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Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?

Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences? Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png West European Politics Taylor & Francis

Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?

West European Politics , Volume 25 (1): 24 – Jan 1, 2002
24 pages

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References (59)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1743-9655
eISSN
0140-2382
DOI
10.1080/713601584
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops.

Journal

West European PoliticsTaylor & Francis

Published: Jan 1, 2002

Keywords: delegation; supranational institutions; European Commission; European Court of Justice; principal-agent theory

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