “Deliberative stakeholder engagement and foresight ble and desirable courses of action, and shade from view or approaches”). entirely foreclose alternative options. The second is on the kind of challenges that a method We take a bird’s eye view of climate and integrated is deployed to investigate surrounding the development assessment modeling, ‘deductive’ modes of social science, or deployment of CE techniques. The dimensions of such ‘deliberative’ stakeholder engagement, and foresight-based inquiry can be (combinations of the) physical, techno-eco- scenarios, introducing a number of dimensions for illumi- nomic, and socio-political. Exploration of these challenges is nating relationships and contestations between methods often phrased as assessing ‘benefits and risks’, though a host (the second section) before undertaking our overview (the of near-synonyms abound. Another way of thinking about it, third section). The final section synthesizes the links and however, is that methods (and by extension, the communities comparisons established in the overview, showing how our deploying them, for a variety of agendas and disciplinary analysis of different methods can be read as a history of how understandings) will privilege certain criteria over others the risks of CE have been assessed (or constructed)—and in defining risk. We might, however, also consider if, in the therefore, how the bounds of the debate itself have come to grand scheme of the CE research ecosystem, certain dimen- be configured. sions—that is, some mental and methodological ways of projecting risk—are made subordinate and subsequent to others. Some dimensions of future mapping The third parses the process of engaging with futures as deductive or deliberative. Deduction is a pervasive form of In this section, we lay out some characteristics by which we reasoning, where conclusions are reached ‘downward’ from can differentiate methods engaged in mapping the concerns a set of general assumptions rather than built ‘upward’ from and challenges associated with engineering the climate—the particular instances. Disciplines across the humanities and following section on the methods themselves should be read the natural sciences provide much nuance on the definition in this light. Needless to say, our list of dimensions is neither and procedures of this concept. We ask the reader to indulge exhaustive nor definitive—we derive them from an analysis in a broad definition: if the laws of a system hold—say, the of relevant literature, from long-standing participation in CE global climate system, or a system of (international) struc- debates, and from an analytical sensibility based in science tures and actors, or some analogy of technological develop- and technology studies (STS). Like the methods we discuss, ment—then if A happens, the analyst, with degrees of likeli- these dimensions are geared toward a purpose; in our case, hood, can expect B, C, or D to result (or can, depending on to allow for some systematic conclusions to be drawn about her mental or computing capacity, trace a sequence of further the mutual influences—and tensions—between modes of assumptions and probabilities). From there a conversation 1 3 Sustainability Science opens up on the value of and motivations behind extrapola- assessment models (IAMs)—assemblages that combine tive, simulative, or probabilistic modes of thought. In the climate, land-use, energy systems, and economic compo- CE space, this includes efforts to gauge climatic as well as nents—are the vehicles of Working Group III assessments societal dimensions of CE; quantitative modeling and more of mitigation options. These have been implicated in the qualitative methods; and disciplines ranging from climate conceptualizing of large-scale carbon removal (CDR) as science to economic and sociopolitical inquiry (see “Climate an essential part of strategies for reaching the Paris Agree- models and integrated assessment models”, and “Deductive ment’s 2C target. Climate models and IAMs have different reasoning in socio-political inquiry”). histories and applications in the CE space, but we address A process set in opposition to ‘deductive’ thinking might them together here because of epistemological overlaps in be labeled as ‘deliberative’—though this term (like deduc- exploring the future. tion) is shorthand for other adjoining concepts. Attempts Climate models were not originally intended to simu- to cohere such a mode of investigation can particularly be late targeted modifications of planetary reflectivity, but found in frameworks of emerging technology governance have been repurposed for gauging SRM’s physical impacts that highlight deliberative engagement as part of the concept (Wiertz 2015). This modeling activity has since generated of ‘anticipation’ (see “Deliberative stakeholder engagement one of the CE debate’s largest bodies of the literature and and foresight approaches”). The idea is that thinking about authorship networks, relying heavily on the Geoengineer- the future as part of a deductive paradigm can be prone to ing Model Intercomparison Project, or GeoMIP. Since technocracy—there is an implicit emphasis on usable, tech- 2011, research has become increasingly fine-tuned in terms nically focused projections, more so than on the processes, of technology, regions, and impacts assessed (Kravitz et al. values, actors and agendas constructing them. The emphasis, 2015). The principle of SRM modeling is straightforwardly then, should be less on what the future might be (however deductive. Modelers adjust the reflectivity of various envi- conditionally), and more on who is in the room to say so. ronmental systems as proxies for SRM approaches, result- Futures should be more explicitly treated as experimental, ing in projections of climate variables such as temperature, user-generated, and as inclusive as possible, highlighting the precipitation, sea level rise, and ozone. Calls for expanding disciplinary and political understandings that create them, modeling of devolved impacts on agriculture, fisheries, air and generating avenues for action that navigate a wide array pollution, and health are increasing (Irvine et al. 2016). of aims and possibilities. In the climate modeling literature, cooling the planet is broadly projected to reduce certain impacts associated with rising temperatures (Irvine et al. 2016). At the same Methods of future‑oriented research time, significant variations and uncertainties—particularly on regional effects—depend on assumptions and choices Climate models and integrated assessment models made by researchers themselves. At the input stage, results are structured by the model used, and by the technology, The Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel amount, rate, term and location of deployment selected. on Climate Change (IPCC) rely upon ‘a vast machine’ of Any modeler admits to this, but the details of these choices, computer models to simulate future climates—that is, they spread over dozens of papers, are unfortunately if under- provide a legitimized mode for forming evidence on the risks standably elided. At the output stage, the reporting on bene- of a warming planet, as well as for assessing the viability fits and risks, or the very translation work that makes results of strategies to reduce emissions (Edwards 2010). When meaningful for further research or for societal deliberation, climate change emerged as a subject of scientific inquiry— often then depends on the communicators in question, be and later, political ambition—an evolving array of model they modelers or others. For example, Irvine et al. (2016) types became entrenched as the principle apparatus by which give a technical overview of SRM modeling that also func- sense could be made of such a complex, systemic phenom- tions as an optimistic prospectus, while McLaren (2018) enon. The importance of computer modeling, and the episte- provides a critical sociological and ethical interrogation. mology it represents, is held in place by continued advances IAM work on CDR, meanwhile, was not brought into in capacity, application to new issues, and mutual reliance conversations on CE until it was pointed out in the prelude between climatic projections and policy discussions. to the negotiation of the Paris Agreement that the vast Deriving the potentials of various CE proposals borrows majority of Working Group III scenarios limiting tempera- heavily from the resources and historic credibility of the ture increases to 2C in 2100 relied on the rapid, large- modeling enterprise. Climate models—underpinning the scale deployment of bioenergy carbon capture and stor- work of IPCC Working Group I on the physical science of age (BECCS), an unproven chimera then on the fringes of climate change—have been used to estimate the climatic CDR conversations. The presence of BECCS in resonant impacts of sunlight reflection methods (SRM). Integrated AR5 projections, it was argued, provides a backstop that 1 3 Sustainability Science scientifically legitimizes ambitious temperature targets as These are fair conditions, but their limitations are worth ‘feasible’, and introduces strange new signals to climate considering. Climate models, for example, have been argued governance. There are concerns over the risks of deploying to be an ‘inventive tool’ in the design of SRM strategies, in BECCS, such as land-use conflicts, carbon storage safety, which planetary sunshades are ‘virtual technologies’ con- or de-incentivizing emissions reductions, alongside fears structed and framed strongly within the bounds allowed that if there few other envisioned paths capable of meeting by modeling capacity (Wiertz 2015). They are also black 2C, then climate policy is being shoehorned into a future boxes imbued with the credibility of the modeling enter- generated from these projections (e.g. Beck and Mahony prise, from which conflicting choices and results can be 2018). selectively emphasized. More critical scholarship notes that Interestingly, critical commentary also placed an ongo- this combination of expert judgment and complex model ing focus on the role of the research groups built around structure allows for much freedom in shaping the bounds— IAM work as future-makers, resembling points made on the and results—of modeling scenarios. But choices contested shaping choices of researchers in SRM modeling. The IAM within modeling communities require a high bar of basic lit- community, it was argued, needs to be aware that their work eracy, translate poorly to non-specialist audiences, and may does not neutrally assess options as much as actively frame even distract from political agendas or biases that remain their viability and necessity. More uncomfortably, modelers less investigated or revealed (e.g. Wiertz 2015 and McLaren are argued to be complicit in a mode of IPCC assessment 2018 for SRM; Beck and Mahony 2018 for BECCS). Criti- in which policy actors invested in the 2C target as a politi- cisms of technocracy can hardly be limited to modelers; cal benchmark functionally trade funding to IAM groups critics also do not deny the value of modeling work in cer- in return for evidence that sustains its viability (Geden and tain domains. That said, there is a difference in emphasis Beck 2014; Geden 2016; Anderson 2015). This, then, calls on the role of the researcher. Critical scholarship, more so the impartiality of certain strands of research into question. than modeling papers, emphasizes the political dimensions These issues are further complicated by the fact that contes- of research practice, and the myriad agendas and pressures tations over influential technical parameters occur largely surrounding climate science. within hidden modeling processes, and are often lost in This focus on the construction of evidence through translation during the creation of outputs for wider delib- research practice is helpful when considering that modeling eration (Pindyck 2017). The IAM community disputes these activity in the CE space explores a deliberately limited set characterizations, noting that they had consistently warned of dimensions. SRM modelers note that the risks they assess about over-relying on BECCS and submitted agendas for are limited to climatic processes and impacts. Integrated further research, before rather than in response to critical assessment modelers are frank that BECCS-heavy scenarios attention (Tavoni and Socolow 2013; Fuss et  al. 2014). in AR5 were calculated based on technical, economically Moreover, they resist the depiction of BECCS as somehow efficient criteria for scaling up infrastructure, and deliber - fabricated for filling the gap between reality and climate ately bracket sociopolitical dimensions. Yet, both therefore ambition, arguing that IAMs do not advocate for particular contain bracketed conceptualizations—of ‘risk’ for SRM, climate strategies as much as simulate emissions pathways or ‘feasibility’ for BECCS—that functionally emphasize the with alternative mixes of technology as a platform for policy physical or techno-economic criteria that modeling infra- discussions. structure is able to portray, ahead of the societal dimen- Modelers in either field argue that their work offers sions of deployment. Such politically and historically ‘thin’ fact-grounded but experimental estimates of the future that scenarios do not capture historic culpability, vulnerability, imperfectly aggregate trend across complex physical and need, and capacity; as such, they demand solutions divorced economic systems. The process emphasizes expert judgment, from the context in which the snapshot emerged (McLaren as well as ‘inter-comparisons’ (e.g. GeoMIP for SRM) where 2018). For example, the scaling up of BECCS, in many AR5 a comparison between a range of models aiming at com- scenarios commencing heavily during the 2030s, assumes mon targets is argued to contextualise outliers and deliver facilitating conditions on a global level and elides inequi- conclusions with greater confidence. In this understanding, ties in technological capacity and (carbon) geopolitics. This knowledge of climatic impacts of CE approaches or of bar- would be a deceptive basis upon which to build a case for riers to deploying them, can be produced or improved by BECCS, given resilient controversies surrounding the pro- refining inputs or by running a greater diversity of scenarios. duction of biomass for energy, or carbon capture and storage. Stronger modeling capacity and further modeling applica- There is a further concern that scenarios can signal tions are seen to improve understanding of certain dimen- the need for politics to catch up to, or strongly avoid, the sions of risk, and their simplified, often intentionally lim- modeled reality. This is complicated by ambiguities sur- ited parameters have to be taken into account when applying rounding the intents of modeling for explicitly providing modeling results to policy crafting. decision-making support. IAM work—more established as 1 3 Sustainability Science a science-for-policy enterprise than SRM modeling due to and even statistical and modeling approaches, from eco- its role in WGIII work in the IPCC process—tends to frame nomics (where influences have been traced further back to itself as neutral ‘map-making’, following the ‘policy relevant attempts at modeling social inquiry after the principles of but not policy prescriptive’ ethos of the IPCC (Edenhofer physics) in the guises of rational choice theory and its off- and Minx 2014); the signaling implications of their ‘maps’ shoots (Bernstein et al. 2000). Through the application of for expectations in climate governance, however, are high- those approaches, deductive thinking is a general presence lighted in Beck and Mahony (2018). In contrast, SRM mod- in discussions of the ‘social impacts’ that CE approaches, as eling networks have no common platform. GeoMIP’s earlier well as other fields of emerging sociotechnical systems, may efforts were geared more to model validation than policy; have, despite criticism of such thinking from social scientific bluntly designed to induce strong impacts in the earth sys- and humanist disciplines such as science and technology tem to garner broad understandings of engineered climates, studies (e.g. Bijker et al. 1987). rather than reflect what might be climatically or politically One prominent vein is interested in the international ‘desirable’ (however this is to be defined). Some modelers political dynamics around SRM, forming a body of game- have argued that scenarios assuming stronger mitigation and theoretic modeling studies that simulate the strategic actions moderate SRM provide more tempered and realistic results of states regarding the development or deployment of SRM for policy deliberation (Keith and MacMartin 2015). But (Harding and Moreno-Cruz 2016), with implications for are the conclusions of idealised studies deployed in political some outcome of interest to the study: for example, the for- settings in a manner that exceeds their mandate? If so, what mation of coalitions of SRM-capable states in Ricke et al. are the responsibilities of those involved—generators (e.g. (2013), environmental treaty formation in Millard-Ball modelers), translators (expert networks in climate govern- (2012), or emission reductions in Urpelainen (2012). These ance), and audiences (civic and policy communities)? calculations unfold according to some set of covering laws: Tensions between the purposes of modeling for improv- notably, states are represented as rational, strategic and uni- ing systems understandings, calibrating modeling practice, tary maximizers of benefits and minimizers of costs, follow - or providing a workable basis for informing climate policy; ing the concept of a ‘homo oeconomicus’ imported from or alternately, between the grounding of modeling outputs microeconomic theory. Often, knowledge on the physical in real-world processes and their extrapolation into more impacts of SRM deployments generated via climate mod- fantastic possibilities, remain unresolved dimensions of this eling efforts serves as input for informing state preferences. mode of research. But that modeling has both value and limi- By giving a ‘parsimonious’ account of international polit- tations in structure and application is not in dispute, neither ical dynamics, such exercises can explain and, by extension, by its practitioners nor by adjoining networks of (critical) project outcomes with some predictive capacity precisely experts. In what follows, we explore whether there is some because of their high level of abstraction—or so propo- disproportionate importance given to the epistemologies nents argue. Summarizing conclusions are difficult to reach and practices of futures assessment represented by modeling due to differing aims: Urpelainen ( 2012) and Millard-Ball in the CE research ecosystem, whether there are efforts to (2012) point out consequences of unilateral SRM on miti- change these logics in research practice, and if these efforts gation efforts; Ricke et al. (2013) conclude that a small-as- can fruitfully co-exist. possible club of first-moving states will have an incentive to exclude new members that might upset their established Deductive reasoning in socio‑political inquiry preferences. To non-specialists, such exercises can appear based on highly simplified assumptions, and removed from While integrated assessment models do represent the social the concerns that more qualitatively oriented scholarship world in certain constrained ways, we now enter an area takes to be at work in international politics. These dynam- in which the focus is placed squarely on ‘the social.’ No ics of justification and critique can be observed regarding method for exploring the sociopolitical dimensions of CE other modeling and simulative activities—for example, on approaches is as dominant as modeling is regarding climatic the emergence of BECCS as a strategy for mitigation in inte- effects. In approaching those dimensions, however, the meth- grated assessment modeling scenarios. odologies examined here are in some ways epistemologically Unlike the use of climate and integrated assessment mod- similar to the logics underpinning computer simulations: els, a critical summary and interrogation of this body of again, what we refer to as a ‘deductive’ approach. Expanded modeling work and its implications has yet to be undertaken. into social inquiry, dynamics are deduced from an initial set Some critiques would likely be imported (and contested by of starting conditions following the logic of the given meth- economic modelers): Abstracting complex societal trends odology; this is a common but contested approach across and dynamics via numeracy (however advanced); the elid- economics, political science, and international relations. ing of influential choices on modeling parameters made The latter pair of disciplines has imported key assumptions, by researchers (however unintentionally); the relevance of 1 3 Sustainability Science politically ‘thin’ work that results from simplifying context, more on the priority thought to be given to technical and time, and value-specific concerns (however necessarily for physical criteria of risk, or a perceived disposition of deduc- calculability and parsimony). Whether or not these game tive social inquiry to expert-driven narratives and techno- theoretic studies present potentials for building momentum cratic research, than on the notion that they are wrong in behind realities they represent is another matter (e.g. BECCS principle. In what follows, we trace one strand of pushback in climate discussions); they do not appear to have had sig- emerging against research practices that facilitate these nificant traction beyond internal debates in CE research net- modes of thinking. works. It is, perhaps, a space to watch. Deductive reasoning is also found in less formalized Deliberative stakeholder engagement and foresight analyses (as opposed to the highly formalized nature of approaches game theory) regarding the politics of CE deployment, generally grouped within international relations or politi- If the works of the previous section represent a ‘deductive’ cal science literatures. Neither discipline professes to be in mode of social science, then a burgeoning field of ‘empiri- the business of prediction; yet it is quite common to estab- cal’ social science (Burns et al. 2016) posits that under- lish systemic understandings of the driving motivations and standings of concerns and values regarding future risks and dynamics of politics that can then be presumed to shape challenges can be sourced from engagements with scientific, actions and effects. What binds these otherwise disparate policy, and civic stakeholders. From there, however, proce- studies together is the understanding that future dynamics dures and intents underpinning engagement work diverge. can be extrapolated from the assumption that SRM or CDR A network of (largely) UK-based scholars and practitioners will grow up in a world embodied by particular problem highlight that two distinct waves of stakeholder engagements structures—some understanding of the international system, can be observed. In the first wave, it was argued, procedures some logic of conflict potential, some knowledge about envi- were functionally entrenching SRM and CDR approaches ronmental or technological consequences—that hold true for as ‘policy objects’ (the accused include, e.g. Ipsos 2010; mapping its future politics. Mercer et al. 2011). Questions were asked, and discussion For example, Horton and Reynolds (2016) call for studies configured, around technical dimensions and thresholds utilizing leading international relations theories (e.g. real- of effectiveness, safety and cost that purportedly made CE ism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism) to help approaches more researchable or actionable for the projected structure thinking on the potential intersections between CE desires of policy-makers, disaggregated into individual tech- deployment, mitigation efforts, conflict, north–south rela- nologies for ‘differentiated governance’, and with increased tions, and governance challenges. Many security studies examination of stages of research or ‘reduction of uncertain- similarly rely on a systematic understanding of the motiva- ties’ rather than broader social and ethical questions (Corner tions and constraints facing international actors to deduce et al. 2013; Owen 2014). implications for conflict over CE, implying that deployment Engagements of a so-called ‘Second Wave’ would utilize would follow existing logics of ‘potentials for direct conflict’ deliberative exercises—described generally as innovative like resource scarcity (Maas and Scheffran 2012), or that the dialogues highlighting different perspectives in exploring promise of doing it would breed systemic brinksmanship in futures, with minimal prefacing work by experts. This would climate politics (the ‘security hazard’, Corry 2017). Studies ideally create a space for discussing CE’s means and ends can rely implicitly upon knowledge about environmental and in an open-ended, substantive manner, while ‘un-framing’ technical consequences or ‘side effects’ to deduce politi- them as policy objects (for a summary of such exercises, cal implications (e.g. Zürn and Schäfer 2013). Indeed, it see Bellamy and Lezaun 2017). Significantly, this body of is often the supposed environmental impacts that get first work invoked the principles of ‘anticipatory governance’ mention: for example, for SRM, changing temperature and (Guston 2014), and ‘responsible research and innovation precipitation patterns. For some, this sequencing is explic- (RRI)’ (Stilgoe et al. 2013)—deliberative and future-ori- itly desirable, lest, to paraphrase Victor et al. (2013), the ented frameworks for the governance of emerging technol- politics of geoengineering get far ahead of the science. This ogies. Both had previously seen concerted application in has similarly often been the case for assessments of govern- nanotechnology debates, and can be seen as an importation, ance and policy options; early governance proposals tended by its practitioners, of an evolving toolkit of governance to emphasize management of physical risks, and ‘tailor the concepts and research practices from one realm of emerging amount of scrutiny to the scale’ thereof (Lin 2015, p. 2538). techno-science into another (for a history of this ‘amalgam That environmental and climatic consequences of human of ideas’, see Burget et al. 2017). activity have political knock-ons, and that systemic struc- Methodologically, advocates of these frameworks con- tures shape distributed outcomes, is seldomly contested in tend that the current paradigm in future-oriented research principle. Disagreement with these assumptions is based places an undue focus on ‘outcomes’ rather than ‘processes’: 1 3 Sustainability Science that is, on the accuracy and usability of future projections of CE approaches (e.g. prioritizing technical metrics over technology for policy, rather than on the epistemologies and societal and normative questions) or elide the shaping choices on which these are pieced together; and on public influences of researchers (e.g. in modeling), than its own engagement as a kind of reporting mechanism for audiences practice and politics. One need not devalue their work after-the-fact, rather than a deliberative activity from the while asking the question of who is watching the watchers. outset that helps inform the objectives of scientific work. An adjacent corner of this ad-hoc field of deliberative The argument is that this paradigm privileges and elides the methods requires its own mention, due to nuances in his- role of ‘key enactors’ in setting and framing risks, reserving tory and application. ‘Foresight’ approaches have recently capacity to frame the boundaries of the debate for particu- found a limited traction in the CE space: predominantly larly invested constituencies while simultaneously portray- (though not exclusively) as scenario-building exercises, ing this process as apolitical (Owen 2014). Substantively, and increasingly (though not initially) under the rubric of RRI practitioners in the CE space set themselves up against anticipatory frameworks. Long practiced as a set of prog- a reliance on technical knowledge as a baseline for defin- nostic and planning tools in military and business settings, ing societal challenges, or framing CE approaches as a nar- foresight struggled for acceptance in the social sciences in row response to climate change rather than game-changing earlier guises as ‘futurology’ or ‘future studies’. However, endeavors in their own right (Bellamy and Lezaun 2017; overlaps were established between foresight practice and Foley et al. 2018). scholarship examining the shaping effects of claims to the One can admire the mission statement of RRI while inter- future in emerging techno-science fields, and incorporated rogating its execution. Some have observed that the publica- as a principal component of ‘anticipatory governance’ tions of this ‘Second Wave’ of engagements produce con- (‘Foresight’ in Guston 2014) and later in RRI (‘Antici- clusions that counter-frame the viability and desirability of pation’ in Stilgoe et al. 2013). Both frameworks invoke CE approaches as successfully as the framers they seek to the use of scenario work—emphasizing its potential to counteract (Heyward and Rayner 2013; Schäfer and Low enhance deliberation and critical reflection amongst par - 2018). Bellamy et al. (2013), as a typical example of ‘Sec- ticipants—to map future-making processes. ond Wave’ work, concludes that when engagements focus Scenarios, in this understanding, reject probabilistic on more expansive societal concerns rather than on tech- forecasting in favor of small sets of futures that are rich in nical questions of cost and efficiency, participants tend to sociopolitical detail, highly differentiated (or ‘alternative’) de-prioritise CE approaches. Macnaghten and Szerszynski and easily comparable, and are developed deliberatively (2013) more forcefully point to the ‘centralising and auto- between diverse viewpoints. Scenarios are in turn sup- cratic social constitution’ of sunlight reflection methods, posed to be experimental: provoking reflection by partici- and question if it is compatible with democratic govern- pants on specific conceptions of future threats and oppor - ance. Heyward and Rayner (2013) argue Macnaghten and tunities, on why these conceptions (but not others) made Szerszynski’s conclusions reflect a ‘curious asymmetry’, in the cut, and on strategies that might be resilient against or which these characterizations are applied to forms of CE, yet adaptable to a wide variety of possible outcomes rather not uniformly so to a variety of other governance proposals than tailored to a more limited set of predictions (Vervoort with similarly global, centralizing implications. The implica- and Gupta 2018). Most exercises in the CE space were tion is that some RRI practitioners in this space, in seeking developed in expert-driven workshops with small partici- to ‘unframe’ climate engineering and retard its lock-in as a pation numbers, developing ‘explorative’ scenarios that set of policy options, can be quieter on their own framing reflect on the challenges presented to—and by—efforts to choices. govern SRM or CDR development under a variety of envi- There is a larger point to be made, however obvious. ronmental and societal pressures (Low 2017b). We might RRI is not just a procedural framework for bettering par- note that early CE scenarios were motivated by older prin- ticipation; it is an umbrella concept for sets of political ciples of foresight rather than by RRI. Alongside delibera- activities, representing the agendas and logics of particular tive engagement exercises, scenario work began to invoke networks in specific areas of emerging technology assess- RRI as that framework became popularized (Low 2017a; ment, as well as particular conceptions of the proper rela- Bellamy and Healey 2018). tionship between science and society. The political may Whether conducted under the spirit or the letter of influence how the procedural is developed and executed, RRI, foresight’s practitioners pose it as a corrective logic and to focus on the procedural alone de-politicises RRI as to inertial modes of inquiry that lend greater credence to a concept and its practitioners as actors (see Van Oudheus- evidence grounded in hindsight, and portray researchers den 2014). Engagements and critiques invoking RRI in the as aloof from rather than constitutive of the futures they CE space focus more on interrogating the actors and sign- assess. Both are points of view antithetical to the practice- aling effects of modes of inquiry deemed to operationalize oriented prospection that foresight represents (Selin 2008). 1 3 Sustainability Science The framing effects of this small collection of exercises on are designed to explore; indeed, one can reasonably argue the wider debate, however, are for now minimal. For a start, that different epistemologies and practices of assessment the field suffers from low visibility, and has not generated tackle different areas of the puzzle. Models, one might resonant conclusions on risk or governance that one might note, cannot determine public values any more than delib- examine for motive and effect. Scenarios sometimes turn out erative engagement can determine the physical science of too outlandishly to be actionable or recombine risks already precipitation; the challenge is for the results of different derived in other studies. Moreover, its objectives and conclu- areas of investigation to fruitfully inform each other. Yet, sions are internally incoherent. Practitioners are divided on this proposed division of labour might be a little simplis- the use of foresight for creating ‘actionable’ knowledge for tic: All research practices (and users) are already engaged strategic framing and policy guidance, or for communicat- in a larger system where judgment is passed, in ways that ing between and interrogating participating perspectives as defy simple boundary-drawing between methods and part of ‘community learning’ (Talberg et al. 2018; Gabriel expert communities, on the viability and desirability of and Low 2018). However, as a deliberative tool, foresight kinds of CE. Plainly put: the use of research often exceeds shares much with (and is often used for) stakeholder engage- the bounds of its design. ment—this is where it may currently hold more credibility The question critics (and the authors as well) raise is in the CE space. As with engagement exercises conducted whether limited conceptions and calculations of risk, and under the RRI banner, one can question if foresight applica- the futures they frame, are inertially and disproportionately tions fulfill ambitions of ‘opening up’ the debate to more prominent within CE’s research ecosystem because they plural processes, or produce results with veiled political and are more amenable to modeling practices. This is seen to normative commitments. be amplified by other perceived factors: If modeling, as a mode of futures-exploration, retains a particular, historic resonance and credibility in climate science and governance; A shared understanding of futures research if the CE research enterprise is, as is the case for much work in emerging fields of science and technology, characterized Our intent here has been to question if research methods strongly by the expectation to create actionable or policy produce assumptions that structure how futures are gener- relevant evidence; and if expert-driven assessment, however ated and acted upon in the present. What are the kinds of unintentionally, often leans toward technocracy. In partial risk highlighted by those futures, and positioned as relevant response to these concerns (within and outside of CE), more concerns for research and policy in the present? What are deliberative practices of social inquiry—increasingly mar- epistemologies, expertises, and agendas that they come tied shalled under the banner of RRI or ‘anticipatory’ assess- up with, and what actors do they privilege? In short: how do ment of immature technological systems—have developed methods and their users configure the bounds of the debate? a growing presence. These attempts to present alternatives From the above analysis, we distil some underlying currents by repositioning politics as constitutive of, and not subordi- in the construction of climate engineering futures. What fol- nate to, science. Deliberative engagement, at least in mission lows is not intended as definitive, or as a strict dichotomy; statement, presents an increasing variety of civic and policy however, we believe that it captures relevant differences in audiences with the opportunity to frame the implications broad strokes. of engineered climates on their own terms. But although First, the dimensions represented by modeling—the posing corrective measures to technical and technocratic capacity of numeracy to capture and simulate complex future-making, some actors in this space have been critiqued dynamics, the functional focus on physical and techno- as bringing with them their own normative commitments economic aspects, characterizations as science ‘proper’— regarding the desirability of the climate engineering enter- often occupy a position of epistemological primacy. We prise. The observation, then, that research practice is politi- can consider, for example, the expansion of modeling log- cal is not applicable only to modeling work. Approaches for ics into assessments that focus upon political and societal bettering process such as RRI need to be examined as tied questions, or (more tenuously) the resilience of deductive to the forms of expertise, agendas, and blind spots of its reasoning across research practice. Moreover, and with practitioners, as much as the activities that they interrogate. particular relevance to SRM, socio-political assessments— All this is to point out that practitioners in this space can in game theory, deductive inquiry into risk, even some and should work to enhance complementarity between meth- engagement work—position politics as efforts to navigate ods and users—not simply by ‘putting them in their place’, the ‘climates’ generated by physical science modeling. or allowing die ff rent methods to assess die ff rent questions— This is not to write off the usefulness of such simula- but by also building a shared understanding of the practices tions. These can yield imperfect but valuable observations and politics that underpin future-oriented research. 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Eur J Int Relat 6(1):43–76 ing in assessments, see Foley et al. 2018). Understanding Bijker WE, Hughes TP, Pinch TJ (1987) The social construction of ‘boundary work’ is especially useful for cross-disciplinary technological systems: new directions in the sociology and his- tory of technology. MIT Press, Cambridge learning: the idea that concepts ostensibly common to dif- Borup M, Brown N, Konrad K et al (2006) The sociology of expecta- ferent expert, civic, or policy communities—for example, tions in science and technology. Technol Anal Strateg Manag ‘deductive’ and ‘deliberative’, ‘risk’ and ‘feasibility’, ‘expert 18:285–298 judgment’, ‘scenarios’, ‘futures’, and even ‘sustainability’— Burget M, Bardone E, Pedaste M (2017) Definitions and conceptual dimensions of responsible research and innovation: a literature are likely understood and practiced with tribal nuances and review. Sci Eng Ethics 23:1–19 agendas (e.g. Shackley and Wynne 1996). 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Royal Society of Chemistry, London, pp 211–247 Pindyck RS (2017) The use and misuse of models for climate policy. Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to Rev Environ Econ Policy 11:100–114 jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Ricke KL, Moreno-Cruz JB, Caldeira K (2013) Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation. Environ Res Lett 8:014021 1 3 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Sustainability Science Springer Journals

Tools of the trade: practices and politics of researching the future in climate engineering

Low, Sean; Schäfer, Stefan
Sustainability Science , Volume OnlineFirst – May 6, 2019
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Springer Journals
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Copyright © 2019 by The Author(s)
Subject
Environment; Environmental Management; Climate Change Management and Policy; Environmental Economics; Landscape Ecology; Sustainable Development; Public Health
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1862-4065
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1862-4057
DOI
10.1007/s11625-019-00692-x
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Abstract

Making sense of the implications of climate engineering approaches (solar radiation management, SRM; and carbon dioxide removal, CDR) at planetary scales occurs via a host of methods that calculate, project, and imagine the future in distinct ways. We take a systemic and synthesizing view of some of the (inter)disciplinary methods by which these futures are derived: climate and integrated assessment modeling, ‘deductive’ modes of social science inquiry, deliberative stakeholder engage- ment, and foresight-based scenarios. We speak to the epistemologies, objectives, and user communities surrounding these research practices, highlighting that different modes of constructing and interpreting evidence about an unformed future yield different kinds of results and signals for actions to be taken. We show how different methods for exploring ‘futures’ form an evolving history of how the risks of CE have been assessed (or constructed), and conclude by echoing calls for a stronger shared understanding of the practices and politics that underpin future-oriented research. Keywords Futures · Climate engineering · Methodology · Research practice · Epistemology · Risk Future‑based evidence making described as backed by proofs-of-concept, co-optable from components of existing systems, and sufficiently viable at In the governance of climate change, understandings and small scales to merit discussion. They are, however, also decisions in the present are often informed by evidence often described as ‘immature’—not (yet) existing as opera- that speaks of the future. Engineering planetary sunshades tional systems, and lacking technical and societal support. (solar radiation management, SRM) or carbon sinks (carbon Advocacy and opposition thus has in the last decade been dioxide removal, CDR; or of late, negative emissions tech- shaped by calculations, projections, and imaginings that nologies, NETs) are the latest entrants to the landscape of richly depict the potential benefits and risks of these so- proposals for increasing humanity’s capacity to cope with called forms of ‘climate engineering’ (CE). In doing so, such the effects of climate change. These approaches are often depictions frame the viability and desirability of different approaches. We take as axiomatic that ‘futures’ are politically active Handled by Anne-Katrin Holfelder, Institute for Advanced resources. Insights into the shaping influences of concep- Sustainability Studies, Germany. tions of the future can be found in a rich literature on the * Sean Low sociologies of expectations (Borup et al. 2006), sociotechni- sean.low@iass-potsdam.de cal imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim 2015), or visions (Grin and Grunwald 2000)—generally in science and technology Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies, Berliner Str. debates, but also as these intersect with systemic governance 130, 14467 Potsdam, Germany issues such as security, health, and the global environment Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development, Utrecht (Granjou et al. 2017). The objective of this contribution University, Utrecht, Netherlands is to take a systemic and synthesizing view of the (inter) Program On Science, Technology and Society, Harvard disciplinary methods by which futures are derived in the University, Cambridge, USA discourse on climate engineering. We do so as a point of Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, University entry for better understanding how futures are mobilized of Oxford, Oxford, UK Vol.:(0123456789) 1 3 Sustainability Science by scientific practice in an increasingly significant area of future-oriented research in CE, and about the overall direc- climate and sustainability politics. In speaking of methods, tion of that work. we highlight communities of practice, shared objectives and The first differentiates between the processes of quantita- norms, epistemologies for generating evidence, and relative tive modeling approaches in natural and social science, and statuses of authority in the ecosystem of climate science and qualitative assessments generally deployed as part of social policy. A focus on methods also gives us an entry point into science scholarship. Modeling approaches use simulations understanding how specific concerns emerge in relation to based on advanced numeracy. These are simplified repre- CE—that is, how different methods cast CE in their image sentations of reality extrapolated from an understanding of by viewing it as a problem of, for example, changes in tem- systemic laws (underpinning processes and trends, incen- perature and precipitation, interstate conflict and coopera- tives and constraints) marshaled by quantitative variables tion, the balancing of costs and benefits, or public support and formulae, and that can be computed and aggregated in or rejection. high numbers of scenarios (of a future moment) or pathways Why does this matter? In a field where much attention (leading to a future moment)—see the sub-section on “Cli- is directed to imaginary technologies and scenarios of mate models and integrated assessment models”. The others usage, diverse disciplinary understandings inform how such are mixed-methods constructions (scenarios, frames, narra- objects are marshaled as evidence. But how does a method tives) that, apart from eschewing a reliance on numeracy, of evidence production shape the evidence it produces, or defy easy coherence. Some display a similar logic to simula- implicitly favor certain perspectives or actors? Our intent is tions, producing scenarios that extrapolate outcomes from to explore how different ways of making the future known systemic processes (see “Deductive reasoning in socio-polit- shape the knowledge base upon which climate governance ical inquiry”). Others rely on stakeholder engagements, and depends. For when particular futures gain a hold on the on the proposed value of including a diverse range of disci- imagination of scientists, politicians and publics, they can plinary and political perspectives, for exploring challenges come to structure expectations about what constitutes feasi- (see  “Deliberative stakeholder engagement and foresight ble and desirable courses of action, and shade from view or approaches”). entirely foreclose alternative options. The second is on the kind of challenges that a method We take a bird’s eye view of climate and integrated is deployed to investigate surrounding the development assessment modeling, ‘deductive’ modes of social science, or deployment of CE techniques. The dimensions of such ‘deliberative’ stakeholder engagement, and foresight-based inquiry can be (combinations of the) physical, techno-eco- scenarios, introducing a number of dimensions for illumi- nomic, and socio-political. Exploration of these challenges is nating relationships and contestations between methods often phrased as assessing ‘benefits and risks’, though a host (the second section) before undertaking our overview (the of near-synonyms abound. Another way of thinking about it, third section). The final section synthesizes the links and however, is that methods (and by extension, the communities comparisons established in the overview, showing how our deploying them, for a variety of agendas and disciplinary analysis of different methods can be read as a history of how understandings) will privilege certain criteria over others the risks of CE have been assessed (or constructed)—and in defining risk. We might, however, also consider if, in the therefore, how the bounds of the debate itself have come to grand scheme of the CE research ecosystem, certain dimen- be configured. sions—that is, some mental and methodological ways of projecting risk—are made subordinate and subsequent to others. Some dimensions of future mapping The third parses the process of engaging with futures as deductive or deliberative. Deduction is a pervasive form of In this section, we lay out some characteristics by which we reasoning, where conclusions are reached ‘downward’ from can differentiate methods engaged in mapping the concerns a set of general assumptions rather than built ‘upward’ from and challenges associated with engineering the climate—the particular instances. Disciplines across the humanities and following section on the methods themselves should be read the natural sciences provide much nuance on the definition in this light. Needless to say, our list of dimensions is neither and procedures of this concept. We ask the reader to indulge exhaustive nor definitive—we derive them from an analysis in a broad definition: if the laws of a system hold—say, the of relevant literature, from long-standing participation in CE global climate system, or a system of (international) struc- debates, and from an analytical sensibility based in science tures and actors, or some analogy of technological develop- and technology studies (STS). Like the methods we discuss, ment—then if A happens, the analyst, with degrees of likeli- these dimensions are geared toward a purpose; in our case, hood, can expect B, C, or D to result (or can, depending on to allow for some systematic conclusions to be drawn about her mental or computing capacity, trace a sequence of further the mutual influences—and tensions—between modes of assumptions and probabilities). From there a conversation 1 3 Sustainability Science opens up on the value of and motivations behind extrapola- assessment models (IAMs)—assemblages that combine tive, simulative, or probabilistic modes of thought. In the climate, land-use, energy systems, and economic compo- CE space, this includes efforts to gauge climatic as well as nents—are the vehicles of Working Group III assessments societal dimensions of CE; quantitative modeling and more of mitigation options. These have been implicated in the qualitative methods; and disciplines ranging from climate conceptualizing of large-scale carbon removal (CDR) as science to economic and sociopolitical inquiry (see “Climate an essential part of strategies for reaching the Paris Agree- models and integrated assessment models”, and “Deductive ment’s 2C target. Climate models and IAMs have different reasoning in socio-political inquiry”). histories and applications in the CE space, but we address A process set in opposition to ‘deductive’ thinking might them together here because of epistemological overlaps in be labeled as ‘deliberative’—though this term (like deduc- exploring the future. tion) is shorthand for other adjoining concepts. Attempts Climate models were not originally intended to simu- to cohere such a mode of investigation can particularly be late targeted modifications of planetary reflectivity, but found in frameworks of emerging technology governance have been repurposed for gauging SRM’s physical impacts that highlight deliberative engagement as part of the concept (Wiertz 2015). This modeling activity has since generated of ‘anticipation’ (see “Deliberative stakeholder engagement one of the CE debate’s largest bodies of the literature and and foresight approaches”). The idea is that thinking about authorship networks, relying heavily on the Geoengineer- the future as part of a deductive paradigm can be prone to ing Model Intercomparison Project, or GeoMIP. Since technocracy—there is an implicit emphasis on usable, tech- 2011, research has become increasingly fine-tuned in terms nically focused projections, more so than on the processes, of technology, regions, and impacts assessed (Kravitz et al. values, actors and agendas constructing them. The emphasis, 2015). The principle of SRM modeling is straightforwardly then, should be less on what the future might be (however deductive. Modelers adjust the reflectivity of various envi- conditionally), and more on who is in the room to say so. ronmental systems as proxies for SRM approaches, result- Futures should be more explicitly treated as experimental, ing in projections of climate variables such as temperature, user-generated, and as inclusive as possible, highlighting the precipitation, sea level rise, and ozone. Calls for expanding disciplinary and political understandings that create them, modeling of devolved impacts on agriculture, fisheries, air and generating avenues for action that navigate a wide array pollution, and health are increasing (Irvine et al. 2016). of aims and possibilities. In the climate modeling literature, cooling the planet is broadly projected to reduce certain impacts associated with rising temperatures (Irvine et al. 2016). At the same Methods of future‑oriented research time, significant variations and uncertainties—particularly on regional effects—depend on assumptions and choices Climate models and integrated assessment models made by researchers themselves. At the input stage, results are structured by the model used, and by the technology, The Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel amount, rate, term and location of deployment selected. on Climate Change (IPCC) rely upon ‘a vast machine’ of Any modeler admits to this, but the details of these choices, computer models to simulate future climates—that is, they spread over dozens of papers, are unfortunately if under- provide a legitimized mode for forming evidence on the risks standably elided. At the output stage, the reporting on bene- of a warming planet, as well as for assessing the viability fits and risks, or the very translation work that makes results of strategies to reduce emissions (Edwards 2010). When meaningful for further research or for societal deliberation, climate change emerged as a subject of scientific inquiry— often then depends on the communicators in question, be and later, political ambition—an evolving array of model they modelers or others. For example, Irvine et al. (2016) types became entrenched as the principle apparatus by which give a technical overview of SRM modeling that also func- sense could be made of such a complex, systemic phenom- tions as an optimistic prospectus, while McLaren (2018) enon. The importance of computer modeling, and the episte- provides a critical sociological and ethical interrogation. mology it represents, is held in place by continued advances IAM work on CDR, meanwhile, was not brought into in capacity, application to new issues, and mutual reliance conversations on CE until it was pointed out in the prelude between climatic projections and policy discussions. to the negotiation of the Paris Agreement that the vast Deriving the potentials of various CE proposals borrows majority of Working Group III scenarios limiting tempera- heavily from the resources and historic credibility of the ture increases to 2C in 2100 relied on the rapid, large- modeling enterprise. Climate models—underpinning the scale deployment of bioenergy carbon capture and stor- work of IPCC Working Group I on the physical science of age (BECCS), an unproven chimera then on the fringes of climate change—have been used to estimate the climatic CDR conversations. The presence of BECCS in resonant impacts of sunlight reflection methods (SRM). Integrated AR5 projections, it was argued, provides a backstop that 1 3 Sustainability Science scientifically legitimizes ambitious temperature targets as These are fair conditions, but their limitations are worth ‘feasible’, and introduces strange new signals to climate considering. Climate models, for example, have been argued governance. There are concerns over the risks of deploying to be an ‘inventive tool’ in the design of SRM strategies, in BECCS, such as land-use conflicts, carbon storage safety, which planetary sunshades are ‘virtual technologies’ con- or de-incentivizing emissions reductions, alongside fears structed and framed strongly within the bounds allowed that if there few other envisioned paths capable of meeting by modeling capacity (Wiertz 2015). They are also black 2C, then climate policy is being shoehorned into a future boxes imbued with the credibility of the modeling enter- generated from these projections (e.g. Beck and Mahony prise, from which conflicting choices and results can be 2018). selectively emphasized. More critical scholarship notes that Interestingly, critical commentary also placed an ongo- this combination of expert judgment and complex model ing focus on the role of the research groups built around structure allows for much freedom in shaping the bounds— IAM work as future-makers, resembling points made on the and results—of modeling scenarios. But choices contested shaping choices of researchers in SRM modeling. The IAM within modeling communities require a high bar of basic lit- community, it was argued, needs to be aware that their work eracy, translate poorly to non-specialist audiences, and may does not neutrally assess options as much as actively frame even distract from political agendas or biases that remain their viability and necessity. More uncomfortably, modelers less investigated or revealed (e.g. Wiertz 2015 and McLaren are argued to be complicit in a mode of IPCC assessment 2018 for SRM; Beck and Mahony 2018 for BECCS). Criti- in which policy actors invested in the 2C target as a politi- cisms of technocracy can hardly be limited to modelers; cal benchmark functionally trade funding to IAM groups critics also do not deny the value of modeling work in cer- in return for evidence that sustains its viability (Geden and tain domains. That said, there is a difference in emphasis Beck 2014; Geden 2016; Anderson 2015). This, then, calls on the role of the researcher. Critical scholarship, more so the impartiality of certain strands of research into question. than modeling papers, emphasizes the political dimensions These issues are further complicated by the fact that contes- of research practice, and the myriad agendas and pressures tations over influential technical parameters occur largely surrounding climate science. within hidden modeling processes, and are often lost in This focus on the construction of evidence through translation during the creation of outputs for wider delib- research practice is helpful when considering that modeling eration (Pindyck 2017). The IAM community disputes these activity in the CE space explores a deliberately limited set characterizations, noting that they had consistently warned of dimensions. SRM modelers note that the risks they assess about over-relying on BECCS and submitted agendas for are limited to climatic processes and impacts. Integrated further research, before rather than in response to critical assessment modelers are frank that BECCS-heavy scenarios attention (Tavoni and Socolow 2013; Fuss et  al. 2014). in AR5 were calculated based on technical, economically Moreover, they resist the depiction of BECCS as somehow efficient criteria for scaling up infrastructure, and deliber - fabricated for filling the gap between reality and climate ately bracket sociopolitical dimensions. Yet, both therefore ambition, arguing that IAMs do not advocate for particular contain bracketed conceptualizations—of ‘risk’ for SRM, climate strategies as much as simulate emissions pathways or ‘feasibility’ for BECCS—that functionally emphasize the with alternative mixes of technology as a platform for policy physical or techno-economic criteria that modeling infra- discussions. structure is able to portray, ahead of the societal dimen- Modelers in either field argue that their work offers sions of deployment. Such politically and historically ‘thin’ fact-grounded but experimental estimates of the future that scenarios do not capture historic culpability, vulnerability, imperfectly aggregate trend across complex physical and need, and capacity; as such, they demand solutions divorced economic systems. The process emphasizes expert judgment, from the context in which the snapshot emerged (McLaren as well as ‘inter-comparisons’ (e.g. GeoMIP for SRM) where 2018). For example, the scaling up of BECCS, in many AR5 a comparison between a range of models aiming at com- scenarios commencing heavily during the 2030s, assumes mon targets is argued to contextualise outliers and deliver facilitating conditions on a global level and elides inequi- conclusions with greater confidence. In this understanding, ties in technological capacity and (carbon) geopolitics. This knowledge of climatic impacts of CE approaches or of bar- would be a deceptive basis upon which to build a case for riers to deploying them, can be produced or improved by BECCS, given resilient controversies surrounding the pro- refining inputs or by running a greater diversity of scenarios. duction of biomass for energy, or carbon capture and storage. Stronger modeling capacity and further modeling applica- There is a further concern that scenarios can signal tions are seen to improve understanding of certain dimen- the need for politics to catch up to, or strongly avoid, the sions of risk, and their simplified, often intentionally lim- modeled reality. This is complicated by ambiguities sur- ited parameters have to be taken into account when applying rounding the intents of modeling for explicitly providing modeling results to policy crafting. decision-making support. IAM work—more established as 1 3 Sustainability Science a science-for-policy enterprise than SRM modeling due to and even statistical and modeling approaches, from eco- its role in WGIII work in the IPCC process—tends to frame nomics (where influences have been traced further back to itself as neutral ‘map-making’, following the ‘policy relevant attempts at modeling social inquiry after the principles of but not policy prescriptive’ ethos of the IPCC (Edenhofer physics) in the guises of rational choice theory and its off- and Minx 2014); the signaling implications of their ‘maps’ shoots (Bernstein et al. 2000). Through the application of for expectations in climate governance, however, are high- those approaches, deductive thinking is a general presence lighted in Beck and Mahony (2018). In contrast, SRM mod- in discussions of the ‘social impacts’ that CE approaches, as eling networks have no common platform. GeoMIP’s earlier well as other fields of emerging sociotechnical systems, may efforts were geared more to model validation than policy; have, despite criticism of such thinking from social scientific bluntly designed to induce strong impacts in the earth sys- and humanist disciplines such as science and technology tem to garner broad understandings of engineered climates, studies (e.g. Bijker et al. 1987). rather than reflect what might be climatically or politically One prominent vein is interested in the international ‘desirable’ (however this is to be defined). Some modelers political dynamics around SRM, forming a body of game- have argued that scenarios assuming stronger mitigation and theoretic modeling studies that simulate the strategic actions moderate SRM provide more tempered and realistic results of states regarding the development or deployment of SRM for policy deliberation (Keith and MacMartin 2015). But (Harding and Moreno-Cruz 2016), with implications for are the conclusions of idealised studies deployed in political some outcome of interest to the study: for example, the for- settings in a manner that exceeds their mandate? If so, what mation of coalitions of SRM-capable states in Ricke et al. are the responsibilities of those involved—generators (e.g. (2013), environmental treaty formation in Millard-Ball modelers), translators (expert networks in climate govern- (2012), or emission reductions in Urpelainen (2012). These ance), and audiences (civic and policy communities)? calculations unfold according to some set of covering laws: Tensions between the purposes of modeling for improv- notably, states are represented as rational, strategic and uni- ing systems understandings, calibrating modeling practice, tary maximizers of benefits and minimizers of costs, follow - or providing a workable basis for informing climate policy; ing the concept of a ‘homo oeconomicus’ imported from or alternately, between the grounding of modeling outputs microeconomic theory. Often, knowledge on the physical in real-world processes and their extrapolation into more impacts of SRM deployments generated via climate mod- fantastic possibilities, remain unresolved dimensions of this eling efforts serves as input for informing state preferences. mode of research. But that modeling has both value and limi- By giving a ‘parsimonious’ account of international polit- tations in structure and application is not in dispute, neither ical dynamics, such exercises can explain and, by extension, by its practitioners nor by adjoining networks of (critical) project outcomes with some predictive capacity precisely experts. In what follows, we explore whether there is some because of their high level of abstraction—or so propo- disproportionate importance given to the epistemologies nents argue. Summarizing conclusions are difficult to reach and practices of futures assessment represented by modeling due to differing aims: Urpelainen ( 2012) and Millard-Ball in the CE research ecosystem, whether there are efforts to (2012) point out consequences of unilateral SRM on miti- change these logics in research practice, and if these efforts gation efforts; Ricke et al. (2013) conclude that a small-as- can fruitfully co-exist. possible club of first-moving states will have an incentive to exclude new members that might upset their established Deductive reasoning in socio‑political inquiry preferences. To non-specialists, such exercises can appear based on highly simplified assumptions, and removed from While integrated assessment models do represent the social the concerns that more qualitatively oriented scholarship world in certain constrained ways, we now enter an area takes to be at work in international politics. These dynam- in which the focus is placed squarely on ‘the social.’ No ics of justification and critique can be observed regarding method for exploring the sociopolitical dimensions of CE other modeling and simulative activities—for example, on approaches is as dominant as modeling is regarding climatic the emergence of BECCS as a strategy for mitigation in inte- effects. In approaching those dimensions, however, the meth- grated assessment modeling scenarios. odologies examined here are in some ways epistemologically Unlike the use of climate and integrated assessment mod- similar to the logics underpinning computer simulations: els, a critical summary and interrogation of this body of again, what we refer to as a ‘deductive’ approach. Expanded modeling work and its implications has yet to be undertaken. into social inquiry, dynamics are deduced from an initial set Some critiques would likely be imported (and contested by of starting conditions following the logic of the given meth- economic modelers): Abstracting complex societal trends odology; this is a common but contested approach across and dynamics via numeracy (however advanced); the elid- economics, political science, and international relations. ing of influential choices on modeling parameters made The latter pair of disciplines has imported key assumptions, by researchers (however unintentionally); the relevance of 1 3 Sustainability Science politically ‘thin’ work that results from simplifying context, more on the priority thought to be given to technical and time, and value-specific concerns (however necessarily for physical criteria of risk, or a perceived disposition of deduc- calculability and parsimony). Whether or not these game tive social inquiry to expert-driven narratives and techno- theoretic studies present potentials for building momentum cratic research, than on the notion that they are wrong in behind realities they represent is another matter (e.g. BECCS principle. In what follows, we trace one strand of pushback in climate discussions); they do not appear to have had sig- emerging against research practices that facilitate these nificant traction beyond internal debates in CE research net- modes of thinking. works. It is, perhaps, a space to watch. Deductive reasoning is also found in less formalized Deliberative stakeholder engagement and foresight analyses (as opposed to the highly formalized nature of approaches game theory) regarding the politics of CE deployment, generally grouped within international relations or politi- If the works of the previous section represent a ‘deductive’ cal science literatures. Neither discipline professes to be in mode of social science, then a burgeoning field of ‘empiri- the business of prediction; yet it is quite common to estab- cal’ social science (Burns et al. 2016) posits that under- lish systemic understandings of the driving motivations and standings of concerns and values regarding future risks and dynamics of politics that can then be presumed to shape challenges can be sourced from engagements with scientific, actions and effects. What binds these otherwise disparate policy, and civic stakeholders. From there, however, proce- studies together is the understanding that future dynamics dures and intents underpinning engagement work diverge. can be extrapolated from the assumption that SRM or CDR A network of (largely) UK-based scholars and practitioners will grow up in a world embodied by particular problem highlight that two distinct waves of stakeholder engagements structures—some understanding of the international system, can be observed. In the first wave, it was argued, procedures some logic of conflict potential, some knowledge about envi- were functionally entrenching SRM and CDR approaches ronmental or technological consequences—that hold true for as ‘policy objects’ (the accused include, e.g. Ipsos 2010; mapping its future politics. Mercer et al. 2011). Questions were asked, and discussion For example, Horton and Reynolds (2016) call for studies configured, around technical dimensions and thresholds utilizing leading international relations theories (e.g. real- of effectiveness, safety and cost that purportedly made CE ism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism) to help approaches more researchable or actionable for the projected structure thinking on the potential intersections between CE desires of policy-makers, disaggregated into individual tech- deployment, mitigation efforts, conflict, north–south rela- nologies for ‘differentiated governance’, and with increased tions, and governance challenges. Many security studies examination of stages of research or ‘reduction of uncertain- similarly rely on a systematic understanding of the motiva- ties’ rather than broader social and ethical questions (Corner tions and constraints facing international actors to deduce et al. 2013; Owen 2014). implications for conflict over CE, implying that deployment Engagements of a so-called ‘Second Wave’ would utilize would follow existing logics of ‘potentials for direct conflict’ deliberative exercises—described generally as innovative like resource scarcity (Maas and Scheffran 2012), or that the dialogues highlighting different perspectives in exploring promise of doing it would breed systemic brinksmanship in futures, with minimal prefacing work by experts. This would climate politics (the ‘security hazard’, Corry 2017). Studies ideally create a space for discussing CE’s means and ends can rely implicitly upon knowledge about environmental and in an open-ended, substantive manner, while ‘un-framing’ technical consequences or ‘side effects’ to deduce politi- them as policy objects (for a summary of such exercises, cal implications (e.g. Zürn and Schäfer 2013). Indeed, it see Bellamy and Lezaun 2017). Significantly, this body of is often the supposed environmental impacts that get first work invoked the principles of ‘anticipatory governance’ mention: for example, for SRM, changing temperature and (Guston 2014), and ‘responsible research and innovation precipitation patterns. For some, this sequencing is explic- (RRI)’ (Stilgoe et al. 2013)—deliberative and future-ori- itly desirable, lest, to paraphrase Victor et al. (2013), the ented frameworks for the governance of emerging technol- politics of geoengineering get far ahead of the science. This ogies. Both had previously seen concerted application in has similarly often been the case for assessments of govern- nanotechnology debates, and can be seen as an importation, ance and policy options; early governance proposals tended by its practitioners, of an evolving toolkit of governance to emphasize management of physical risks, and ‘tailor the concepts and research practices from one realm of emerging amount of scrutiny to the scale’ thereof (Lin 2015, p. 2538). techno-science into another (for a history of this ‘amalgam That environmental and climatic consequences of human of ideas’, see Burget et al. 2017). activity have political knock-ons, and that systemic struc- Methodologically, advocates of these frameworks con- tures shape distributed outcomes, is seldomly contested in tend that the current paradigm in future-oriented research principle. Disagreement with these assumptions is based places an undue focus on ‘outcomes’ rather than ‘processes’: 1 3 Sustainability Science that is, on the accuracy and usability of future projections of CE approaches (e.g. prioritizing technical metrics over technology for policy, rather than on the epistemologies and societal and normative questions) or elide the shaping choices on which these are pieced together; and on public influences of researchers (e.g. in modeling), than its own engagement as a kind of reporting mechanism for audiences practice and politics. One need not devalue their work after-the-fact, rather than a deliberative activity from the while asking the question of who is watching the watchers. outset that helps inform the objectives of scientific work. An adjacent corner of this ad-hoc field of deliberative The argument is that this paradigm privileges and elides the methods requires its own mention, due to nuances in his- role of ‘key enactors’ in setting and framing risks, reserving tory and application. ‘Foresight’ approaches have recently capacity to frame the boundaries of the debate for particu- found a limited traction in the CE space: predominantly larly invested constituencies while simultaneously portray- (though not exclusively) as scenario-building exercises, ing this process as apolitical (Owen 2014). Substantively, and increasingly (though not initially) under the rubric of RRI practitioners in the CE space set themselves up against anticipatory frameworks. Long practiced as a set of prog- a reliance on technical knowledge as a baseline for defin- nostic and planning tools in military and business settings, ing societal challenges, or framing CE approaches as a nar- foresight struggled for acceptance in the social sciences in row response to climate change rather than game-changing earlier guises as ‘futurology’ or ‘future studies’. However, endeavors in their own right (Bellamy and Lezaun 2017; overlaps were established between foresight practice and Foley et al. 2018). scholarship examining the shaping effects of claims to the One can admire the mission statement of RRI while inter- future in emerging techno-science fields, and incorporated rogating its execution. Some have observed that the publica- as a principal component of ‘anticipatory governance’ tions of this ‘Second Wave’ of engagements produce con- (‘Foresight’ in Guston 2014) and later in RRI (‘Antici- clusions that counter-frame the viability and desirability of pation’ in Stilgoe et al. 2013). Both frameworks invoke CE approaches as successfully as the framers they seek to the use of scenario work—emphasizing its potential to counteract (Heyward and Rayner 2013; Schäfer and Low enhance deliberation and critical reflection amongst par - 2018). Bellamy et al. (2013), as a typical example of ‘Sec- ticipants—to map future-making processes. ond Wave’ work, concludes that when engagements focus Scenarios, in this understanding, reject probabilistic on more expansive societal concerns rather than on tech- forecasting in favor of small sets of futures that are rich in nical questions of cost and efficiency, participants tend to sociopolitical detail, highly differentiated (or ‘alternative’) de-prioritise CE approaches. Macnaghten and Szerszynski and easily comparable, and are developed deliberatively (2013) more forcefully point to the ‘centralising and auto- between diverse viewpoints. Scenarios are in turn sup- cratic social constitution’ of sunlight reflection methods, posed to be experimental: provoking reflection by partici- and question if it is compatible with democratic govern- pants on specific conceptions of future threats and oppor - ance. Heyward and Rayner (2013) argue Macnaghten and tunities, on why these conceptions (but not others) made Szerszynski’s conclusions reflect a ‘curious asymmetry’, in the cut, and on strategies that might be resilient against or which these characterizations are applied to forms of CE, yet adaptable to a wide variety of possible outcomes rather not uniformly so to a variety of other governance proposals than tailored to a more limited set of predictions (Vervoort with similarly global, centralizing implications. The implica- and Gupta 2018). Most exercises in the CE space were tion is that some RRI practitioners in this space, in seeking developed in expert-driven workshops with small partici- to ‘unframe’ climate engineering and retard its lock-in as a pation numbers, developing ‘explorative’ scenarios that set of policy options, can be quieter on their own framing reflect on the challenges presented to—and by—efforts to choices. govern SRM or CDR development under a variety of envi- There is a larger point to be made, however obvious. ronmental and societal pressures (Low 2017b). We might RRI is not just a procedural framework for bettering par- note that early CE scenarios were motivated by older prin- ticipation; it is an umbrella concept for sets of political ciples of foresight rather than by RRI. Alongside delibera- activities, representing the agendas and logics of particular tive engagement exercises, scenario work began to invoke networks in specific areas of emerging technology assess- RRI as that framework became popularized (Low 2017a; ment, as well as particular conceptions of the proper rela- Bellamy and Healey 2018). tionship between science and society. The political may Whether conducted under the spirit or the letter of influence how the procedural is developed and executed, RRI, foresight’s practitioners pose it as a corrective logic and to focus on the procedural alone de-politicises RRI as to inertial modes of inquiry that lend greater credence to a concept and its practitioners as actors (see Van Oudheus- evidence grounded in hindsight, and portray researchers den 2014). Engagements and critiques invoking RRI in the as aloof from rather than constitutive of the futures they CE space focus more on interrogating the actors and sign- assess. Both are points of view antithetical to the practice- aling effects of modes of inquiry deemed to operationalize oriented prospection that foresight represents (Selin 2008). 1 3 Sustainability Science The framing effects of this small collection of exercises on are designed to explore; indeed, one can reasonably argue the wider debate, however, are for now minimal. For a start, that different epistemologies and practices of assessment the field suffers from low visibility, and has not generated tackle different areas of the puzzle. Models, one might resonant conclusions on risk or governance that one might note, cannot determine public values any more than delib- examine for motive and effect. Scenarios sometimes turn out erative engagement can determine the physical science of too outlandishly to be actionable or recombine risks already precipitation; the challenge is for the results of different derived in other studies. Moreover, its objectives and conclu- areas of investigation to fruitfully inform each other. Yet, sions are internally incoherent. Practitioners are divided on this proposed division of labour might be a little simplis- the use of foresight for creating ‘actionable’ knowledge for tic: All research practices (and users) are already engaged strategic framing and policy guidance, or for communicat- in a larger system where judgment is passed, in ways that ing between and interrogating participating perspectives as defy simple boundary-drawing between methods and part of ‘community learning’ (Talberg et al. 2018; Gabriel expert communities, on the viability and desirability of and Low 2018). However, as a deliberative tool, foresight kinds of CE. Plainly put: the use of research often exceeds shares much with (and is often used for) stakeholder engage- the bounds of its design. ment—this is where it may currently hold more credibility The question critics (and the authors as well) raise is in the CE space. As with engagement exercises conducted whether limited conceptions and calculations of risk, and under the RRI banner, one can question if foresight applica- the futures they frame, are inertially and disproportionately tions fulfill ambitions of ‘opening up’ the debate to more prominent within CE’s research ecosystem because they plural processes, or produce results with veiled political and are more amenable to modeling practices. This is seen to normative commitments. be amplified by other perceived factors: If modeling, as a mode of futures-exploration, retains a particular, historic resonance and credibility in climate science and governance; A shared understanding of futures research if the CE research enterprise is, as is the case for much work in emerging fields of science and technology, characterized Our intent here has been to question if research methods strongly by the expectation to create actionable or policy produce assumptions that structure how futures are gener- relevant evidence; and if expert-driven assessment, however ated and acted upon in the present. What are the kinds of unintentionally, often leans toward technocracy. In partial risk highlighted by those futures, and positioned as relevant response to these concerns (within and outside of CE), more concerns for research and policy in the present? What are deliberative practices of social inquiry—increasingly mar- epistemologies, expertises, and agendas that they come tied shalled under the banner of RRI or ‘anticipatory’ assess- up with, and what actors do they privilege? In short: how do ment of immature technological systems—have developed methods and their users configure the bounds of the debate? a growing presence. These attempts to present alternatives From the above analysis, we distil some underlying currents by repositioning politics as constitutive of, and not subordi- in the construction of climate engineering futures. What fol- nate to, science. Deliberative engagement, at least in mission lows is not intended as definitive, or as a strict dichotomy; statement, presents an increasing variety of civic and policy however, we believe that it captures relevant differences in audiences with the opportunity to frame the implications broad strokes. of engineered climates on their own terms. But although First, the dimensions represented by modeling—the posing corrective measures to technical and technocratic capacity of numeracy to capture and simulate complex future-making, some actors in this space have been critiqued dynamics, the functional focus on physical and techno- as bringing with them their own normative commitments economic aspects, characterizations as science ‘proper’— regarding the desirability of the climate engineering enter- often occupy a position of epistemological primacy. We prise. The observation, then, that research practice is politi- can consider, for example, the expansion of modeling log- cal is not applicable only to modeling work. Approaches for ics into assessments that focus upon political and societal bettering process such as RRI need to be examined as tied questions, or (more tenuously) the resilience of deductive to the forms of expertise, agendas, and blind spots of its reasoning across research practice. Moreover, and with practitioners, as much as the activities that they interrogate. particular relevance to SRM, socio-political assessments— All this is to point out that practitioners in this space can in game theory, deductive inquiry into risk, even some and should work to enhance complementarity between meth- engagement work—position politics as efforts to navigate ods and users—not simply by ‘putting them in their place’, the ‘climates’ generated by physical science modeling. or allowing die ff rent methods to assess die ff rent questions— This is not to write off the usefulness of such simula- but by also building a shared understanding of the practices tions. These can yield imperfect but valuable observations and politics that underpin future-oriented research. This, about the environmental or technical dimensions that they ideally, might allow for more fluid, mutual access between 1 3 Sustainability Science Bellamy R, Lezaun J (2017) Crafting a public for geoengineering. disciplinary communities, or with stakeholders from a vari- Public Underst Sci 26:402–417 ety of demographics and polities, in shaping objectives and Bellamy R, Chilvers J, Vaughan NE et al (2013) ‘Opening up’ geo- methods of research. Efforts across disciplines to clarify the engineering appraisal: multi-criteria mapping of options for intents and limits of various methods remain low hanging tackling climate change. Glob Environ Change 23:926–937 Bernstein S, Lebow RN, Stein JG, Weber S (2000) God gave physics fruits, as is deepening the interdisciplinarity of research pro- the easy problems: adapting social science to an unpredictable jects (for a critique of the imperfect degree of mutual learn- world. 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Sustainability Science – Springer Journals

Published: May 6, 2019

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