Abstract

Psychological Inquiry, 26: 197–199, 2015 Copyright
Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1047-840X print / 1532-7965 online DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2015.1010421 Richard J. McNally Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts In their stimulating target article, Bonanno, Romero, fallacy occurs when characteristics possessed by the and Klein (this issue) ask whether we can measure— whole are improperly applied to its parts (Bennett & and perhaps facilitate—the psychological resilience Hacker, 2003; Smit & Hacker, 2014). Such language of communities, buffering them against the adverse sometimes occurs in cognitive neuroscience when effects of traumatic stressors. Just as some anthropol- people attribute predicates to the brain that apply ogists (e.g., Robben, 2005) and sociologists (e.g., only to the whole person (e.g., the “creative brain”). Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser, & Sztompka, Anyone speaking of resilient brains, genes, and so 2004) speak of societal and cultural trauma, Bonanno forth would be committing the mereological fallacy. et al. propose that the concept of resilience may like- Potentially more relevant to community resilience wise be usefully applied to social units larger than the is the fallacy of composition—the error of assuming individual. that what applies to the individual necessarily applies Their article raises several interesting issues. First,