Abstract

Psychological Inquiry, 23: 166–171, 2012 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1047-840X print / 1532-7965 online DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2012.670101 J. Kiley Hamlin Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada In their target article, Gray, Young, and Waytz re- authors raise developmental data, both in normal de- view an exciting body of research pointing to the es- velopment (e.g., newborns’ reaction to suffering; Sagi sential nature of mind perception in morality. In partic- & Hoffman, 1976; children’s use of intention in moral ular, they argue that morality is rooted in a fundamental judgment; Piaget, 1932) and in developmental disor- cognitive assumption that there are two kinds of minds: ders (e.g, autism; Baron-Cohen, 1995), suggesting they an intending mind belonging to moral agents, and an believe developmental evidence to be both relevant to experiencing mind belonging to moral patients. Each and supportive of their claims. mind in the agent/patient “moral dyad” has specific The purpose of this commentary, therefore, is to ex- mental contents associated with it: The agent’s mind amine whether or not developmental data supports the deals in intention, knowledge, and belief; the patient’s authors’ claims for a moral dyad. I discuss the develop- mind