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How the EU-induced Institutional Changes Facilitated Patronage over and Capture of Judiciary in North Macedonia

How the EU-induced Institutional Changes Facilitated Patronage over and Capture of Judiciary in... Extensive reforms were undertaken to tackle the inefficiencies in judiciary in the Southeast European country of North Macedonia. The EU asked North Macedonia, as a candidate country for EU membership, to undertake intensive judiciary reforms. However, these reforms were not sufficient to eradicate and prevent patronage practices regarding the judiciary by the ruling political parties. Instead, contestation accompanied judiciary reforms. This article examines how the politics of patronage emerged and progressed and argues that it is possible to identify a quiet take-over of the judiciary by the executive. What is distinctive about North Macedonia is the failure of the reforms to constrain the ability of the ruling majorities to penetrate the judiciary. The result has been a patronage over and capture of the judiciary. This study demonstrates that there was informal resistance and failure to ensure internalization of EU judiciary norms. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies Taylor & Francis

How the EU-induced Institutional Changes Facilitated Patronage over and Capture of Judiciary in North Macedonia

Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies , Volume 24 (5): 24 – Sep 3, 2022

How the EU-induced Institutional Changes Facilitated Patronage over and Capture of Judiciary in North Macedonia

Abstract

Extensive reforms were undertaken to tackle the inefficiencies in judiciary in the Southeast European country of North Macedonia. The EU asked North Macedonia, as a candidate country for EU membership, to undertake intensive judiciary reforms. However, these reforms were not sufficient to eradicate and prevent patronage practices regarding the judiciary by the ruling political parties. Instead, contestation accompanied judiciary reforms. This article examines how the politics of patronage...
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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
ISSN
1944-8961
eISSN
1944-8953
DOI
10.1080/19448953.2022.2037961
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Extensive reforms were undertaken to tackle the inefficiencies in judiciary in the Southeast European country of North Macedonia. The EU asked North Macedonia, as a candidate country for EU membership, to undertake intensive judiciary reforms. However, these reforms were not sufficient to eradicate and prevent patronage practices regarding the judiciary by the ruling political parties. Instead, contestation accompanied judiciary reforms. This article examines how the politics of patronage emerged and progressed and argues that it is possible to identify a quiet take-over of the judiciary by the executive. What is distinctive about North Macedonia is the failure of the reforms to constrain the ability of the ruling majorities to penetrate the judiciary. The result has been a patronage over and capture of the judiciary. This study demonstrates that there was informal resistance and failure to ensure internalization of EU judiciary norms.

Journal

Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern StudiesTaylor & Francis

Published: Sep 3, 2022

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