Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
J Mairesse, BH Hall (1994)
International Productivity Comparisons
R. Inklaar, M. Timmer (2008)
GGDC Productivity Level Database: International Comparisons of Output, Inputs and Productivity at the Industry Level
G. Linden, K. Kraemer, Jason Dedrick (2009)
Who captures value in a global innovation network?: the case of Apple's iPodCommun. ACM, 52
H. Capron, Michele Cincera (1998)
Exploring the Spillover Impact on Productivity of World-Wide Manufacturing FirmsAnnals of economics and statistics
Mark Schankerman (1981)
The effects of double-counting and expensing on the measured returns to r&dThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 63
D. Harhoff (1998)
R&D and Productivity in German Manufacturing FirmsEconomics of Innovation and New Technology, 6
(2007)
FORM 20-F REPORT—Nokia Corporation
Bronwyn Hall (1993)
Industrial Research During the 1980s: Did the Rate of Return Fall?, 1993
Bronwyn Hall (2010)
The Financing of Innovative FirmsReview of Economics and Institutions, 1
K Motohashi (2007)
Productivity in Asia: economic growth and competitiveness
K. Motohashi (2007)
Assessing Japan’s Industrial Competitiveness by International Productivity Level: Comparison with China, Korea, Taiwan and the United States
R. Inklaar, M. Timmer (2008)
GGDC Productivity Level Database
BH Hall (2009)
The financing of innovative firmsEuropean Investment Bank Papers, 14
J. Mairesse, Bronwyn Hall (1996)
Estimating the Productivity of Research and Development: An Exploration of GMM Methods Using Data on French & United States Manufacturing FirmsNBER Working Paper Series
Arjan Lejour, Peter Smith (2008)
International Trade in Services—Editorial IntroductionJournal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 8
(2008)
Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring
Available statistics reveal little about the economic consequences of the increasing global dispersion of production processes. To investigate the issue, we perform grass-roots investigative work to uncover the geography of the value added for a Nokia N95 smartphone circa 2007. The phone was assembled in Finland and China. When the device was assembled and sold in Europe, the value-added share of Europe (EU-27) rose to 68%. Even when it was assembled in China and sold in the United States, Europe captured as much as 51% of the value added, despite of the fact that it played little role in supplying the physical components. Our analysis illustrates that international trade statistics can be misleading; the capture of value added is largely detached from the flow of physical goods. Instead, services and other intangible aspects of the supply chain dominate. While final assembly—commanding 2% of the value added in our case—has increasingly moved offshore, the developed countries continue to capture most of the value added generated by global supply chains.
"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" – Springer Journals
Published: May 31, 2011
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.