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Unilateral Divorce for Women and Labor Supply in the Middle East and North Africa: The Effect of Khul Reform

Unilateral Divorce for Women and Labor Supply in the Middle East and North Africa: The Effect of... This contribution investigates whether the introduction of Khul, Islamic unilateral divorce rights for women, helps to explain recent dramatic increases in women's labor supply in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries over the 1980–2008 period. It shows, using data for eighteen countries, that Khul reform increased the labor force participation of women relative to men. Furthermore, we find evidence that the effect of Khul is larger for younger women (ages 24–34) compared to older women (ages 35–55). Younger women increased their labor force participation by 6 percent, which accounts for about 10 percent of the increase in their labor force participation from 1980 to 2008. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Feminist Economics Taylor & Francis

Unilateral Divorce for Women and Labor Supply in the Middle East and North Africa: The Effect of Khul Reform

Hassani-Nezhad, Lena; Sjögren, Anna
Feminist Economics , Volume 20 (4): 25 – Oct 2, 2014
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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
© 2014 IAFFE
ISSN
1466-4372
eISSN
1354-5701
DOI
10.1080/13545701.2014.932421
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This contribution investigates whether the introduction of Khul, Islamic unilateral divorce rights for women, helps to explain recent dramatic increases in women's labor supply in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries over the 1980–2008 period. It shows, using data for eighteen countries, that Khul reform increased the labor force participation of women relative to men. Furthermore, we find evidence that the effect of Khul is larger for younger women (ages 24–34) compared to older women (ages 35–55). Younger women increased their labor force participation by 6 percent, which accounts for about 10 percent of the increase in their labor force participation from 1980 to 2008.

Journal

Feminist Economics – Taylor & Francis

Published: Oct 2, 2014

Keywords: Family law; intrahousehold bargaining; women's labor force participation; D1; J2

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