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Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models

Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models Spatial models of two-party or two-candidatecompetition almost never have pure-strategy Nashequilibria when the issue space has more than onedimension. This paper shows that the introduction ofvalence issues can create conditions where equilibriaexist, even in a multidimensional setting. We derivesufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria,and characterize the spatial locations of twocompeting parties or candidates when such equilibriaexist. The party with the advantage on the valencedimension will generally take a moderate position onthe positional issues. We consider the implications ofthese results for public perceptions of the parties,incumbency advantages, and realigning elections. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Public Choice Springer Journals

Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models

Public Choice , Volume 103 (4) – Oct 8, 2004

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References (40)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Public Finance; Political Science
ISSN
0048-5829
eISSN
1573-7101
DOI
10.1023/A:1005020606153
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Spatial models of two-party or two-candidatecompetition almost never have pure-strategy Nashequilibria when the issue space has more than onedimension. This paper shows that the introduction ofvalence issues can create conditions where equilibriaexist, even in a multidimensional setting. We derivesufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria,and characterize the spatial locations of twocompeting parties or candidates when such equilibriaexist. The party with the advantage on the valencedimension will generally take a moderate position onthe positional issues. We consider the implications ofthese results for public perceptions of the parties,incumbency advantages, and realigning elections.

Journal

Public ChoiceSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 8, 2004

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