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Having identified the use of collective action in gaining access to land in an earlier study, this study examined the forms of collective action being utilised by settled pastoralists in southwest Nigeria for land accessibility and use. The justification for this lies mainly on the optimism of the group theory that individuals with common interests would voluntarily act to further those interests. Six Fulani communities were selected purposively and data were collected from 120 settled agro-pastoralists. Interviews and focus group discussions were used to generate data on social features, livelihoods and collective action. Nine forms of collective action were identified, which were based on social networks and organised effort towards peaceful co-existence. Most of the collective action were rated effective by pastoralists in enhancing their land access. However, using the complete model with the Logit link function in the ordinal regression procedure, the study identified five of the collective actions with a higher probability (P < 0.05) of removing land restrictions, which were forms of use, farm size, grazing distance, grazing fields and land title restrictions. The most relevant problems to the effectiveness of collective action in the study area were the unwillingness of host communities and the non-participation of pastoralists. It is, therefore, recommended that settled pastoralists invest more on social networks in order to build stronger linkages with pastoral and host communities. This will enhance the ability to engage positively in the spheres of market and civil society. The organised efforts for peaceful coexistence will reduce the incidence of internal conflict.
Sustainability Science – Springer Journals
Published: Sep 17, 2009
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