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Virtue Epistemology NaturalizedTowards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology

Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology [This chapter is about the science of vision and memory in relation to virtue epistemology. My argument will turn on the point that the mechanisms underlying vision and knowledge that, according to current neuroscience, remain non-conscious can’t be considered virtuous mechanisms even if they are highly reliable. Hence, I argue, virtue epistemology cannot count these obvious forms of knowledge as true forms of knowledge. Virtue epistemology thus is at best a partial theory of knowledge.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Virtue Epistemology NaturalizedTowards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology

Part of the Synthese Library Book Series (volume 366)
Editors: Fairweather, Abrol
Brogaard, Berit
Virtue Epistemology Naturalized — Mar 20, 2014
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
ISBN
978-3-319-04671-6
Pages
83 –102
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_6
Publisher site
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Abstract

[This chapter is about the science of vision and memory in relation to virtue epistemology. My argument will turn on the point that the mechanisms underlying vision and knowledge that, according to current neuroscience, remain non-conscious can’t be considered virtuous mechanisms even if they are highly reliable. Hence, I argue, virtue epistemology cannot count these obvious forms of knowledge as true forms of knowledge. Virtue epistemology thus is at best a partial theory of knowledge.]

Published: Mar 20, 2014

Keywords: True Belief; False Memory; Cognitive Faculty; Dorsal Stream; Epistemic Norm

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