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Humanism, reflective capacities and prejudice

Humanism, reflective capacities and prejudice Angelaki: Journal of the theoretical humanities 3:1 1998 At any particular time, the current image of the soul is a function of the current language and its inner symbolism. 0. Spengler, Decline of the West t is conceivable that a person could take a cer- I tain point of view on a question without there- by being prejudiced with respect to it. But humanism may present a special case. For there may be no way to take the "human point of view" in debate — always supposing that we know what we mean by such a phrase — without prejudging the issues it is supposed to raise. Consider the question "what is it to have access to the world in experience?" It may be impossible for a human being to raise this question except max de gaynesford from a perspective that is saturated by qualities peculiar to human experience. And these qualities may prejudge various issues. Philosophers central HUMANISM, to both the "analytic" and "continental" tradi- tions would deny that this prejudice is unavoid- REFLECTIVE able. They have claimed that non-human or "mere" animals cannot experience the world, and CAPACITIES have no world to experience. And they add no http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities Taylor & Francis

Humanism, reflective capacities and prejudice

8 pages

Humanism, reflective capacities and prejudice

Abstract

Angelaki: Journal of the theoretical humanities 3:1 1998 At any particular time, the current image of the soul is a function of the current language and its inner symbolism. 0. Spengler, Decline of the West t is conceivable that a person could take a cer- I tain point of view on a question without there- by being prejudiced with respect to it. But humanism may present a special case. For there may be no way to take the "human point of view" in debate — always supposing that we...
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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1469-2899
eISSN
0969-725X
DOI
10.1080/09697259808571970
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Angelaki: Journal of the theoretical humanities 3:1 1998 At any particular time, the current image of the soul is a function of the current language and its inner symbolism. 0. Spengler, Decline of the West t is conceivable that a person could take a cer- I tain point of view on a question without there- by being prejudiced with respect to it. But humanism may present a special case. For there may be no way to take the "human point of view" in debate — always supposing that we know what we mean by such a phrase — without prejudging the issues it is supposed to raise. Consider the question "what is it to have access to the world in experience?" It may be impossible for a human being to raise this question except max de gaynesford from a perspective that is saturated by qualities peculiar to human experience. And these qualities may prejudge various issues. Philosophers central HUMANISM, to both the "analytic" and "continental" tradi- tions would deny that this prejudice is unavoid- REFLECTIVE able. They have claimed that non-human or "mere" animals cannot experience the world, and CAPACITIES have no world to experience. And they add no

Journal

Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical HumanitiesTaylor & Francis

Published: Apr 1, 1998

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