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Virtue Epistemology NaturalizedEpistemic Values and Disinformation

Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Epistemic Values and Disinformation [David Hume (1748) famously said, “when anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened.” Of course, intentionally deceptive information on many topics (not just reports of miracles) can interfere with our ability to achieve our epistemic goals of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. Thus, it would be beneficial to reduce the spread of such disinformation. In order to do this, we need to identify what sorts of things affect the amount of disinformation and how they affect it. Toward this end, I offer an analysis of what disinformation is. I then use this analysis to develop a game-theoretic model (which is inspired by the work of Elliott Sober and of Brian Skyrms and which appeals to philosophical work on epistemic values) of the sending and receiving of disinformation.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Virtue Epistemology NaturalizedEpistemic Values and Disinformation

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 366)
Editors: Fairweather, Abrol
Fallis, Don
Virtue Epistemology Naturalized — Mar 20, 2014
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20 pages

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
ISBN
978-3-319-04671-6
Pages
159 –179
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_10
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[David Hume (1748) famously said, “when anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened.” Of course, intentionally deceptive information on many topics (not just reports of miracles) can interfere with our ability to achieve our epistemic goals of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. Thus, it would be beneficial to reduce the spread of such disinformation. In order to do this, we need to identify what sorts of things affect the amount of disinformation and how they affect it. Toward this end, I offer an analysis of what disinformation is. I then use this analysis to develop a game-theoretic model (which is inspired by the work of Elliott Sober and of Brian Skyrms and which appeals to philosophical work on epistemic values) of the sending and receiving of disinformation.]

Published: Mar 20, 2014

Keywords: Equilibrium Point; True Belief; Pure Strategy; Epistemic State; Monarch Butterfly

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