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Value and Conceptions of the Whole: The Views of Dewey, Nagel, and Gamwell William J. Meyer illiam James once suggested that the underlying difference between empiricists and rationalists is that empiricists explain wholes in Wterms of parts, while rationalists explain parts in relation to wholes. Whatever the merits of this description, it is fair to say that modern thought has predominantly followed the empiricist habit of emphasizing parts and par- ticularity rather than wholes and totality. This essay explores the views of three philosophers who have challenged this dominant trend. In various ways, John Dewey, Thomas Nagel, and Franklin Gamwell have argued that the meaning and value of human life are only properly understood in relation to the whole of reality. To be sure, Dewey embraced the empiricist mantle. Nevertheless, whether it was due to his early neo-Hegelianism or to his persistent holistic conception of the world, he always resisted the reductionistic tendencies of modern empiricism. Likewise, Nagel and Gamwell appreciate the insights of empiricism while also rejecting its tendency to ignore, deny, or downplay the importance of the whole. But what do Dewey, Nagel, and Gamwell mean when they speak of the whole? This article sets forth and
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy – University of Illinois Press
Published: Aug 5, 2020
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