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Vertical Relations in the Presence of Competitive Recycling

Vertical Relations in the Presence of Competitive Recycling This paper studies the vertical relations between a manufacturer and one or more retailers over two periods in the presence of a competitive recycling sector. In a bilateral monopoly, two-part tariffs are always efficient, i.e. the manufacturer will produce the joint-profit-maximizing output. Under downstream oligopoly, instead, retailers compete to acquire the recycled good which allows the recycling sector to appropriate some of the industry profits. Under two-part tariffs, the manufacturer has an incentive to distort her output choices to reduce this rent loss: She will discriminate among her retailers, and she will either overproduce in the second period or underproduce in the first period. Vertical restraints that restore profit maximization (e.g. loyalty rebates) will harm consumers whenever the manufacturer would overproduce otherwise. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" Springer Journals

Vertical Relations in the Presence of Competitive Recycling

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References (12)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Economic Policy; R & D/Technology Policy; European Integration; Microeconomics; International Economics
ISSN
1566-1679
eISSN
1573-7012
DOI
10.1007/s10842-015-0200-1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper studies the vertical relations between a manufacturer and one or more retailers over two periods in the presence of a competitive recycling sector. In a bilateral monopoly, two-part tariffs are always efficient, i.e. the manufacturer will produce the joint-profit-maximizing output. Under downstream oligopoly, instead, retailers compete to acquire the recycled good which allows the recycling sector to appropriate some of the industry profits. Under two-part tariffs, the manufacturer has an incentive to distort her output choices to reduce this rent loss: She will discriminate among her retailers, and she will either overproduce in the second period or underproduce in the first period. Vertical restraints that restore profit maximization (e.g. loyalty rebates) will harm consumers whenever the manufacturer would overproduce otherwise.

Journal

"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" – Springer Journals

Published: Aug 21, 2015

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