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Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers

Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Legal Ethics, Volume 7, No.1 Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers TIM DARE* I. Introduction According to the “standard conception of the lawyer’s role”, lawyers owe special duties to their clients that allow and perhaps even require conduct that would otherwise be morally impermissible. But ‘the standard conception’ has become an ironic epithet. If numbers count, the standard view now is that it cannot be right. The conception has passed from orthodoxy to fair game, replaced by a near consensus that it “must be abandoned, to be replaced by a conception that better allows the lawyer to bring his full moral sensibilities to play in his professional role” and that “[t]he lawyer’s role carries no moral privileges and immunities”. Much of the criticism of the standard conception is directed at the idea that it requires excessive and immoral advocacy on behalf of clients. “Every lawyer”, David Luban claims, “knows tricks of the trade that can be used to do opponents out of their legal deserts”. Critics of the standard conception claim that it not only allows, but also requires them to use such tricks if it is in their client’s interests to do so. But I do http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Legal Ethics Taylor & Francis

Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers

Legal Ethics , Volume 7 (1): 15 – Jan 1, 2004

Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers

Legal Ethics , Volume 7 (1): 15 – Jan 1, 2004

Abstract

Legal Ethics, Volume 7, No.1 Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers TIM DARE* I. Introduction According to the “standard conception of the lawyer’s role”, lawyers owe special duties to their clients that allow and perhaps even require conduct that would otherwise be morally impermissible. But ‘the standard conception’ has become an ironic epithet. If numbers count, the standard view now is that it cannot be right. The conception has passed from orthodoxy to fair game, replaced by a near consensus that it “must be abandoned, to be replaced by a conception that better allows the lawyer to bring his full moral sensibilities to play in his professional role” and that “[t]he lawyer’s role carries no moral privileges and immunities”. Much of the criticism of the standard conception is directed at the idea that it requires excessive and immoral advocacy on behalf of clients. “Every lawyer”, David Luban claims, “knows tricks of the trade that can be used to do opponents out of their legal deserts”. Critics of the standard conception claim that it not only allows, but also requires them to use such tricks if it is in their client’s interests to do so. But I do

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References (10)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
© 2004 Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1757-8450
eISSN
1460-728x
DOI
10.1080/1460728X.2004.11424197
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Legal Ethics, Volume 7, No.1 Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers TIM DARE* I. Introduction According to the “standard conception of the lawyer’s role”, lawyers owe special duties to their clients that allow and perhaps even require conduct that would otherwise be morally impermissible. But ‘the standard conception’ has become an ironic epithet. If numbers count, the standard view now is that it cannot be right. The conception has passed from orthodoxy to fair game, replaced by a near consensus that it “must be abandoned, to be replaced by a conception that better allows the lawyer to bring his full moral sensibilities to play in his professional role” and that “[t]he lawyer’s role carries no moral privileges and immunities”. Much of the criticism of the standard conception is directed at the idea that it requires excessive and immoral advocacy on behalf of clients. “Every lawyer”, David Luban claims, “knows tricks of the trade that can be used to do opponents out of their legal deserts”. Critics of the standard conception claim that it not only allows, but also requires them to use such tricks if it is in their client’s interests to do so. But I do

Journal

Legal EthicsTaylor & Francis

Published: Jan 1, 2004

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