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The calculus of feeling, or how to live on as a linguist after the death of the representation

The calculus of feeling, or how to live on as a linguist after the death of the representation Abstract In reaction against the still popular but (for many) increasingly unpalatable notion of a ‘language of thought’ (cf. Fodor 1975, Jackendoff 1983:19f.), and the digital computer metaphor of the mind that lies behind it, alternative models have been proposed with vigour within the broad field of Cognitive Science. Such models have largely abandoned the notion of a monolithic, modality-free system of mental representations upon which central cognitive processes act. These alternatives include Paivio's dual coding approach (Paivio 1986), Pribram's holographic model (Pribram 1971:250ff), Johnson's ‘body in the mind’ (Johnson 1987)1, Johnson-Laird's ‘mental models' (Johnson-Laird 1983), and the whole thriving new field of connectionism (see Elman et al. 1997). Chaos Theory is beginning, moreover, to alter our overall picture of how the brain/mind may function ‘at the edge of Chaos’ (cf. Robertson and Combs 1994, also Edelman 1987). Despite such conceptual advances, theoretical linguists continue blithely to argue over their specific brands of semantic (or other) representations, taking it for granted that such things have been or will be pinpointed in the human brain. The most common attitude is perhaps this: “If neurolinguists have not yet reached full agreement on how meanings (or anything else) are represented in the mind/brain, why should we be expected to stick our necks out on such matters? Meanings of sentences must obviously be represented there somehow, since we can recall them. Our labelled units of meaning are merely shorthand abbreviations for whatever neural reality may lie behind their instantiation.” http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International Taylor & Francis

The calculus of feeling, or how to live on as a linguist after the death of the representation

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The calculus of feeling, or how to live on as a linguist after the death of the representation

Abstract

Abstract In reaction against the still popular but (for many) increasingly unpalatable notion of a ‘language of thought’ (cf. Fodor 1975, Jackendoff 1983:19f.), and the digital computer metaphor of the mind that lies behind it, alternative models have been proposed with vigour within the broad field of Cognitive Science. Such models have largely abandoned the notion of a monolithic, modality-free system of mental representations upon which central cognitive processes act. These...
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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1949-0763
eISSN
0374-0463
DOI
10.1080/03740463.1999.10415465
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract In reaction against the still popular but (for many) increasingly unpalatable notion of a ‘language of thought’ (cf. Fodor 1975, Jackendoff 1983:19f.), and the digital computer metaphor of the mind that lies behind it, alternative models have been proposed with vigour within the broad field of Cognitive Science. Such models have largely abandoned the notion of a monolithic, modality-free system of mental representations upon which central cognitive processes act. These alternatives include Paivio's dual coding approach (Paivio 1986), Pribram's holographic model (Pribram 1971:250ff), Johnson's ‘body in the mind’ (Johnson 1987)1, Johnson-Laird's ‘mental models' (Johnson-Laird 1983), and the whole thriving new field of connectionism (see Elman et al. 1997). Chaos Theory is beginning, moreover, to alter our overall picture of how the brain/mind may function ‘at the edge of Chaos’ (cf. Robertson and Combs 1994, also Edelman 1987). Despite such conceptual advances, theoretical linguists continue blithely to argue over their specific brands of semantic (or other) representations, taking it for granted that such things have been or will be pinpointed in the human brain. The most common attitude is perhaps this: “If neurolinguists have not yet reached full agreement on how meanings (or anything else) are represented in the mind/brain, why should we be expected to stick our necks out on such matters? Meanings of sentences must obviously be represented there somehow, since we can recall them. Our labelled units of meaning are merely shorthand abbreviations for whatever neural reality may lie behind their instantiation.”

Journal

Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International – Taylor & Francis

Published: Jan 1, 1999

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