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- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- 2015 Japanese Economic Association
- ISSN
- 1352-4739
- eISSN
- 1468-5876
- DOI
- 10.1111/jere.12051
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract This paper provides variants of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that there exists no non-dictatorial aggregation rule satisfying weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and collective rationality. In this paper, independence of irrelevant alternatives and collective rationality are simultaneously relaxed. Weak independence is imposed instead of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Social preferences are assumed to satisfy the semi-order properties of semi-transitivity and the interval-order property. We prove that there exists a vetoer when the number of alternatives is greater than or equal to six.
Journal
The Japanese Economic Review – Springer Journals
Published: Sep 1, 2015
Keywords: economics, general; microeconomics; macroeconomics/monetary economics//financial economics; econometrics; development economics; economic history