Abstract

Psychological Inquiry, 22: 108–114, 2011 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1047-840X print / 1532-7965 online DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2011.547387 Daniel Burnston, Benjamin Sheredos, and William Bechtel Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California Introduction are measured, and phenomena, which are repeatable processes in the world that are to be explained. Mea- Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been surements can provide an epistemic inroad to phenom- proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical ac- ena but should not be confused for phenomena them- counts of how mental activities (fully understood, as selves. Reading ability is a cognitive phenomenon; they might be at the end of science) relate to brain response time on the Stroop task is often used as a processes. Kievet et al. (this issue) suggest that to be measure of that phenomenon. Attention is a cognitive relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophi- phenomenon; success at discriminating targets from cal positions must make empirically testable claims distracters is one measure of it. Memory is a cognitive and be evaluated accordingly—they cannot sit on the phenomenon; accurate recall is often used to measure sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cog- it. If one examines any research