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Preface

Preface Abstract § 1. In my view meaning tends to be given too important a role in the explanation of the communicative function of language. There is a tendency to reason like this: If a given linguistic element contributes to the communicative function of an utterance this element must eo ipso have some meaning, and, conversely, when we have understood the meanings contained in an utterance there is no part of the information conveyed which has not been grasped. Naturally it is possible to understand ‘meaning’ in so vague and imprecise a way that this becomes correct. For example, with respect to proper names it is, of course, possible to hold that “these possess meaning in the sense that they are known to refer to something, the mental counterpart of that something constituting the “meaning” (Gardiner 1940, p. 41). However, the fact that a linguistic element has the power to call forth a subjective, mental image does not imply that the element has meaning in any relevant sense of the word, and, let me add, Gardiner himself does not think so1). When I talk about ‘meanings’ I must always be understood to mean concepts, i.e. what Mill and Alston (and many others) call ‘connotations’. And meanings in this sense cannot explain the referential function of linguistic expressions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International Taylor & Francis

Preface

Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International , Volume 19 (1): 5 – Jan 1, 1985
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Preface

Abstract

Abstract § 1. In my view meaning tends to be given too important a role in the explanation of the communicative function of language. There is a tendency to reason like this: If a given linguistic element contributes to the communicative function of an utterance this element must eo ipso have some meaning, and, conversely, when we have understood the meanings contained in an utterance there is no part of the information conveyed which has not been grasped. Naturally it is possible to...
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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1949-0763
eISSN
0374-0463
DOI
10.1080/03740463.1985.10416053
Publisher site
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Abstract

Abstract § 1. In my view meaning tends to be given too important a role in the explanation of the communicative function of language. There is a tendency to reason like this: If a given linguistic element contributes to the communicative function of an utterance this element must eo ipso have some meaning, and, conversely, when we have understood the meanings contained in an utterance there is no part of the information conveyed which has not been grasped. Naturally it is possible to understand ‘meaning’ in so vague and imprecise a way that this becomes correct. For example, with respect to proper names it is, of course, possible to hold that “these possess meaning in the sense that they are known to refer to something, the mental counterpart of that something constituting the “meaning” (Gardiner 1940, p. 41). However, the fact that a linguistic element has the power to call forth a subjective, mental image does not imply that the element has meaning in any relevant sense of the word, and, let me add, Gardiner himself does not think so1). When I talk about ‘meanings’ I must always be understood to mean concepts, i.e. what Mill and Alston (and many others) call ‘connotations’. And meanings in this sense cannot explain the referential function of linguistic expressions.

Journal

Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International – Taylor & Francis

Published: Jan 1, 1985

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