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Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality

Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality Abstract The effectiveness of control exercised over executive remuneration and the quality of information disclosed in financial statements have given rise to concern and have led to proposals for the reform of corporate governance. A model of the optimal disclosure decision is presented in terms of managerial incentives and the impact of corporate governance structures. An investigation into the quality of share option disclosure in financial statements is used as the basis for testing hypotheses derived from the model and for assessing alternative policy options. The results support the need for guidance on the duties and responsibilities of audit committees and non-executive directors but fall short of providing a basis for deciding whether regulatory action is required. The evidence also supports the view that a threat to monitoring quality exists where the roles of chief executive and chairman are combined. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Accounting and Business Research Taylor & Francis

Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality

Accounting and Business Research , Volume 22 (86): 14 – Mar 1, 1992

Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality

Accounting and Business Research , Volume 22 (86): 14 – Mar 1, 1992

Abstract

Abstract The effectiveness of control exercised over executive remuneration and the quality of information disclosed in financial statements have given rise to concern and have led to proposals for the reform of corporate governance. A model of the optimal disclosure decision is presented in terms of managerial incentives and the impact of corporate governance structures. An investigation into the quality of share option disclosure in financial statements is used as the basis for testing hypotheses derived from the model and for assessing alternative policy options. The results support the need for guidance on the duties and responsibilities of audit committees and non-executive directors but fall short of providing a basis for deciding whether regulatory action is required. The evidence also supports the view that a threat to monitoring quality exists where the roles of chief executive and chairman are combined.

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References (22)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
2159-4260
eISSN
0001-4788
DOI
10.1080/00014788.1992.9729426
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract The effectiveness of control exercised over executive remuneration and the quality of information disclosed in financial statements have given rise to concern and have led to proposals for the reform of corporate governance. A model of the optimal disclosure decision is presented in terms of managerial incentives and the impact of corporate governance structures. An investigation into the quality of share option disclosure in financial statements is used as the basis for testing hypotheses derived from the model and for assessing alternative policy options. The results support the need for guidance on the duties and responsibilities of audit committees and non-executive directors but fall short of providing a basis for deciding whether regulatory action is required. The evidence also supports the view that a threat to monitoring quality exists where the roles of chief executive and chairman are combined.

Journal

Accounting and Business ResearchTaylor & Francis

Published: Mar 1, 1992

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