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/lp/university-of-chicago-press/cameras-of-merit-or-engines-of-inequality-college-ranking-systems-and-dV71rPZ0gC
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Copyright
- © 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
- ISSN
- 0002-9602
- eISSN
- 1537-5390
- DOI
- 10.1086/714916
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The expansion of ranking systems has increased public access to information about organizations, but there is burgeoning concern that rankings reduce the accessibility of goods and services for individuals from lower socioeconomic status backgrounds. The evidence and underlying theory for this claim, however, remain unclear. This article develops two possibilities: (1) positional advantage, where rankings increase demand for better-ranked organizations and crowd out disadvantaged individuals; and (2) algorithmic trade-offs, where rankings lead organizations to optimize on criteria that are in tension with serving individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds. Scope conditions for these theories are established, and key predictions are tested with administrative data matched with U.S. News & World Report college rankings between 1997 and 2015. This research clarifies how the consequences of ranking systems spill over from organizations to broader social inequalities and demonstrates when and how rankings contribute to structural barriers to upward mobility.
Journal
American Journal of Sociology – University of Chicago Press
Published: May 1, 2021