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The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940

The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940 incapable of making up the difference neutrality in 1936, the French were partially Kaufmann, J. E., and H. W. Kaufmann between herself and the other two great pow- forced out of their defensive posture in the The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass ers, despite Hitler’s energetic rearmament Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group (likely) event of German invasion of that 151 pp., $55.00, ISBN 0-275-95719-5 program. country because allied aid to Belgium was Publication Date: October 1997 Here is where Corum makes his contribu- essential to guard the industrial northeast of tion. He shows that actual accumulation of France; to accomplish such, at least a limited Few phenomena of the twentieth century have military aircraft from 1918 to 1934 was not SO allied strategic offensive to aid the Belgians been so misunderstood and maligned as important because, in the meantime, the Ger- became imperative. This presented a dilem- France’s elaborate system of frontier defens- man advocates of air power worked very dili- ma. The authors quote Theodore Draper’s es dating from 1929 and collectively (and gently to craft a doctrinal and operational 1944 classic, The Six Weeks’ War; May erroneously) called “the Maginot Line.” Two base for a modern air force. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History: Reviews of New Books Taylor & Francis

The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940

History: Reviews of New Books , Volume 26 (4): 2 – Jul 1, 1998
2 pages

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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1930-8280
eISSN
0361-2759
DOI
10.1080/03612759.1998.10528218
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

incapable of making up the difference neutrality in 1936, the French were partially Kaufmann, J. E., and H. W. Kaufmann between herself and the other two great pow- forced out of their defensive posture in the The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass ers, despite Hitler’s energetic rearmament Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group (likely) event of German invasion of that 151 pp., $55.00, ISBN 0-275-95719-5 program. country because allied aid to Belgium was Publication Date: October 1997 Here is where Corum makes his contribu- essential to guard the industrial northeast of tion. He shows that actual accumulation of France; to accomplish such, at least a limited Few phenomena of the twentieth century have military aircraft from 1918 to 1934 was not SO allied strategic offensive to aid the Belgians been so misunderstood and maligned as important because, in the meantime, the Ger- became imperative. This presented a dilem- France’s elaborate system of frontier defens- man advocates of air power worked very dili- ma. The authors quote Theodore Draper’s es dating from 1929 and collectively (and gently to craft a doctrinal and operational 1944 classic, The Six Weeks’ War; May erroneously) called “the Maginot Line.” Two base for a modern air force.

Journal

History: Reviews of New BooksTaylor & Francis

Published: Jul 1, 1998

There are no references for this article.