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Vagueness as ArbitrarinessImprecise Predicates

Vagueness as Arbitrariness: Imprecise Predicates [In this chapter, I consider some different definitions of the linguistic conception of imprecision, proposing that a predicate is imprecise if and only if there is no sharp boundary between objects to which its application yields some particular truth-value and objects to which its application does not yield that truth-value. With the definition of imprecision in hand, I provide a more accurate formulation of the criterion of precisification, which will be my final formulation of this criterion. I then address the question of whether there are any reasons against a linguistic interpretation of the notion of imprecision. Although the linguistic conception of imprecision is intuitive, it is not the only one on the table. In particular, imprecision might be interpreted epistemically. The existence of an epistemic sense is important, because it apparently allows one to accept that a predicate is vague only if it is imprecise, while rejecting my final formulation of the criterion of precisification. This, in turn, would undermine some of the main theses and arguments presented in this book. I argue that the two relevant senses of imprecision are mutually consistent, and the mere existence of an epistemic sense does not raise any relevant problem for my views.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Vagueness as ArbitrarinessImprecise Predicates

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 436)
Salles, Sagid
Vagueness as Arbitrariness — Mar 13, 2021
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
ISBN
978-3-030-66780-1
Pages
33 –64
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-66781-8_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In this chapter, I consider some different definitions of the linguistic conception of imprecision, proposing that a predicate is imprecise if and only if there is no sharp boundary between objects to which its application yields some particular truth-value and objects to which its application does not yield that truth-value. With the definition of imprecision in hand, I provide a more accurate formulation of the criterion of precisification, which will be my final formulation of this criterion. I then address the question of whether there are any reasons against a linguistic interpretation of the notion of imprecision. Although the linguistic conception of imprecision is intuitive, it is not the only one on the table. In particular, imprecision might be interpreted epistemically. The existence of an epistemic sense is important, because it apparently allows one to accept that a predicate is vague only if it is imprecise, while rejecting my final formulation of the criterion of precisification. This, in turn, would undermine some of the main theses and arguments presented in this book. I argue that the two relevant senses of imprecision are mutually consistent, and the mere existence of an epistemic sense does not raise any relevant problem for my views.]

Published: Mar 13, 2021

Keywords: Vagueness; Vague predicates; Criterion of precisification; Sorites paradox; Principle of tolerance; Imprecise predicates; Linguistic imprecision; Epistemic imprecision; Higher-order imprecision; Hierarchical higher-order; Columnar higher-order

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