Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Subscribe now for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Technocratic Populism à la Française? The Roots and Mechanisms of Emmanuel Macron’s Success

Technocratic Populism à la Française? The Roots and Mechanisms of Emmanuel Macron’s Success ThisarticlefocusesontherootsandmechanismsofMacron’ssuccess,arguingthatin2017twoconditionswereessential inMacron’srise—theimplosionoftheestablishedsystemoftheFrenchFifthRepublicinwhichthetwomainpartieswere alternating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment populist challengers on the right and on the left (cf. Stockemer, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). It was anti-establishment appeal that put Macron on the map, but the appeal to technocratic competencethatwonhimthepresidency.Technocraticpopulismtranscendstheleft–rightcleavageand,asaresult,hasa broaderappealthanitsleft-andright-wingcounterparts.EmmanuelMacronwasaninsidertakingonthe(crumbling)sys- temandpositioninghimselfasanoutsider—refusingthetraditionallabels,includingcentrism,eliterecruitmentpatterns, andmediatedpolitics.Instead,MacronandLaRepubliqueenMarcheattemptedtocreatenewformsofresponsivenessby ‘givingvoicetothepeople,’whilerelyingontechnocraticcompetenceasalegitimationmechanism.InpowerEmmanuel Macronattemptstobalanceresponsivenessandresponsibility(cf.Guasti&Buštíková,2020). Keywords France;Macron;populism;technocraticpopulism Issue This article is part of the issue “Varieties of Technocratic Populism around the World” edited by Petra Guasti (Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic) and Lenka Buštíková (Institute of Sociology of the Czech AcademyofSciences,CzechRepublic/ArizonaStateUniversity,USA). © 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion4.0InternationalLicense(CCBY). 1.Introduction BeforethePresidency,EmmanuelMacronneverheldan electedoffice.EventhoughhewasMinisterofEconomy, CommentatorsconsidertheFrenchpresidentialelection Industry,andDigitalAffairsinManuelValls’government inMay2017asadisruption(Perrineau,2017)inthelong (2014–2016), Macron successfully presented himself as traditionofFrenchpolitics.Thedramaticchangesinclude an outsider. Macron cultivated the image of a (moder- failure of the mainstream candidates on the right and ate) challenger of the old system, the only one able to the left in the first round of the presidential elections, transcendthestaleestablishmentofFrenchpoliticsand theuseofsocialmedia,andarelativelyhighabstention reform France, the only candidate to overcome the old rate. The mostsignificant change was the winner of the sterileFrenchcleavages. election himself: Emmanuel Macron, a young newcom- This election seemed to fulfil the idea of a success- er. Macron was elected at the age of 39, the youngest ful third way, neither right nor left, breaking the tra- elected President of the Fifth republic before him was ditional cleavage typical for the last seven decades of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, elected at the age of 48. This French politics. Emmanuel Macron won both the first youth was also a part of the newness and freshness. andthesecondroundofthepresidentialelections,even PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 545 thoughitwashisfirstelection.Thisvictoryofanewcom- Usingtheliteratureonvarietiesofpopulism(Caiani& erwasconfirmedbythegeneralelectionresultsamonth Graziano,2016;Zulianello,2020)andthecaseofFrance, later. Macron’s new ‘party’ La Republique en Marche we show the vast differences among various populisms (The Republic on the Move, LREM), gained an absolute present on the French political scene and the long and majority.ItenabledMacrontoformaGovernmentable rich history of populism in France—for instance, the to enact Macron’s ambitious plan to transform French boulangism (1885–1889) or the poujadism in the 1950s politics and society. Like their leader, the majority of (Birnbaum, 2012; Surel, 2019). We can identify Marine thenewparliamentarianswerenewcomersandhadnev- LePenandherNationalRally(ex-NationalFront;Mudde er held elected office before (LREM lost a part of its &RoviraKaltwasser,2018)andJean-LucMélenchonand deputiesquiterapidly,andinthespringof2020,itlostits his France Unbowed (La France Insoumise; Ivaldi, 2019; absolutemajority;Momtaz,2020).This wasseenasevi- Norris, 2020; Rosanvallon, 2020; Surel, 2019) as pop- dence of the promise of the renewal of French politics ulist (Zulianello, 2020). Both represent different pop- (Surel,2019). ulismtypes,asthehostideologydiverges—theNational As in other cases of successful personalist populist Front is a radical right-wing populist party and France parties founded by outsiders and disrupting difunction- Unbowed, on the contrary, is a radical left-wing pop- al party systems (Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in 1994 and ulist party. The disparities in terms of leadership, style, Babiš’s ANO in 2013), Emmanuel Macron’s rapid ‘march rhetoric,andaboveallintermsofprogramsarequitesig- to the power’ started officially almost a year before, nificant. However, they share some similarities (like the without clear electoral support, with a relatively weak positioning against the EU; cf. Halikiopoulou, Nanou, & program and blurred campaign funding (Kuhn, 2017). Vasilopoulou,2012). Berlusconi and Babiš both combined populist and tech- At first sight, Emmanuel Macron has nothing in nocraticappealtobroadentheirelectoralchances.Both common with Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. havebeenstudiedthroughthelensoftechnocraticpop- The Chapel Hill Survey (2019) shows that Macron’s ulism, used initially to study Latin America (Buštíková & LREM is quite far away from the positions of both Guasti, 2019; Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; de la Torre, right-wing and left-wing populist parties, especially on 2013; Havlík, 2019). As Emmanuel Macron shares many the EU (LREM is broadly pro-European), protectionism, of their characteristics, this article applies the techno- and other policies. Most importantly, compared to the craticpopulismperspectivetotestwhetherMacronisa National Front and France Unbowed, Macron’s LREM technocraticpopulist. alsoscoresrelativelylowonanti-elitesalience.However, This article proceeds as follows. In part two, we while Emmanuel Macron and his LREM position them- clarify some of the terminology and concepts (focus- selves as the representatives of a moderate part of the ing on technocratic populism) used to show how and French political arena, LREM scores higher on anti-elite why Emmanuel Macron (as a leader) matches these saliencethan othermoderateFrenchparties. According categories (as a charismatic leader claiming technocrat- to CHES experts, LREM is a moderate, non-populist ic competence, against the established political elites). party. However, for Norris and Inglehart (2017, p. 12), InpartthreeandfourweexplainhowandwhyMacron’s EmmanuelMacronisacentristpopulistleader.AsPippa success was possible and to what extent he is a techno- Norrismentioned: craticpopulistinpower,mainlybyfocusingontheways hegoverns. Despiteoftenbeinglabelled‘radicalright,’infact,pop- ulist parties are also distributed in the other quad- 2.VarietiesofPopulismandtheTechnocraticPopulism rants….Therearealsoafewpopulistpartiesscattered in the other quadrants, such as President Macron Thedebateontheconceptualdefinitionofpopulismand whocampaignedforLaRépubliqueEnMarche!asan theterminologyisstillopen(forinstance,seeMudde& anti-establishmentoutsider,whileadvocatingmoder- RoviraKaltwasser,2018). ate economic policies and a pro-EU stance. (Norris, Some of the commonly used criteria to define pop- 2020,p.15) ulismare‘thinideology’,peoplevs.elites,specificpoliti- calrhetoricandstyle,orstrategy.Populismvariesacross The core of Macron’s populist appeal relies on the cri- time and space and has many faces beyond the classi- tique and rejection of intermediate bodies, combined cal (extreme) right-wing (Norris, 2020; Zulianello, 2020). with a robust anti-establishment discourse and a spe- In order to classify whether and what type of populist cific call to the French people. Macron has already Emmanuel Macron is, we draw on classical scholars of beenclassifiedasapopulistbypoliticalscientists(Ivaldi, populism (Canovan, 1999; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019), sometimes in a specific way (“populist from the 2018),acontemporarycontribution(Buštíková&Guasti, extreme-centre,’’ Godin, 2016; “antipopulist populist,” 2019), and theoretical scholarship on similarities and Bordignon,2017).Tosomeextent,theriseofEmmanuel differences between populist and technocratic critiques MacronshouldbeseenasaneffectoftheFifthRepublic of party democracy (cf. Bickerton & Accetti, 2017; system, but in a new populist logic dominating the Caramani,2017). Frenchpoliticallandscape. PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 546 Theadaptabilityof populism tovariousideologies is mation and a strategy to distinguish himself from his notnew(Mudde,2004;Taggart,2000).Oneofourprima- anti-establishmentcompetitors,especiallyhismaincom- ryhypothesesisthatpopulism,mainlyasadiscourseand petitor in the second round of presidential elections, astyle,isnotlimitedtothepoliticalextremesontheleft MarineLePen. andtherightandshouldnotbereducedtoademocratic Nevertheless, let us summarize some criteria of threat (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018; Stavrakakis & Jäger, the technocratic populism: A charismatic leader calls 2018). The concept of centrist populism has been used for the fight against the political establishment in the to describe parties neither on the left nor on the right. name of the people, denouncing the intermediate bod- It is based on an assumption of an ideal political space, ies(inabroadsense,includingparties),andcommunicat- anin-between,rejectingtheideologicalextremes. ingdirectlywiththepeople.Technocraticpopulismdoes Mattia Zulianello (2020) has significantly contribut- not only appear as an alternative to the ideology of lib- ed to conceptualizing this residual category into a new eral democratic pluralism (Havlík, 2019) but also when type. Valence populist parties compete predominantly, thetraditionalpartysystemisexhausted,andstalemain- if not exclusively, by focusing on nonpositional ‘valence’ streampartiesareunabletoeffectivelyreacttonewchal- issues, such as the fight against corruption, increased lenges (cf. Caiani & Graziano, 2016). Under these con- transparency, democratic reform, and moral integrity, ditions, a weakened party system creates an opening while emphasizing anti-establishment motives. There is for newcomers (cf. Aprasidze & Siroky, 2020; Buštíková no ideological positioning on the difference between & Guasti, 2019; Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; Ganuza & the mentioned centrist populist and the claim of com- Font,2020). petenceandperformance(Zulianello,2020).Historically, valence populist parties emerged mainly in Central 3.TheOriginsofMacron’sTechnocraticPopulism and Eastern Europe (Haughton & Deegan-Krause, 2015; Učeň,2007). 3.1.TheSocialandPoliticalFrameofMacron’s We argue that the concept of valence populism TechnocraticPopulism (Zulianello, 2020, p. 329) is a good starting point to cap- ture Emmanuel Macron and his LREM for two reasons. In explaining the rise of populism to power, it is essen- First, Emmanuel Macron rejected being positioned in tial to consider the appeal and strategies of ascending the center—for him, the left, the right, and the cen- populistsandthepoliticalcontext.Tosomeextent,they ter are obsolete categories. Second, using the flexibili- aretheproductoftheirtimeand,aboveallofthesociety ty of valence populism enables us to identify Macron’s fromwhichtheyariseandwhichallowsthemtowinelec- key valence issue—technocratic expertise. Emmanuel tions(onthelong-termchangesinpoliticsandsocietyin Macron presents himself as an expert in both the pub- Western Europe, see Lynch, 2019; on populism and cri- lic and private spheres. The concept of valence pop- sis, see Caiani & Graziano, 2016). The rise of Emmanuel ulism captures both Macron’s refusal to be positioned Macron is both the result of his charisma, political acu- on the left–right continuum and his self-presentation— men and successful strategy, but also of the state of foundinghislegitimacyinhiscareerinthestateappara- Frenchpolitics. tusandthebankingsector. TheinitialrootsofMacron’ssuccessseemtobeinthe FocusingonMacron’sself-identificationasanexpert economicandfinancialcrisisinthelate2000swhenthe and his career as a technocrat also resonates with Frenchgovernment’sattempttofindasolutionseemed theconceptoftechnocraticpopulism.Technocraticpop- ineffective. Nevertheless, we have to look at its deep- ulismasa‘thinideology’isbasedontherejectionofthe er roots in French history. The main change we have to traditional political parties and on the promise of apo- point out is the progressive disappearance of the clear liticalexpertsolutionsthatbenefitthe‘ordinarypeople’ left–right cleavage. This cleavage is linked to the begin- (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019) As showed by Buštíková and ning of the French Revolution after 1789 and the con- Guasti,“itcombinestheideologyofexpertisewithapop- frontation of ‘two Frances.’ In the second half of the ulist political appeal to ordinary people,” “technocratic 20th century, we can see that for the first time, this populism uses the ideology of numbers and the ideol- cleavage was suppressed by the rise of the French Fifth ogy of expert knowledge to appeal directly to the vot- Republic under the leadership of Charles De Gaulle and ers using an anti-elite, populist rhetoric” (Buštíková & thebeginningof23yearsof‘dextrism’(thegovernment Guasti,2019,p.305).Interestinglythetechnocraticpop- oftheright). ulism undermines the principle of horizontal and verti- TheFrenchFifthRepublicwasconfrontational.While calaccountability,asCaramanishowed(Caramani,2017; the right was in power, the left alternative was clear Guasti,2020). and sharp (but also divided between the declining Two key features of Macron’s appeal match this Communist party and the growing Socialist party). conceptualization. His strong rhetoric against his for- Theshiftfromrighttoleftoccurredin1981afterthesuc- mer Socialist party and broadly against all the French cess of Francois Mitterrand in the presidential election. political elites—an anti-establishment strategy. Second, Itwasseenasarevolutionaryoracatastrophicmoment the use of personal competence as a form of legiti- (dependingontheanalyst). PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 547 After some years, the leftist policy showed its limits, ENA still forms the elite of the French civil servants. and Mitterrand decided to turn in 1983–1984. The gov- Macron (who studied at Sciences Po Paris before ENA) ernmentbegantotakeamuchmoreliberalline.Thishis- ranked fifth in his group at the end of the cursus, thus torical change (practically the abandonment of a long- demonstratinganextraordinarycompetence. term program of the French left) was not successful. For a long time, ENA has been criticized as a form Afterthe1986generalelections,Franceexperienced,for of elite reproduction. The first systematic critic of this the first time, the cohabitation of the left and the right, school and the elites it produced appeared in the late andthereversepolicyofprivatizations. 1960s(Mandrin,1967).Verylittlehaschangedsince,and The ideological rapprochement of the left and its thecritiquecanbeconsideredjustasrelevanttoday.ENA embrace of the liberal paradigm blurred the tradi- isanelitistandtechnocraticschool.Itproducedgenera- tional differences between the left and the right— tions of high civil servants, who made a career not only both were practically calling for the same solutions intheFrenchhighadministrationbutalsoinpoliticsand and became indistinguishable, especially on economic theprivatesector. issues. What remained was a vast difference between EmmanuelMacronisatypicalproductofENA.After the moderate right and the moderate left regarding ENA, Macron had a short career in the Inspectorate social positioning (identity issues). The economic and General of Finances and then moved to a multina- financial crisis brought the political compromise about tional investment bank and financial services company the liberal paradigm to the fore and engendered the Rothschild & Co. Some of the first information about anti-establishment critique of Jean-Marie Le Pen, who MacrontoappearintheFrenchmedia,inSummer2014, denouncedboththeleftandtherightas‘bonnetblancet emphasized his “impressive curriculum vitae” (Chabas, blancbonnet’or,inotherwords,theplotofthecollusion 2014). We can recall here the words of Paul Taggart: ofpoliticalelitesthatwereseeminglyinopposition. Populism“requiresthemostextraordinaryindividualsto In the years leading to the 2017 presidential elec- lead the most ordinary of people” (Taggart, 2000, p. 1; tions, the moderate right lost an essential part of its seealsoMudde,2004). electorate to the radical right. Yet, its electoral failure Macron turned against this form of elite reproduc- is a result of the scandals of the Republican candidate tion, as a consequence of the 2019 debate. Macron— François Fillon. Macron presented himself as the only part of an elite—turned against the elite and espoused real alternative to the old, and delegitimated the polit- anti-elite discourse. In the aftermath of the November ical establishment from both sides, moderate right and 2015 terrorist attacks, he said: “The elites, not the soci- left.ThekeytoMacron’srisewasthebreakdownofthe ety, bear a responsibility” (“Radicalisation: Macron juge Socialist party, which made the shift of the left-wing lesélites,”2015).EmmanuelMacronwasahightechno- electoratetoLREMpossible.Thisnewsituationappears crat with experience in both the public and the private clearly if we compare, for instance, the results of the sectors. In 2015 he turned populist, but his technocrat- Socialist’s candidates in the first round of the presiden- ic competences (and efficiency) remains the source of tial elections in 2012 and 2017 (Hollande 28.63% and his legitimacy. Macron was the right man at the right Hamon 6.36%, respectively). We can make here a par- placeintherighttime—technocraticpopulistatthecrit- allel with the situation in the Czech Republic, where ical juncture of French politics marked by the break- the technocratic populist A. Babiš won a large part of down of left–right cleavage. The second round of the the left-wing electorate in 2013 and 2017 (Buštíková & 2017electionwasEmmanuelMacronorMarineLePen— Guasti,2019;Stauber,2019)ortotheriseofIgorMatovič technocraticpopulistpalatableformany,orradicalright inSlovakia(Buštíková&Babos,2020). leader, unacceptable for the voters of mainstream par- Due to the failure of the mainstream parties on the ties(cf.Stockemer,2017). left and the right, Emmanuel Macron was seen as the sole candidate likely to defeat Marine Le Pen in the 3.3.TheRiseofaCharismaticTechnocrat 2017presidentialelections.Hewasalsoseenastherep- resentative of young modern France—a leader propos- From the beginning of his successful electoral cam- ing a genuinely modern vision and reforms necessary paign, Emmanuel Macron presented himself as the to save France from its long-term social and econom- champion of the fight against the political system. He icdifficulties. introduced himself as an outsider—a new politician who is not linked to the establishment and the old- 3.2.ASpecificCareerofaTechnocrat fashioned parties and elites. He vowed to abandon out- dated ideological discourses and practices and focus Emmanuel Macron is a classical product of the French on practical and effective solutions to contemporary technocracy that appears after the Second World War. economic and societal problems. In a 2016 debate The reform of the state was driven by the idea of a pro- with Columbia University students, Macron embraced fessional depoliticized administration. The new model, anti-establishment rhetoric and reiterated the refusal whichpersiststoday,hasatitstoptheNationalSchoolof to be placed on the LR continuum by his opponents Administration (Ecole Nationale d’Administration, ENA). (Robequain, 2016). Macron saw himself as fighting the PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 548 old and ineffective model of French political compe- specificitiesandshowhowthisnewrealitymatchesthe tition; as somebody who transcends the more than idealtypeoftechnocraticpopulism. 200-year-oldleft–rightcleavage. During his brief career as a minister, Macron identi- 3.4.MacronastheOnlyPossibleSolution fied as a Socialist. But in 2016, he rejected this ‘label’ along with the ‘centrist’ label, preferring at that time As we already stated, one of the key factors of the ‘man of the left’ or ‘liberal’ (Macron, 2016). He also Macron’s success was (and still is) the failure of the started to cite a broad list of references (mixing Pierre well-established parties of the moderate left and right Mendès-France,FrançoisMitterrand,butmainlyCharles (cf. Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020, for parallel develop- de Gaulle). Nevertheless, his policies could certainly be ment in Italy). These parties were alternating in power seen as centrist in the French context (Barlow, 2017). since the 1970s, dominating French political life. Their His positioning between the oldest (formerly) domi- domination progressively eroded due to the growing nant parties (the Socialist party on the left and the electoral success of the anti-establishment radical right Republicans on the right) is seen in France as evidence National Front, which challenged the political establish- of this. To some extent, Macron and the LREM sym- ment.However,theprogressiveweakeningoftheestab- bolically pushed the old-fashioned ‘centrists’ from the lishmentpartieswasmainlyduetointernalcauses(inca- MouvementDémocratetotheright. pacitytoselectcompetentelitesorcorruption;Perottino, The ability to attract media coverage is crucial 2016).Astheestablishmenteroded,andtheradicalright to understanding the speed of Macron’s political rise. remained unpalatable for mainstream voters, a window EmmanuelMacronsucceededinportrayinganimageof of opportunity opened for Macron, who successfully apoliticaloutsidertakingontheolddysfunctionalestab- usedit. lishment that did not match the reality—with his past Macron started his political career with the Socialist career within the system he criticized since the begin- Party (he was a ranking member of this party in ning of his path to the French presidency. The changes 2006–2009; “Emmanuel Macron n’est plus encarté,” in French society, namely its de-ideologization and 2015).However,heroseintheranksthankstohisprofes- de-politicization (Perottino, 2016), contributed to the sional technocratic career, competence, and networks appealofanapoliticaltechnocracy(cf.Putnam,1977). (social capital). His legitimacy claim was to be an out- Macron’s 2016 arrival on the political scene as a sider, even if he was one of the essential ministers presidential candidate is simultaneous with the pro- before running for President (Pietralunga & Bonnefous, found crises of the French establishment political par- 2016).This(relative)newnesswasalsounderlinedbyhis tiesontheleft(Socialists)andontheright(Republicans). age and largely contradicted the ‘normal’ way to enter In the second round of the 2017 elections, Emmanuel politics in France. Once again, Macron was the insider- Macron also presented his new movement (LREM) outsider product and a part of a system he denounced: as the only alternative to the extreme right pop- “Faced with the system, my will to transgress is strong” ulist Marine Le Pen’s National Front (today National (“EmmanuelMacron:Faceausystème,”2016). Rally). The alternative to the exclusionary populism of Macron refused to play the game of the left and Marine Le Pen was Macron’s new formula mixing anti- declined participating in the presidential primaries de establishmentpopulistdiscoursewithanappealtotech- facto organized by his former party. This refusal was nocracyandexpertise. quite logical as Macron refused to be seen as a part Sofia Ventura showed that, during his campaign, of an ending world and to risk losing his main advan- Macron denounced the political elites and the gap tages without gaining anything. He was criticized for betweentheeliteandthepeople:“Theynolongerspeak his weak ideological anchoring, and a blur program. for the people, they speak for themselves” (Ventura, Macron’s approach and action can be seen as return- 2018, p. 95). In his book, Macron rejected at that time ing to what Maurice Duverger called the ‘swamp’ the French political elite as a whole (Macron, 2016). (le marais; see Elgie, 2018). As mentioned by Mayaffre, Finally, in November 2018, in front of the French may- Bouzereau,Ducoffe,Guaresi,andPrecioso(2017,p.135): ors, Macron presented himself and LREM “as real pop- “EmmanuelMacron’sspeechescultivatedynamicsmore ulists,wearewiththepeople,everyday”(Jublin,2018). than they work on themes; they rely on the modali- By doing this, Macron draws a line between populism ties of politics and action (bringing together, setting in anddemagogues(i.e.,LePen). motion, building consensus) more than on the political The populist appeal of a former Minister and tech- programitself.’’ nocrat remains counter intuitive. Nevertheless, Macron Emmanuel Macron entered the political world as was described as a populist (Bordignon, 2017; Godin, a technocrat, not through the classical electoral path. 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and embraced the label He never ran at any level of the French political system. himself (Jublin, 2018; Macron, 2016). This article aims His legitimacy was only technocratic, as a high civil ser- to question both these premises and demonstrate the vant and as a top bank manager. Macron’s two years extent to which Emmanuel Macron can be described as engagement as a minister gave him a high capacity to atechnocraticpopulist.Todothat,weanalyzetheFrench show his know-how and provided necessary credibility PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 549 as a social-liberal. His private sector career equipped mative president’—highly active and visible known as him to present himself as more transparent and effi- the ‘hyperpresident’ (Sarkozy). And third, a ‘Jupiterian cient than his fellow ministers in the Socialist govern- president’—detached from everyday politics above ‘the ment.Whilethegovernmentwasfacingstrongcritiques, political scrum’ and beloved by the people (de Gaulle). part of the opposition presented Macron as a ‘good Macron, a long-time admirer of de Gaulle, embraces minister doing good things.’ During his time as a minis- the latter symbolically and in his presidential posture— ter of economy, Macron’s signature legislation was the his official presidential photograph prominently fea- Law for growth, activity and equal economic opportu- tures de Gaulle’s war memoirs opened on President’s nities (French Republic, 2015), known as Macron Law desk (Boudet, 2017). As a President, Macron communi- (broad law composed of measures concerning a large cates less, leaves everyday politics to the government, part of the economic activity, changing numerous rules, while engaging on the global scene. This detached style for instance, the work at night or on Sunday, the taxes enablesMacrontomaintainsupportanddeflectcritique orliberalizingcoachtransport).Macron’scapacitytohar- forunpopularaspectsofreforms(“Macronnecroitpas,” ness support for the law among both left and right was 2016; see also Cole, 2018). It also enables him to distin- evident,foreshadowinghiscapacitytoestablishLREMas guish himself from the highly political presidents of the a movement logically bridging or transcending the left ThirdandtheFourthRepublic(Cole,2018).Macronlarge- andtheright. lymaintainedthisdeGaule-inspiredhands-offstyleuntil Hand in hand with the changes that occurred in the theCovid-19pandemicwhenhebecamemoreinvolved French society during the last three or four decades, (Pietralunga,Zappi,&deRoyer,2020). Emmanuel Macron as a minister and as a presidential candidate practically embodied the modern spirit, dom- 4.1.Responsiveness:TheLeaderGivingVoiceto inated by the (neo)liberal discourse. In other words, he thePeople appeared the contrary of the old elite: Young, modern, uncorrupted, competent, and fulfilling the ideal of the The vehicle for Macron’s rise was his movement LREM. technocrat from both public and privatesectors. During Multiple versions of the party’s name existed over time, a 2017 TV debate with Marine Le Pen, Macron’s com- the initial En Marche!, with an emphasis on the EM petence, knowledge, and effectiveness were evident, acronym, evolved into today’s LREM. LREM, a broad andhesuccessfullyoutperformedLePen,demonstrating movement,enabledMacrontoformabaseandsocietal hisqualities. support“theraisond’êtreofLREMistogathergoodwill (and support) around a positive ambition for our coun- 4.TechnocraticPopulistinPower try”(EnMarche,2020).TheLREMfoundingmythisthat it was formed from the bottom-up, from the “desire to Macron’s undeniable personal competence, culture, rebuildfrombelow”(EnMarche,2020).However,LREM and charm made him a charismatic presidential can- is a top-down movement—part communication strate- didate. On 7 May 2017, the 39-year old disrupter gy,partpoliticalorganizing—butEmmanuelMacron,his became the youngest President in the history of France. advisors and staff, ‘give people the voice’ (En Marche, In his inaugural speech, Macron combined an appeal 2020). It is Macron who enables the people to express to the people, with the promise of competence and theirwillthroughtheunmediatedrelationshipwithhim renewal—highlighting the redemptive politics of pop- (cf. Caramani, 2017). At the core of LREM is technocrat- ulism(Canovan,1999): icpopulism.Macronoutlinedhisagendabeforethefirst roundofFrenchpresidentialelectionsin2017:“AFrance My dear fellow citizens, a new page in our history which goes beyond the old divisions to put in place has been turned this evening. I want it to be that of the solutions that work, and which finally leads to a renewed hope and confidence. The renewal of our real moralization of its political life” (Macron, 2017a). publiclifewillbearequirementforeveryoneasfrom Technocraticpopulismbestcapturesthismixtureofpop- tomorrow. Raising moral standards in our public life, ulistandtechnocraticappeals. recognizing pluralism, and democratic vitality will be En Marche started in May 2016 with a large door to thebedrockofmyactionfromthefirstday.Iwillnot doorcampaign.Inthe‘GreatWalk,’4,000volunteerssur- letanyobstaclegetinmyway.Iwillworkwithdeter- veying 100,000 citizens, providing the basis for LREM’s minationandwithduerespectforeveryone,because program. The aim of the ‘Great Walk’ was to project throughwork,schoolandculture,wewillbuildabet- responsiveness and competence—LREM surveyed the terfuture.(Macron,2017b) will of the people and processed this will into a ‘uni- fied interest of the country.’ In reality, this was an effec- For Macron, the sui generis candidate, the election tive campaign using techniques and staff with experi- was a turning point, as he faces the choice between ence working on the campaigns of Francois Hollande three archetypal presidential postures. First, the ‘par- andBarrackObama.Thesurveywasprocessedandana- tisan President’—ideological, engaged in everyday pol- lyzed by 200 experts and spin doctors (Dryef, 2017; itics and deeply unpopular (Hollande). Second, ‘perfor- Strudel,2017). PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 550 Themaininnovation(comparedtocampaignsrunby andhasexpertsonhissidetohelphimdecipherthewill political parties), was ‘giving voice to the ordinary peo- ofthepeople(cf.Caramani,2017). ple’todraftthepartyprogram.LREMdrewhistoricalpar- allels to the letters of grievances (Cahiers de doléances, 4.2.Responsibility:TheReformsandtheLimitsof drawn up in 1789), but using experts’ competence to TechnocraticPopulisminPower aggregatetheanswersintoacoherentelectoralprogram. Thecollectionofpeople’sgrievanceswasawaytocreate Historically, French pension reforms trigger backlash— adirectlinkagebetweenthepeople(everybodycanpar- popular mobilization and strikes—and can lead to the ticipate)andtheleader,eliminatingintermediatebodies fall of government (1995 pension reform). In fall 2019, (including political parties’ role as ‘transmission belts’; Macron’s government initiated major pension reform. cf.Sartori,1976). In contrast to 1995, Macron’s government has a more Facing the Yellow Vests protest in 2018, Emmanuel efficient communication strategy—combining populist Macron scaled the 2016 ‘Great Walk’ to the national and technocratic appeals of ‘us vs. them’—the clash of level. In December 2018, the Great National Debate, the old and the new systems, experts vs. ideologues, a ‘listening tour’ comprised of more than 10,000 local the necessity of reform vs. the irresponsible status quo. meetings,generatedmorethantwomillionproposalson Unlikein1995,thecontemporaryoppositionwasunable four topics: energy transition, economy (including taxa- to formulate an understandable critique, trade unions tion, retirement age, pensions), democracy, and citizen- wereweakened,andthesocietywasdepoliticized. ship(including immigration,‘politicalIslam,’andreform Like in 1995, the 2019 reforms led to large-scale of state and public services—including the role of elite protests. While the reaction to the 2018 Yellow Vest schools such as ENA; “Key points of Macron’s plans,” protests was populist responsiveness, the reaction to 2019). Emmanuel Macron, whose popularity decreased the 2019 protests marked the return of technocratic significantly between 2017 and 2018, participated per- populism. Emmanuel Macron portrayed himself and his sonally in dozens of these sessions, promising to dedi- government as the representatives of modernity, pro- catethe secondpartofhis mandateto“puttingcitizens moters of expert solutions, and the legitimate voice of atthecenterofhisagenda.”Thedebatescoincidedwith thepeople.Hedenouncedtheprotestersasillegitimate, thebeginningoftheelectoralcampaignfortheEuropean imprudent, promoting illegitimate social gains for few parliament elections, and Macron’s critics viewed it as (protesters,strikers,tradeunions)attheexpenseofthe a political strategy to improve the President’s image— many. In the case of the Yellow Vests, instances of vio- highlighting the exaggeration of the number of partici- lence during some demonstrations were instrumental- pants, as well as the fact that the government is still to ized to delegitimize the movement and its grievances. takeuptheproposals. The pension reform protest was delegitimized on the As a follow up to the 2018 Great National Debate, grounds of lacking the competence to understand com- a Citizen Assembly was organized between 2019 and plexissues. 2020. In October 2019, 150 randomly selected citizens Similarly to the pension reform, the Covid-19 cri- participated in debates focused on climate change. The sis also follows the technocratic populist playbook debates were broad and democratic, producing a large (cf. Buštíková & Babos, 2020; Guasti, 2020). During setofproposals.However,similarlytotheGreatNational the pandemic’s initial phase, the President was most- Debate, reservations prevail about the future of the ly absent, and the government in charge. As the cri- proposals—in contrast to the initial announcement, the tique of the government intensified, Macron changed President decided to dismiss some of the proposals. his approach and took the lead. The President became Furthermore,thedrawmethodforrandomselectionwas personally engaged, not in drafting and implementing unclear (the Harris Interactive polling institute selected solutions; instead, Emmanuel Macron set out to search the150citizens),andtheParliamentwasexcludedfrom for the best solution. This included a personal visit to theprocess. the proponent of hydroxychloroquine and media dar- All three procedures for engaging citizens—the ling, Professor Raoult in Marseille, to personally dis- ‘Great Walk,’ the ‘Great National Debate,’ and the cuss the potential of hydroxychloroquine as a cure. ‘Citizens Assembly’ represent new forms of direct link- ProfessorRaoultwasatoddswiththeotherexperts,but age between the people and the reader. They bypass the President presented himself as ‘open-minded’ and traditional representative institutions and do not offer searchingforeffectivesolutions. anyformofclearaccountability.Unliketheinstitutionof The reaction to the 2019 protests show the compli- referenda, which has previously destabilized presidents’ cated relationship between technocratic populism and positions (1969 and 2005), these new democratic inno- the will of the people—when people reject his politics, vations combine the appeal of responsiveness, without Macron delegitimizes their voices because they are out- accountability (Macron has full control over the imple- side of the unified will of the people he embodies and mentation of outcomes). The debates ‘give voice to the because their knowledge is inferior to the expertise of people’ as the President ‘listens,’ politics is unmediated thePresidentandhisadvisors. andpersonalized,andtheleaderremainsunconstrained PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 551 5.Conclusion Emmanuel Macron was undoubtedly a formidable candidate. Both charismatic and credibly competent, In 2017 Emmanuel Macron transformed French Politics. he stood in stark contrast to both the established par- He emerged when the embattled traditional party sys- ties and their populist challengers. Macron combined temimploded,andpopulismrose(radicalleftandradical theredemptivepromiseofpopulism—torejuvenatethe right).ThisarticlearguesthatEmmanuelMacron’spres- countrywiththetechnocraticpromiseofcompetentgov- idential bid succeeded because he combined populist ernance (cf. Canovan, 1999). LREM also sought to build anti-establishmentappealwithatechnocraticappealto a new, direct link with the people by introducing demo- competence. He was able to transcend the exhausted craticinnovationsasawaytomappeople’sgrievances. politics of the left and the right, while simultaneously Two conditions were essential in Macron’s rise: fending off radical populist competitors (especially the The implosion of the established system of the French NationalFront)usingtechnocraticpopulism. Fifth Republic in which the two main parties were alter- Emmanuel Macron was an insider taking on the sys- nating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment tem and positioning himself as an outsider. He refused populist challengers on the right and on the left the traditional labels, including centrism, elite recruit- (cf. Stockemer, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). In was his anti- ment patterns, and mediated politics. Instead, Macron establishment appeal, which put Macron on the map, and LREM attempted to create new forms of respon- buttheappealtotechnocraticcompetencewonhimthe sivenessby‘givingvoicetothepeople,’whilerelyingon presidency. Technocratic populism transcends the left– histechnocraticcompetenceandthatofhisexpertadvi- rightcleavageand,asaresult,hasabroaderappealthan sors. Macron success highlights the exhaustion of the itsleft-andright-wingcounterparts. left–rightcleavageandtheappealofthenewpolitics. Finally, the rise of Emmanuel Macron and LREM Technocratic populism in power attempts to bal- demonstrates that populism does not necessarily imply ance responsiveness and responsibility (cf. Guasti & a threat for liberal democracy and cannot be auto- Buštíková,2020).Intermsofresponsiveness,Macronini- matically linked to illiberalism (cf. Norris & Inglehart, tiated new procedures for engaging citizens, forming a 2019). Populist rhetoric and thin-centered ideology can new direct linkage between the leader and the people. befoundinother‘quadrants’thanontheextremeright These procedures create an alternative to the tradition- and extremeleft(Norris, 2020). New formsof populism al representative institutions, unmediated politics with- include valence (cf. Zulianello, 2020) and technocratic out accountability. The unified conception of the will of populism(cf.Buštíková&Guasti,2019). the people combined with the belief in experts’ supe- Future research should focus on the analysis of rior knowledge does not allow for dissent. Opposition the LREM. Beyond its leader’s technocratic populism, it (such as the 2019) protests are delegitimized as uncivi- wouldbeessentialtoanalyzethisnew’party’sinstitution- lizedand/oruninformed. alization and programmatic orientation. Furthermore, After reaching power, Emmanuel Macron sought to comparatively, LREM could be analyzed in the context distance himself from everyday politics. The Covid-19 of similar party-movements such us the Italian Five Star crises forced him to reengage. In power, Macron is no Movement, Spanish Podemos, Czech ANO, and Slovak longer an outsider ‘taking on the system.’ Nevertheless, Party of the Ordinary People. The recent dissent of he continues to use the same anti-establishment and a large part of LREM’s MPs, decline in support for (selectively)anti-elitistdiscursivestrategyofbringingthe Emmanuel Macron, and LREM MPs’ defections hint at ‘people’ back. Some aspects of Macron’s technocratic the degree of volatility these disrupters of the estab- populism remain salient—competency (partly showed lished political order face. The Covid-19 response and during the Covid-19 crisis), the necessity to reform subsequent elections will test the competence and last- France (the Covid-19 crisis has simultaneously delayed ingappealoftechnocraticpopulists. reforms, but made them more salient), the denounce- mentoftheintermediatebodies,ortherejectionofthe Acknowledgments oldelites(againsttheircomebacktopower).Thepower ofMacron’stechnocraticpopulismhasweakened,butit The study has been completed with funding from remainsaneffectivestrategyagainsthismainstreamand the Strategy AV21 of the Czech Academy of Sciences, populistcompetitors. researchprogrammeNo.15—GlobalConflictsandLocal The contribution of this article to the study of pop- Interactions:CulturalandSocialChallenges(P.G)andsup- ulism is threefold. First, it provides a systematic analy- ported by the Charles University Research Programme sis of Macron’s rise. Second, it highlights an important ‘Progres’ Q18—Social Sciences: From Multidisciplinarity condition for the rise of populism—the implosion of to Interdisciplinarity (M.P.). The authors would like to the established party systems (cf. Caiani & Graziano, mostwarmlythanktoLenkaBuštíkováforextensivecom- 2016;Castaldo&Verzichelli,2020;Ganuza&Font,2020; ments on multiple versions of this article, and to Rikki Guasti & Buštíková, 2020). Third, it illustrates that pop- Dean for insightful comments on the final version; and ulist rhetoric is not limited to the extremes on the right tothetwoanonymousreviewersfortheircommentsand ortheleft(Norris,2020). recommendations. PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 552 ConflictofInterests Chapel Hill Survey. (2019). 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Sur- vey. Retrieved from www.chesdata.eu/2019-chapel- Theauthordeclaresnoconflictofinterests. hill-expert-survey Cole, A. (2018). Crowning Jupiter: The 2017 French References electoralseriesinperspective.ParliamentaryAffairs, 501–520. Aprasidze, D., & Siroky, D. S. (2020). Technocratic pop- delaTorre,C.(2013).LatinAmerica’sauthoritariandrift: ulism in hybrid regimes: Georgia on my mind and in TechnocraticpopulisminEcuador.JournalofDemoc- mypocket.PoliticsandGovernance,8(4),580–589. racy,24(3),33–46. Barlow,N.(2017).Macron’slessonsfortheBritishcentre. Dryef, Z. (2017, July 4). Trois hommes + un logiciel ThePoliticalQuarterly,88(3),400–403. = l’Elysée? [Three men + a software = Elysée?]. Bickerton, C., & Accetti, C. I. (2017). Populism and tech- Le Monde. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde. nocracy:Oppositesorcomplements?CriticalReview fr/m-moyen-format/article/2017/04/07/trois- ofInternationalSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy,20(2), hommes-un-logiciel-l-elysee_5107263_ 186–206. 4497271.html Birnbaum, P. (2012). Genèse du populisme: Le peuple et Elgie, R. (2018). The election of Emmanuel Macron and lesgros[GenesisofthePopulism:Thepeopleandthe the new French party system: A return to the éter- fat].Paris:Hachette. nel marais? Modern & Contemporary France, 26(1), Bordignon, F. (2017, April 28). In and out: Emmanuel 15–29. Macron’santipopulistpopulism.LSEBlogs.Retrieved Emmanuel Macron n’est plus encarté au Parti social- from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/ iste [Emmanuel Macron is no longer member 28/macron-anti-populist-populism of the Socialist Party]. (2015, February 18). Boudet, A. (2017, June 29). Dans le portrait officiel Le Figaro. Retrieved from https://www.lefigaro.fr/ d’Emmanuel Macron, ces détails qu’il a voulu que politique/le-scan/coulisses/2015/02/18/25006- vous voyiez [On the official portrait of Emmanuel 20150218ARTFIG00160-emmanuel-macron-n-est- Macron, those details he wanted you to see]. plus-encarte-au-parti-socialiste.php The Huffington Post. Retried from https://www. Emmanuel Macron: Face au système, “ma volonté de huffingtonpost.fr/entry/sur-le-portrait-officiel- transgression est forte” [Emmanuel Macron: Faced demmanuel-macron-ces-details-quil-a_fr_ with the system, “my will to transgress is strong”]. 5c92efbde4b06857fcbc3353 (2016, October 16). Challenges. Retrieved from Buštíková,L.,&Babos,P.(2020).BestinCovid:Populists https://www.challenges.fr/election-presidentielle- in the time of pandemic. Politics and Governance, 2017/emmanuel-macron-face-au-systeme-ma- 8(4),496–508. volonte-de-transgression-est-forte_433063 Buštíková, L., & Guasti, P. (2019). The state as a firm: EnMarche.(2020).Lemovement[Themovement].EM! Understanding the autocratic roots of technocratic Retrievedfromhttps://en-marche.fr/le-mouvement populism. East European Politics and Society, 33(2), FrenchRepublic.(2015).Loinº2015-990du6août2015 302–330. pour la croissance, l’activité et l’égalité des chances Caiani, M., & Graziano, P. (2016). Varieties of populism: économiques[Lawno.2015-990of6August2015for Insights from the Italian case. Italian Political Sci- the growth, activity and equal economic opportuni- enceReview/RivistaItalianaDiScienzaPolitica,46(2), ties].Paris:FrenchRepublic. 243–267. Ganuza, E., & Font, J. (2020). Experts in government: Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and Whatfor?Ambiguitiesinpublicopiniontowardstech- the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), nocracy.PoliticsandGovernance,8(4),520–532. 2–16. Godin, R. (2016, November 16). Emmanuel Macron Caramani, D. (2017). Will vs reason: The populist and ou le populisme d’extrême-centre [Emmanuel technocratic forms of political representation and Macronortheextremecenterpopulism].LaTribune. their critique to party government. American Politi- Retrievedfromhttps://www.latribune.fr/economie/ calScienceReview,111(1),54–67. presidentielle-2017/emmanuel-macron-ou-le- Castaldo, A., & Verzichelli, L. (2020). Technocratic pop- populisme-d-extreme-centre-617015.html ulisminItalyafterBerlusconi:Thetrendsetterandhis Guasti, P. (2020). Populism in power and democra- disciples.PoliticsandGovernance,8(4),485–495. cy: Democratic decay and resilience in the Czech Chabas, C. (2014, August 27). Emmanuel Macron, Republic(2013–2020).PoliticsandGovernance,8(4), de “Mozart de l’Elysée” à ministre de l’économie 473–484. [Emmanuel Macron, from “Mozart of the Elysée” to Guasti, P., & Buštíková, L. (2020). A marriage of Minister of Economy]. Le Monde. Retrieved from convenience: Responsive populists and responsible https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2014/08/ experts.PoliticsandGovernance,8(4),468–472. 27/emmanuel-macron-de-mozart-de-l-elysee-a- Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2012). ministre-de-l-economie_4477318_823448.html The paradox of nationalism: The common denom- PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 553 inator of radical right and radical left Euroscepti- “allons”à“vertu”[Thewordsofthecandidates,from cism. European Journal of Political Research, 51(4), “let’s go” to “virtue”]. In P. Perrineau (Ed.), Le vote 504–539. disruptif:Lesélectionsprésidentielleetlégislativesde Haughton,T.,&Deegan-Krause,K.(2015).Hurricanesea- 2017 [The disruptive vote: Presidential and legisla- son: Systems of instability in Central and East Euro- tive elections in 2017] (pp. 129–152). Paris: Presses pean party politics. East European Politics and Soci- deSciencesPo. eties,29(1),61–80. Momtaz, R. (2020, May 31). Macron loses absolute Havlík, V. (2019). Technocratic populism and political majority in parliament. Politico. Retrieved from illiberalism in central Europe. Problems of Post- https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron- Communism,66(6),369–384. loses-absolute-majority-in-parliament-france Ivaldi, G. (2019). Populism in France. In D. Stockemer Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government (Ed.),Populismaroundtheworld (pp.27–48).Cham: andOpposition,39(4),541–563. Springer. Mudde,C.,&RoviraKaltwasser,C.(2018).Studyingpop- Jublin, M. (2018, November 22). Emmanuel Macron se ulismincomparativeperspective:Reflectionsonthe désigne désormais comme “populiste”: Comment contemporary and future research agenda. Compar- s’yretrouverparmitouslespopulismes?[Emmanuel ativePoliticalStudies,51(13),1667–1693. Macron now calls himself a ”populist”: How do Norris, P. (2020). Measuring populism worldwide you find your way among all the populisms?]. (Working Paper Series RWP 20–002). Boston, LCI. Retrieved from https://www.lci.fr/politique/ MA: Harvard Kennedy School. Retrieved from emmanuel-macron-se-designe-desormais-comme- https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/ populiste-comment-s-y-retrouver-parmi-tous-les- measuring-populism-worldwide populismes-2105364.html Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Key points of Macron’s plans after ‘Great National Trump,Brexit,andauthoritarianpopulism.NewYork, Debate.’ (2019, April 26). France 24. Retrieved from NY:CambridgeUniversityPress. https://www.france24.com/en/20190426-france- Perottino, M. (2016). The disappearance of politics, or macron-speech-response-yellow-vest-protests- depolitizationintheCzechway.SocialStudies,13(1), taxes-national-debate 45–56. Kuhn,R.(2017).Expecttheunexpected:The2017French Perrineau,P.(Ed.).(2017).Levotedisruptif:Lesélections presidential and parliamentary elections. Modern & présidentielle et législatives de 2017 [The disruptive ContemporaryFrance,25(4),359–375. vote: Presidential and legislative elections in 2017]. Lynch, J. (2019). Populism, partisan convergence, Paris:PressesdeSciencesPo. and mobilization in Western Europe. Polity, 51(4), Pietralunga, C., & Bonnefous, B. (2016, November 16). 668–677. EmmanuelMacron(enfin)candidatàl’électionprési- Macron ne croit pas “au président normal, cela désta- dentielle [Emmanuel Macron (finally) candidate for bilise les Français” [Macron does not believe “in thepresidentialelection].LeMonde.Retrievedfrom the normal president, it destabilizes the French”]. https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle- (2016, October 16). Challenges. Retrieved from 2017/article/2016/11/16/emmanuel-macron- https://www.challenges.fr/election-presidentielle- candidat-a-l-election-presidentielle_5031923_ 2017/interview-exclusive-d-emmanuel-macron-je- 4854003.html ne-crois-pas-au-president-normal_432886 Pietralunga, C., Zappi, S., & de Royer, S. (2020, April 15). Macron, E. (2016). Révolution [Revolution]. Paris: XO Coronavirus: Emmanuel Macron cherche son ‘union Éditions. nationale’ [Coronavirus: Emmanuel Macron looks Macron, E. (2017a). Profession de foi du candidat E: for his ‘national union’]. Le Monde. Retrieved from Macron au premier tour de l’élection présidentielle https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/04/ 2017 [Presentation of the candidate E. Macron for 15/coronavirus-emmanuel-macron-cherche-son- the first round of the 2017 presidential election]. union-nationale_6036620_823448.html Paris: LREM. Retrieved from https://promesses. Putnam, R. (1977). Elite transformation in advanced fr/profession-foi-emmanuel-macron-premier-tour- industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the election-presidentielle-2017 theoryoftechnocracy.ComparativePoliticalStudies, Macron, E. (2017b, May 8). Inauguration speech. BBC. 10(3),383–412. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world- Radicalisation: Macron juge les élites en partie respon- europe-39842084 sables [Radicalization: Macron holds elites partly Mandrin, J. (1967). L’énarchie ou les mandarins de la responsible]. (2015, 29 November). Les Echos. société bourgeoise [The enarchy or the mandarins Retrived from https://www.lesechos.fr/2015/11/ of the bourgeois society]. Paris: Éditions de la Table radicalisation-macron-juge-les-elites-en-partie- Ronde. responsables-282766 Mayaffre, D., Bouzereau, C., Ducoffe, M., Guaresi, M., Robequain, L. (2016, June 12). Le buzz des Etats- & Precioso, F. (2017). Les mots des candidats, de Unis: À New York, Emmanuel Macron joue la PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 554 carte de l’anti-système [The buzz of the United vote: Presidential and legislative elections in 2017] States: In New York, Emmanuel Macron plays (pp.205–220).Paris:PressesdeSciencesPo. the anti-system card]. Les Echos. Retrieved from Surel,Y.(2019). Howtostaypopulist?TheFrontNation- https://www.lesechos.fr/2016/12/le-buzz-des- alandthechangingFrenchpartysystem.WestEuro- etats-unis-a-new-york-emmanuel-macron-joue-la- peanPolitics,42(6),1230–1257. carte-de-lanti-systeme-221043 Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open Univer- Rosanvallon, P. (2020). Le Siècle du populisme: Histoire, sityPress. théorie, critique [The century of populism: History, Učeň, P. (2007). Parties, populism, and anti- theory,criticism].Paris:Seuil. establishment politics in East Central Europe. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems: A frame- SAISReview,27(1),49–62. work for analysis. New York, NY: Cambridge Univer- Ventura, S. (2018). Emmanuel Macron: Un leader sityPress. antipolitique, outsider et gaullien? Image et narra- Stauber, J. (2019). Party institutionalization in the Czech tion d’un candidat présidentiel en dehors des partis Republic.InR.Harmel&L.Svåsand(Ed.),Institution- [Emmanuel Macron: An anti-political, outsider and alization of political parties: Comparative cases (pp. Gaullian leader? Image and narration of a presiden- 215–238).London:ECPRPress. tialcandidateoutsidetheparties?].InP.J.Maarek& Stavrakakis Y., & Jäger, A. (2018). Accomplishments and A. Mercier (Eds.), 2017, la présidentielle chamboule- limitationsofthe‘new’mainstreamincontemporary tout: La communication politique au prisme du populismstudies.EuropeanJournalofSocialTheory, “dégagisme” [2017, the presidential election upset: 21(4),547–565. Politicalcommunicationthroughtheprismof“degag- Stockemer,D.(2017).TheFrontNationalinFrance:Con- ism”](pp.91–107).Paris:L’Harmattan. tinuity and change under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Zulianello, M. (2020). Varieties of populist parties and MarineLePen.Cham:Springer. partysystemsinEurope:fromstate-of-the-arttothe Strudel, S. (2017). Emmanuel Macron: Un oxymore poli- application of a novel classification scheme to 66 tique? [Emmanuel Macron: a political oxymoron?]. partiesin33countries.GovernmentandOpposition, In P. Perrineau (Ed.), Le vote disruptif: Les élections 55(2),1–21. présidentielle et législatives de 2017 [The disruptive AbouttheAuthors Michel Perottino is an Associate Professor and a Head of the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. Between 2000 and 2013, he was the General Secretary of the French Centre for Research in Social Sciences (CEFRES) in Prague. His research spe- cializes on the French and the Czech politicalsystems (political regimes, institutions, and actors) and political parties (especially on the Czech political parties). He is the author of the monograph French Political System (SLON, 2005, in Czech) and published on the transformation of political parties and partysystemsinEurope,theFrenchpresidency,anddepoliticization. PetraGuastiisaSeniorResearcherattheInstituteofSociologyoftheCzechAcademyofSciencesand aPostdoctoralResearcherattheUniversityofJena.Inacademicyear2018/2019shewasaDemocracy VisitingFellowattheAshCentreforDemocraticGovernanceandInnovation,HarvardKennedySchool. Her main research focus is the growing tension within the system of representative democracy in respect to its legitimacy. Her research appears in Democratic Theory, Democratization, Communist andPost-CommunistStudies,amongothers. PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 555 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Politics and Governance Unpaywall

Technocratic Populism à la Française? The Roots and Mechanisms of Emmanuel Macron’s Success

Politics and GovernanceDec 17, 2020

Loading next page...
 
/lp/unpaywall/technocratic-populism-la-fran-aise-the-roots-and-mechanisms-of-dkOaiqdPEl

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Unpaywall
ISSN
2183-2463
DOI
10.17645/pag.v8i4.3412
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

ThisarticlefocusesontherootsandmechanismsofMacron’ssuccess,arguingthatin2017twoconditionswereessential inMacron’srise—theimplosionoftheestablishedsystemoftheFrenchFifthRepublicinwhichthetwomainpartieswere alternating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment populist challengers on the right and on the left (cf. Stockemer, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). It was anti-establishment appeal that put Macron on the map, but the appeal to technocratic competencethatwonhimthepresidency.Technocraticpopulismtranscendstheleft–rightcleavageand,asaresult,hasa broaderappealthanitsleft-andright-wingcounterparts.EmmanuelMacronwasaninsidertakingonthe(crumbling)sys- temandpositioninghimselfasanoutsider—refusingthetraditionallabels,includingcentrism,eliterecruitmentpatterns, andmediatedpolitics.Instead,MacronandLaRepubliqueenMarcheattemptedtocreatenewformsofresponsivenessby ‘givingvoicetothepeople,’whilerelyingontechnocraticcompetenceasalegitimationmechanism.InpowerEmmanuel Macronattemptstobalanceresponsivenessandresponsibility(cf.Guasti&Buštíková,2020). Keywords France;Macron;populism;technocraticpopulism Issue This article is part of the issue “Varieties of Technocratic Populism around the World” edited by Petra Guasti (Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic) and Lenka Buštíková (Institute of Sociology of the Czech AcademyofSciences,CzechRepublic/ArizonaStateUniversity,USA). © 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion4.0InternationalLicense(CCBY). 1.Introduction BeforethePresidency,EmmanuelMacronneverheldan electedoffice.EventhoughhewasMinisterofEconomy, CommentatorsconsidertheFrenchpresidentialelection Industry,andDigitalAffairsinManuelValls’government inMay2017asadisruption(Perrineau,2017)inthelong (2014–2016), Macron successfully presented himself as traditionofFrenchpolitics.Thedramaticchangesinclude an outsider. Macron cultivated the image of a (moder- failure of the mainstream candidates on the right and ate) challenger of the old system, the only one able to the left in the first round of the presidential elections, transcendthestaleestablishmentofFrenchpoliticsand theuseofsocialmedia,andarelativelyhighabstention reform France, the only candidate to overcome the old rate. The mostsignificant change was the winner of the sterileFrenchcleavages. election himself: Emmanuel Macron, a young newcom- This election seemed to fulfil the idea of a success- er. Macron was elected at the age of 39, the youngest ful third way, neither right nor left, breaking the tra- elected President of the Fifth republic before him was ditional cleavage typical for the last seven decades of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, elected at the age of 48. This French politics. Emmanuel Macron won both the first youth was also a part of the newness and freshness. andthesecondroundofthepresidentialelections,even PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 545 thoughitwashisfirstelection.Thisvictoryofanewcom- Usingtheliteratureonvarietiesofpopulism(Caiani& erwasconfirmedbythegeneralelectionresultsamonth Graziano,2016;Zulianello,2020)andthecaseofFrance, later. Macron’s new ‘party’ La Republique en Marche we show the vast differences among various populisms (The Republic on the Move, LREM), gained an absolute present on the French political scene and the long and majority.ItenabledMacrontoformaGovernmentable rich history of populism in France—for instance, the to enact Macron’s ambitious plan to transform French boulangism (1885–1889) or the poujadism in the 1950s politics and society. Like their leader, the majority of (Birnbaum, 2012; Surel, 2019). We can identify Marine thenewparliamentarianswerenewcomersandhadnev- LePenandherNationalRally(ex-NationalFront;Mudde er held elected office before (LREM lost a part of its &RoviraKaltwasser,2018)andJean-LucMélenchonand deputiesquiterapidly,andinthespringof2020,itlostits his France Unbowed (La France Insoumise; Ivaldi, 2019; absolutemajority;Momtaz,2020).This wasseenasevi- Norris, 2020; Rosanvallon, 2020; Surel, 2019) as pop- dence of the promise of the renewal of French politics ulist (Zulianello, 2020). Both represent different pop- (Surel,2019). ulismtypes,asthehostideologydiverges—theNational As in other cases of successful personalist populist Front is a radical right-wing populist party and France parties founded by outsiders and disrupting difunction- Unbowed, on the contrary, is a radical left-wing pop- al party systems (Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in 1994 and ulist party. The disparities in terms of leadership, style, Babiš’s ANO in 2013), Emmanuel Macron’s rapid ‘march rhetoric,andaboveallintermsofprogramsarequitesig- to the power’ started officially almost a year before, nificant. However, they share some similarities (like the without clear electoral support, with a relatively weak positioning against the EU; cf. Halikiopoulou, Nanou, & program and blurred campaign funding (Kuhn, 2017). Vasilopoulou,2012). Berlusconi and Babiš both combined populist and tech- At first sight, Emmanuel Macron has nothing in nocraticappealtobroadentheirelectoralchances.Both common with Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. havebeenstudiedthroughthelensoftechnocraticpop- The Chapel Hill Survey (2019) shows that Macron’s ulism, used initially to study Latin America (Buštíková & LREM is quite far away from the positions of both Guasti, 2019; Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; de la Torre, right-wing and left-wing populist parties, especially on 2013; Havlík, 2019). As Emmanuel Macron shares many the EU (LREM is broadly pro-European), protectionism, of their characteristics, this article applies the techno- and other policies. Most importantly, compared to the craticpopulismperspectivetotestwhetherMacronisa National Front and France Unbowed, Macron’s LREM technocraticpopulist. alsoscoresrelativelylowonanti-elitesalience.However, This article proceeds as follows. In part two, we while Emmanuel Macron and his LREM position them- clarify some of the terminology and concepts (focus- selves as the representatives of a moderate part of the ing on technocratic populism) used to show how and French political arena, LREM scores higher on anti-elite why Emmanuel Macron (as a leader) matches these saliencethan othermoderateFrenchparties. According categories (as a charismatic leader claiming technocrat- to CHES experts, LREM is a moderate, non-populist ic competence, against the established political elites). party. However, for Norris and Inglehart (2017, p. 12), InpartthreeandfourweexplainhowandwhyMacron’s EmmanuelMacronisacentristpopulistleader.AsPippa success was possible and to what extent he is a techno- Norrismentioned: craticpopulistinpower,mainlybyfocusingontheways hegoverns. Despiteoftenbeinglabelled‘radicalright,’infact,pop- ulist parties are also distributed in the other quad- 2.VarietiesofPopulismandtheTechnocraticPopulism rants….Therearealsoafewpopulistpartiesscattered in the other quadrants, such as President Macron Thedebateontheconceptualdefinitionofpopulismand whocampaignedforLaRépubliqueEnMarche!asan theterminologyisstillopen(forinstance,seeMudde& anti-establishmentoutsider,whileadvocatingmoder- RoviraKaltwasser,2018). ate economic policies and a pro-EU stance. (Norris, Some of the commonly used criteria to define pop- 2020,p.15) ulismare‘thinideology’,peoplevs.elites,specificpoliti- calrhetoricandstyle,orstrategy.Populismvariesacross The core of Macron’s populist appeal relies on the cri- time and space and has many faces beyond the classi- tique and rejection of intermediate bodies, combined cal (extreme) right-wing (Norris, 2020; Zulianello, 2020). with a robust anti-establishment discourse and a spe- In order to classify whether and what type of populist cific call to the French people. Macron has already Emmanuel Macron is, we draw on classical scholars of beenclassifiedasapopulistbypoliticalscientists(Ivaldi, populism (Canovan, 1999; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019), sometimes in a specific way (“populist from the 2018),acontemporarycontribution(Buštíková&Guasti, extreme-centre,’’ Godin, 2016; “antipopulist populist,” 2019), and theoretical scholarship on similarities and Bordignon,2017).Tosomeextent,theriseofEmmanuel differences between populist and technocratic critiques MacronshouldbeseenasaneffectoftheFifthRepublic of party democracy (cf. Bickerton & Accetti, 2017; system, but in a new populist logic dominating the Caramani,2017). Frenchpoliticallandscape. PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 546 Theadaptabilityof populism tovariousideologies is mation and a strategy to distinguish himself from his notnew(Mudde,2004;Taggart,2000).Oneofourprima- anti-establishmentcompetitors,especiallyhismaincom- ryhypothesesisthatpopulism,mainlyasadiscourseand petitor in the second round of presidential elections, astyle,isnotlimitedtothepoliticalextremesontheleft MarineLePen. andtherightandshouldnotbereducedtoademocratic Nevertheless, let us summarize some criteria of threat (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018; Stavrakakis & Jäger, the technocratic populism: A charismatic leader calls 2018). The concept of centrist populism has been used for the fight against the political establishment in the to describe parties neither on the left nor on the right. name of the people, denouncing the intermediate bod- It is based on an assumption of an ideal political space, ies(inabroadsense,includingparties),andcommunicat- anin-between,rejectingtheideologicalextremes. ingdirectlywiththepeople.Technocraticpopulismdoes Mattia Zulianello (2020) has significantly contribut- not only appear as an alternative to the ideology of lib- ed to conceptualizing this residual category into a new eral democratic pluralism (Havlík, 2019) but also when type. Valence populist parties compete predominantly, thetraditionalpartysystemisexhausted,andstalemain- if not exclusively, by focusing on nonpositional ‘valence’ streampartiesareunabletoeffectivelyreacttonewchal- issues, such as the fight against corruption, increased lenges (cf. Caiani & Graziano, 2016). Under these con- transparency, democratic reform, and moral integrity, ditions, a weakened party system creates an opening while emphasizing anti-establishment motives. There is for newcomers (cf. Aprasidze & Siroky, 2020; Buštíková no ideological positioning on the difference between & Guasti, 2019; Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; Ganuza & the mentioned centrist populist and the claim of com- Font,2020). petenceandperformance(Zulianello,2020).Historically, valence populist parties emerged mainly in Central 3.TheOriginsofMacron’sTechnocraticPopulism and Eastern Europe (Haughton & Deegan-Krause, 2015; Učeň,2007). 3.1.TheSocialandPoliticalFrameofMacron’s We argue that the concept of valence populism TechnocraticPopulism (Zulianello, 2020, p. 329) is a good starting point to cap- ture Emmanuel Macron and his LREM for two reasons. In explaining the rise of populism to power, it is essen- First, Emmanuel Macron rejected being positioned in tial to consider the appeal and strategies of ascending the center—for him, the left, the right, and the cen- populistsandthepoliticalcontext.Tosomeextent,they ter are obsolete categories. Second, using the flexibili- aretheproductoftheirtimeand,aboveallofthesociety ty of valence populism enables us to identify Macron’s fromwhichtheyariseandwhichallowsthemtowinelec- key valence issue—technocratic expertise. Emmanuel tions(onthelong-termchangesinpoliticsandsocietyin Macron presents himself as an expert in both the pub- Western Europe, see Lynch, 2019; on populism and cri- lic and private spheres. The concept of valence pop- sis, see Caiani & Graziano, 2016). The rise of Emmanuel ulism captures both Macron’s refusal to be positioned Macron is both the result of his charisma, political acu- on the left–right continuum and his self-presentation— men and successful strategy, but also of the state of foundinghislegitimacyinhiscareerinthestateappara- Frenchpolitics. tusandthebankingsector. TheinitialrootsofMacron’ssuccessseemtobeinthe FocusingonMacron’sself-identificationasanexpert economicandfinancialcrisisinthelate2000swhenthe and his career as a technocrat also resonates with Frenchgovernment’sattempttofindasolutionseemed theconceptoftechnocraticpopulism.Technocraticpop- ineffective. Nevertheless, we have to look at its deep- ulismasa‘thinideology’isbasedontherejectionofthe er roots in French history. The main change we have to traditional political parties and on the promise of apo- point out is the progressive disappearance of the clear liticalexpertsolutionsthatbenefitthe‘ordinarypeople’ left–right cleavage. This cleavage is linked to the begin- (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019) As showed by Buštíková and ning of the French Revolution after 1789 and the con- Guasti,“itcombinestheideologyofexpertisewithapop- frontation of ‘two Frances.’ In the second half of the ulist political appeal to ordinary people,” “technocratic 20th century, we can see that for the first time, this populism uses the ideology of numbers and the ideol- cleavage was suppressed by the rise of the French Fifth ogy of expert knowledge to appeal directly to the vot- Republic under the leadership of Charles De Gaulle and ers using an anti-elite, populist rhetoric” (Buštíková & thebeginningof23yearsof‘dextrism’(thegovernment Guasti,2019,p.305).Interestinglythetechnocraticpop- oftheright). ulism undermines the principle of horizontal and verti- TheFrenchFifthRepublicwasconfrontational.While calaccountability,asCaramanishowed(Caramani,2017; the right was in power, the left alternative was clear Guasti,2020). and sharp (but also divided between the declining Two key features of Macron’s appeal match this Communist party and the growing Socialist party). conceptualization. His strong rhetoric against his for- Theshiftfromrighttoleftoccurredin1981afterthesuc- mer Socialist party and broadly against all the French cess of Francois Mitterrand in the presidential election. political elites—an anti-establishment strategy. Second, Itwasseenasarevolutionaryoracatastrophicmoment the use of personal competence as a form of legiti- (dependingontheanalyst). PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 547 After some years, the leftist policy showed its limits, ENA still forms the elite of the French civil servants. and Mitterrand decided to turn in 1983–1984. The gov- Macron (who studied at Sciences Po Paris before ENA) ernmentbegantotakeamuchmoreliberalline.Thishis- ranked fifth in his group at the end of the cursus, thus torical change (practically the abandonment of a long- demonstratinganextraordinarycompetence. term program of the French left) was not successful. For a long time, ENA has been criticized as a form Afterthe1986generalelections,Franceexperienced,for of elite reproduction. The first systematic critic of this the first time, the cohabitation of the left and the right, school and the elites it produced appeared in the late andthereversepolicyofprivatizations. 1960s(Mandrin,1967).Verylittlehaschangedsince,and The ideological rapprochement of the left and its thecritiquecanbeconsideredjustasrelevanttoday.ENA embrace of the liberal paradigm blurred the tradi- isanelitistandtechnocraticschool.Itproducedgenera- tional differences between the left and the right— tions of high civil servants, who made a career not only both were practically calling for the same solutions intheFrenchhighadministrationbutalsoinpoliticsand and became indistinguishable, especially on economic theprivatesector. issues. What remained was a vast difference between EmmanuelMacronisatypicalproductofENA.After the moderate right and the moderate left regarding ENA, Macron had a short career in the Inspectorate social positioning (identity issues). The economic and General of Finances and then moved to a multina- financial crisis brought the political compromise about tional investment bank and financial services company the liberal paradigm to the fore and engendered the Rothschild & Co. Some of the first information about anti-establishment critique of Jean-Marie Le Pen, who MacrontoappearintheFrenchmedia,inSummer2014, denouncedboththeleftandtherightas‘bonnetblancet emphasized his “impressive curriculum vitae” (Chabas, blancbonnet’or,inotherwords,theplotofthecollusion 2014). We can recall here the words of Paul Taggart: ofpoliticalelitesthatwereseeminglyinopposition. Populism“requiresthemostextraordinaryindividualsto In the years leading to the 2017 presidential elec- lead the most ordinary of people” (Taggart, 2000, p. 1; tions, the moderate right lost an essential part of its seealsoMudde,2004). electorate to the radical right. Yet, its electoral failure Macron turned against this form of elite reproduc- is a result of the scandals of the Republican candidate tion, as a consequence of the 2019 debate. Macron— François Fillon. Macron presented himself as the only part of an elite—turned against the elite and espoused real alternative to the old, and delegitimated the polit- anti-elite discourse. In the aftermath of the November ical establishment from both sides, moderate right and 2015 terrorist attacks, he said: “The elites, not the soci- left.ThekeytoMacron’srisewasthebreakdownofthe ety, bear a responsibility” (“Radicalisation: Macron juge Socialist party, which made the shift of the left-wing lesélites,”2015).EmmanuelMacronwasahightechno- electoratetoLREMpossible.Thisnewsituationappears crat with experience in both the public and the private clearly if we compare, for instance, the results of the sectors. In 2015 he turned populist, but his technocrat- Socialist’s candidates in the first round of the presiden- ic competences (and efficiency) remains the source of tial elections in 2012 and 2017 (Hollande 28.63% and his legitimacy. Macron was the right man at the right Hamon 6.36%, respectively). We can make here a par- placeintherighttime—technocraticpopulistatthecrit- allel with the situation in the Czech Republic, where ical juncture of French politics marked by the break- the technocratic populist A. Babiš won a large part of down of left–right cleavage. The second round of the the left-wing electorate in 2013 and 2017 (Buštíková & 2017electionwasEmmanuelMacronorMarineLePen— Guasti,2019;Stauber,2019)ortotheriseofIgorMatovič technocraticpopulistpalatableformany,orradicalright inSlovakia(Buštíková&Babos,2020). leader, unacceptable for the voters of mainstream par- Due to the failure of the mainstream parties on the ties(cf.Stockemer,2017). left and the right, Emmanuel Macron was seen as the sole candidate likely to defeat Marine Le Pen in the 3.3.TheRiseofaCharismaticTechnocrat 2017presidentialelections.Hewasalsoseenastherep- resentative of young modern France—a leader propos- From the beginning of his successful electoral cam- ing a genuinely modern vision and reforms necessary paign, Emmanuel Macron presented himself as the to save France from its long-term social and econom- champion of the fight against the political system. He icdifficulties. introduced himself as an outsider—a new politician who is not linked to the establishment and the old- 3.2.ASpecificCareerofaTechnocrat fashioned parties and elites. He vowed to abandon out- dated ideological discourses and practices and focus Emmanuel Macron is a classical product of the French on practical and effective solutions to contemporary technocracy that appears after the Second World War. economic and societal problems. In a 2016 debate The reform of the state was driven by the idea of a pro- with Columbia University students, Macron embraced fessional depoliticized administration. The new model, anti-establishment rhetoric and reiterated the refusal whichpersiststoday,hasatitstoptheNationalSchoolof to be placed on the LR continuum by his opponents Administration (Ecole Nationale d’Administration, ENA). (Robequain, 2016). Macron saw himself as fighting the PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 548 old and ineffective model of French political compe- specificitiesandshowhowthisnewrealitymatchesthe tition; as somebody who transcends the more than idealtypeoftechnocraticpopulism. 200-year-oldleft–rightcleavage. During his brief career as a minister, Macron identi- 3.4.MacronastheOnlyPossibleSolution fied as a Socialist. But in 2016, he rejected this ‘label’ along with the ‘centrist’ label, preferring at that time As we already stated, one of the key factors of the ‘man of the left’ or ‘liberal’ (Macron, 2016). He also Macron’s success was (and still is) the failure of the started to cite a broad list of references (mixing Pierre well-established parties of the moderate left and right Mendès-France,FrançoisMitterrand,butmainlyCharles (cf. Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020, for parallel develop- de Gaulle). Nevertheless, his policies could certainly be ment in Italy). These parties were alternating in power seen as centrist in the French context (Barlow, 2017). since the 1970s, dominating French political life. Their His positioning between the oldest (formerly) domi- domination progressively eroded due to the growing nant parties (the Socialist party on the left and the electoral success of the anti-establishment radical right Republicans on the right) is seen in France as evidence National Front, which challenged the political establish- of this. To some extent, Macron and the LREM sym- ment.However,theprogressiveweakeningoftheestab- bolically pushed the old-fashioned ‘centrists’ from the lishmentpartieswasmainlyduetointernalcauses(inca- MouvementDémocratetotheright. pacitytoselectcompetentelitesorcorruption;Perottino, The ability to attract media coverage is crucial 2016).Astheestablishmenteroded,andtheradicalright to understanding the speed of Macron’s political rise. remained unpalatable for mainstream voters, a window EmmanuelMacronsucceededinportrayinganimageof of opportunity opened for Macron, who successfully apoliticaloutsidertakingontheolddysfunctionalestab- usedit. lishment that did not match the reality—with his past Macron started his political career with the Socialist career within the system he criticized since the begin- Party (he was a ranking member of this party in ning of his path to the French presidency. The changes 2006–2009; “Emmanuel Macron n’est plus encarté,” in French society, namely its de-ideologization and 2015).However,heroseintheranksthankstohisprofes- de-politicization (Perottino, 2016), contributed to the sional technocratic career, competence, and networks appealofanapoliticaltechnocracy(cf.Putnam,1977). (social capital). His legitimacy claim was to be an out- Macron’s 2016 arrival on the political scene as a sider, even if he was one of the essential ministers presidential candidate is simultaneous with the pro- before running for President (Pietralunga & Bonnefous, found crises of the French establishment political par- 2016).This(relative)newnesswasalsounderlinedbyhis tiesontheleft(Socialists)andontheright(Republicans). age and largely contradicted the ‘normal’ way to enter In the second round of the 2017 elections, Emmanuel politics in France. Once again, Macron was the insider- Macron also presented his new movement (LREM) outsider product and a part of a system he denounced: as the only alternative to the extreme right pop- “Faced with the system, my will to transgress is strong” ulist Marine Le Pen’s National Front (today National (“EmmanuelMacron:Faceausystème,”2016). Rally). The alternative to the exclusionary populism of Macron refused to play the game of the left and Marine Le Pen was Macron’s new formula mixing anti- declined participating in the presidential primaries de establishmentpopulistdiscoursewithanappealtotech- facto organized by his former party. This refusal was nocracyandexpertise. quite logical as Macron refused to be seen as a part Sofia Ventura showed that, during his campaign, of an ending world and to risk losing his main advan- Macron denounced the political elites and the gap tages without gaining anything. He was criticized for betweentheeliteandthepeople:“Theynolongerspeak his weak ideological anchoring, and a blur program. for the people, they speak for themselves” (Ventura, Macron’s approach and action can be seen as return- 2018, p. 95). In his book, Macron rejected at that time ing to what Maurice Duverger called the ‘swamp’ the French political elite as a whole (Macron, 2016). (le marais; see Elgie, 2018). As mentioned by Mayaffre, Finally, in November 2018, in front of the French may- Bouzereau,Ducoffe,Guaresi,andPrecioso(2017,p.135): ors, Macron presented himself and LREM “as real pop- “EmmanuelMacron’sspeechescultivatedynamicsmore ulists,wearewiththepeople,everyday”(Jublin,2018). than they work on themes; they rely on the modali- By doing this, Macron draws a line between populism ties of politics and action (bringing together, setting in anddemagogues(i.e.,LePen). motion, building consensus) more than on the political The populist appeal of a former Minister and tech- programitself.’’ nocrat remains counter intuitive. Nevertheless, Macron Emmanuel Macron entered the political world as was described as a populist (Bordignon, 2017; Godin, a technocrat, not through the classical electoral path. 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and embraced the label He never ran at any level of the French political system. himself (Jublin, 2018; Macron, 2016). This article aims His legitimacy was only technocratic, as a high civil ser- to question both these premises and demonstrate the vant and as a top bank manager. Macron’s two years extent to which Emmanuel Macron can be described as engagement as a minister gave him a high capacity to atechnocraticpopulist.Todothat,weanalyzetheFrench show his know-how and provided necessary credibility PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 549 as a social-liberal. His private sector career equipped mative president’—highly active and visible known as him to present himself as more transparent and effi- the ‘hyperpresident’ (Sarkozy). And third, a ‘Jupiterian cient than his fellow ministers in the Socialist govern- president’—detached from everyday politics above ‘the ment.Whilethegovernmentwasfacingstrongcritiques, political scrum’ and beloved by the people (de Gaulle). part of the opposition presented Macron as a ‘good Macron, a long-time admirer of de Gaulle, embraces minister doing good things.’ During his time as a minis- the latter symbolically and in his presidential posture— ter of economy, Macron’s signature legislation was the his official presidential photograph prominently fea- Law for growth, activity and equal economic opportu- tures de Gaulle’s war memoirs opened on President’s nities (French Republic, 2015), known as Macron Law desk (Boudet, 2017). As a President, Macron communi- (broad law composed of measures concerning a large cates less, leaves everyday politics to the government, part of the economic activity, changing numerous rules, while engaging on the global scene. This detached style for instance, the work at night or on Sunday, the taxes enablesMacrontomaintainsupportanddeflectcritique orliberalizingcoachtransport).Macron’scapacitytohar- forunpopularaspectsofreforms(“Macronnecroitpas,” ness support for the law among both left and right was 2016; see also Cole, 2018). It also enables him to distin- evident,foreshadowinghiscapacitytoestablishLREMas guish himself from the highly political presidents of the a movement logically bridging or transcending the left ThirdandtheFourthRepublic(Cole,2018).Macronlarge- andtheright. lymaintainedthisdeGaule-inspiredhands-offstyleuntil Hand in hand with the changes that occurred in the theCovid-19pandemicwhenhebecamemoreinvolved French society during the last three or four decades, (Pietralunga,Zappi,&deRoyer,2020). Emmanuel Macron as a minister and as a presidential candidate practically embodied the modern spirit, dom- 4.1.Responsiveness:TheLeaderGivingVoiceto inated by the (neo)liberal discourse. In other words, he thePeople appeared the contrary of the old elite: Young, modern, uncorrupted, competent, and fulfilling the ideal of the The vehicle for Macron’s rise was his movement LREM. technocrat from both public and privatesectors. During Multiple versions of the party’s name existed over time, a 2017 TV debate with Marine Le Pen, Macron’s com- the initial En Marche!, with an emphasis on the EM petence, knowledge, and effectiveness were evident, acronym, evolved into today’s LREM. LREM, a broad andhesuccessfullyoutperformedLePen,demonstrating movement,enabledMacrontoformabaseandsocietal hisqualities. support“theraisond’êtreofLREMistogathergoodwill (and support) around a positive ambition for our coun- 4.TechnocraticPopulistinPower try”(EnMarche,2020).TheLREMfoundingmythisthat it was formed from the bottom-up, from the “desire to Macron’s undeniable personal competence, culture, rebuildfrombelow”(EnMarche,2020).However,LREM and charm made him a charismatic presidential can- is a top-down movement—part communication strate- didate. On 7 May 2017, the 39-year old disrupter gy,partpoliticalorganizing—butEmmanuelMacron,his became the youngest President in the history of France. advisors and staff, ‘give people the voice’ (En Marche, In his inaugural speech, Macron combined an appeal 2020). It is Macron who enables the people to express to the people, with the promise of competence and theirwillthroughtheunmediatedrelationshipwithhim renewal—highlighting the redemptive politics of pop- (cf. Caramani, 2017). At the core of LREM is technocrat- ulism(Canovan,1999): icpopulism.Macronoutlinedhisagendabeforethefirst roundofFrenchpresidentialelectionsin2017:“AFrance My dear fellow citizens, a new page in our history which goes beyond the old divisions to put in place has been turned this evening. I want it to be that of the solutions that work, and which finally leads to a renewed hope and confidence. The renewal of our real moralization of its political life” (Macron, 2017a). publiclifewillbearequirementforeveryoneasfrom Technocraticpopulismbestcapturesthismixtureofpop- tomorrow. Raising moral standards in our public life, ulistandtechnocraticappeals. recognizing pluralism, and democratic vitality will be En Marche started in May 2016 with a large door to thebedrockofmyactionfromthefirstday.Iwillnot doorcampaign.Inthe‘GreatWalk,’4,000volunteerssur- letanyobstaclegetinmyway.Iwillworkwithdeter- veying 100,000 citizens, providing the basis for LREM’s minationandwithduerespectforeveryone,because program. The aim of the ‘Great Walk’ was to project throughwork,schoolandculture,wewillbuildabet- responsiveness and competence—LREM surveyed the terfuture.(Macron,2017b) will of the people and processed this will into a ‘uni- fied interest of the country.’ In reality, this was an effec- For Macron, the sui generis candidate, the election tive campaign using techniques and staff with experi- was a turning point, as he faces the choice between ence working on the campaigns of Francois Hollande three archetypal presidential postures. First, the ‘par- andBarrackObama.Thesurveywasprocessedandana- tisan President’—ideological, engaged in everyday pol- lyzed by 200 experts and spin doctors (Dryef, 2017; itics and deeply unpopular (Hollande). Second, ‘perfor- Strudel,2017). PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 550 Themaininnovation(comparedtocampaignsrunby andhasexpertsonhissidetohelphimdecipherthewill political parties), was ‘giving voice to the ordinary peo- ofthepeople(cf.Caramani,2017). ple’todraftthepartyprogram.LREMdrewhistoricalpar- allels to the letters of grievances (Cahiers de doléances, 4.2.Responsibility:TheReformsandtheLimitsof drawn up in 1789), but using experts’ competence to TechnocraticPopulisminPower aggregatetheanswersintoacoherentelectoralprogram. Thecollectionofpeople’sgrievanceswasawaytocreate Historically, French pension reforms trigger backlash— adirectlinkagebetweenthepeople(everybodycanpar- popular mobilization and strikes—and can lead to the ticipate)andtheleader,eliminatingintermediatebodies fall of government (1995 pension reform). In fall 2019, (including political parties’ role as ‘transmission belts’; Macron’s government initiated major pension reform. cf.Sartori,1976). In contrast to 1995, Macron’s government has a more Facing the Yellow Vests protest in 2018, Emmanuel efficient communication strategy—combining populist Macron scaled the 2016 ‘Great Walk’ to the national and technocratic appeals of ‘us vs. them’—the clash of level. In December 2018, the Great National Debate, the old and the new systems, experts vs. ideologues, a ‘listening tour’ comprised of more than 10,000 local the necessity of reform vs. the irresponsible status quo. meetings,generatedmorethantwomillionproposalson Unlikein1995,thecontemporaryoppositionwasunable four topics: energy transition, economy (including taxa- to formulate an understandable critique, trade unions tion, retirement age, pensions), democracy, and citizen- wereweakened,andthesocietywasdepoliticized. ship(including immigration,‘politicalIslam,’andreform Like in 1995, the 2019 reforms led to large-scale of state and public services—including the role of elite protests. While the reaction to the 2018 Yellow Vest schools such as ENA; “Key points of Macron’s plans,” protests was populist responsiveness, the reaction to 2019). Emmanuel Macron, whose popularity decreased the 2019 protests marked the return of technocratic significantly between 2017 and 2018, participated per- populism. Emmanuel Macron portrayed himself and his sonally in dozens of these sessions, promising to dedi- government as the representatives of modernity, pro- catethe secondpartofhis mandateto“puttingcitizens moters of expert solutions, and the legitimate voice of atthecenterofhisagenda.”Thedebatescoincidedwith thepeople.Hedenouncedtheprotestersasillegitimate, thebeginningoftheelectoralcampaignfortheEuropean imprudent, promoting illegitimate social gains for few parliament elections, and Macron’s critics viewed it as (protesters,strikers,tradeunions)attheexpenseofthe a political strategy to improve the President’s image— many. In the case of the Yellow Vests, instances of vio- highlighting the exaggeration of the number of partici- lence during some demonstrations were instrumental- pants, as well as the fact that the government is still to ized to delegitimize the movement and its grievances. takeuptheproposals. The pension reform protest was delegitimized on the As a follow up to the 2018 Great National Debate, grounds of lacking the competence to understand com- a Citizen Assembly was organized between 2019 and plexissues. 2020. In October 2019, 150 randomly selected citizens Similarly to the pension reform, the Covid-19 cri- participated in debates focused on climate change. The sis also follows the technocratic populist playbook debates were broad and democratic, producing a large (cf. Buštíková & Babos, 2020; Guasti, 2020). During setofproposals.However,similarlytotheGreatNational the pandemic’s initial phase, the President was most- Debate, reservations prevail about the future of the ly absent, and the government in charge. As the cri- proposals—in contrast to the initial announcement, the tique of the government intensified, Macron changed President decided to dismiss some of the proposals. his approach and took the lead. The President became Furthermore,thedrawmethodforrandomselectionwas personally engaged, not in drafting and implementing unclear (the Harris Interactive polling institute selected solutions; instead, Emmanuel Macron set out to search the150citizens),andtheParliamentwasexcludedfrom for the best solution. This included a personal visit to theprocess. the proponent of hydroxychloroquine and media dar- All three procedures for engaging citizens—the ling, Professor Raoult in Marseille, to personally dis- ‘Great Walk,’ the ‘Great National Debate,’ and the cuss the potential of hydroxychloroquine as a cure. ‘Citizens Assembly’ represent new forms of direct link- ProfessorRaoultwasatoddswiththeotherexperts,but age between the people and the reader. They bypass the President presented himself as ‘open-minded’ and traditional representative institutions and do not offer searchingforeffectivesolutions. anyformofclearaccountability.Unliketheinstitutionof The reaction to the 2019 protests show the compli- referenda, which has previously destabilized presidents’ cated relationship between technocratic populism and positions (1969 and 2005), these new democratic inno- the will of the people—when people reject his politics, vations combine the appeal of responsiveness, without Macron delegitimizes their voices because they are out- accountability (Macron has full control over the imple- side of the unified will of the people he embodies and mentation of outcomes). The debates ‘give voice to the because their knowledge is inferior to the expertise of people’ as the President ‘listens,’ politics is unmediated thePresidentandhisadvisors. andpersonalized,andtheleaderremainsunconstrained PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 551 5.Conclusion Emmanuel Macron was undoubtedly a formidable candidate. Both charismatic and credibly competent, In 2017 Emmanuel Macron transformed French Politics. he stood in stark contrast to both the established par- He emerged when the embattled traditional party sys- ties and their populist challengers. Macron combined temimploded,andpopulismrose(radicalleftandradical theredemptivepromiseofpopulism—torejuvenatethe right).ThisarticlearguesthatEmmanuelMacron’spres- countrywiththetechnocraticpromiseofcompetentgov- idential bid succeeded because he combined populist ernance (cf. Canovan, 1999). LREM also sought to build anti-establishmentappealwithatechnocraticappealto a new, direct link with the people by introducing demo- competence. He was able to transcend the exhausted craticinnovationsasawaytomappeople’sgrievances. politics of the left and the right, while simultaneously Two conditions were essential in Macron’s rise: fending off radical populist competitors (especially the The implosion of the established system of the French NationalFront)usingtechnocraticpopulism. Fifth Republic in which the two main parties were alter- Emmanuel Macron was an insider taking on the sys- nating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment tem and positioning himself as an outsider. He refused populist challengers on the right and on the left the traditional labels, including centrism, elite recruit- (cf. Stockemer, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). In was his anti- ment patterns, and mediated politics. Instead, Macron establishment appeal, which put Macron on the map, and LREM attempted to create new forms of respon- buttheappealtotechnocraticcompetencewonhimthe sivenessby‘givingvoicetothepeople,’whilerelyingon presidency. Technocratic populism transcends the left– histechnocraticcompetenceandthatofhisexpertadvi- rightcleavageand,asaresult,hasabroaderappealthan sors. Macron success highlights the exhaustion of the itsleft-andright-wingcounterparts. left–rightcleavageandtheappealofthenewpolitics. Finally, the rise of Emmanuel Macron and LREM Technocratic populism in power attempts to bal- demonstrates that populism does not necessarily imply ance responsiveness and responsibility (cf. Guasti & a threat for liberal democracy and cannot be auto- Buštíková,2020).Intermsofresponsiveness,Macronini- matically linked to illiberalism (cf. Norris & Inglehart, tiated new procedures for engaging citizens, forming a 2019). Populist rhetoric and thin-centered ideology can new direct linkage between the leader and the people. befoundinother‘quadrants’thanontheextremeright These procedures create an alternative to the tradition- and extremeleft(Norris, 2020). New formsof populism al representative institutions, unmediated politics with- include valence (cf. Zulianello, 2020) and technocratic out accountability. The unified conception of the will of populism(cf.Buštíková&Guasti,2019). the people combined with the belief in experts’ supe- Future research should focus on the analysis of rior knowledge does not allow for dissent. Opposition the LREM. Beyond its leader’s technocratic populism, it (such as the 2019) protests are delegitimized as uncivi- wouldbeessentialtoanalyzethisnew’party’sinstitution- lizedand/oruninformed. alization and programmatic orientation. Furthermore, After reaching power, Emmanuel Macron sought to comparatively, LREM could be analyzed in the context distance himself from everyday politics. The Covid-19 of similar party-movements such us the Italian Five Star crises forced him to reengage. In power, Macron is no Movement, Spanish Podemos, Czech ANO, and Slovak longer an outsider ‘taking on the system.’ Nevertheless, Party of the Ordinary People. The recent dissent of he continues to use the same anti-establishment and a large part of LREM’s MPs, decline in support for (selectively)anti-elitistdiscursivestrategyofbringingthe Emmanuel Macron, and LREM MPs’ defections hint at ‘people’ back. Some aspects of Macron’s technocratic the degree of volatility these disrupters of the estab- populism remain salient—competency (partly showed lished political order face. The Covid-19 response and during the Covid-19 crisis), the necessity to reform subsequent elections will test the competence and last- France (the Covid-19 crisis has simultaneously delayed ingappealoftechnocraticpopulists. reforms, but made them more salient), the denounce- mentoftheintermediatebodies,ortherejectionofthe Acknowledgments oldelites(againsttheircomebacktopower).Thepower ofMacron’stechnocraticpopulismhasweakened,butit The study has been completed with funding from remainsaneffectivestrategyagainsthismainstreamand the Strategy AV21 of the Czech Academy of Sciences, populistcompetitors. researchprogrammeNo.15—GlobalConflictsandLocal The contribution of this article to the study of pop- Interactions:CulturalandSocialChallenges(P.G)andsup- ulism is threefold. First, it provides a systematic analy- ported by the Charles University Research Programme sis of Macron’s rise. Second, it highlights an important ‘Progres’ Q18—Social Sciences: From Multidisciplinarity condition for the rise of populism—the implosion of to Interdisciplinarity (M.P.). The authors would like to the established party systems (cf. Caiani & Graziano, mostwarmlythanktoLenkaBuštíkováforextensivecom- 2016;Castaldo&Verzichelli,2020;Ganuza&Font,2020; ments on multiple versions of this article, and to Rikki Guasti & Buštíková, 2020). Third, it illustrates that pop- Dean for insightful comments on the final version; and ulist rhetoric is not limited to the extremes on the right tothetwoanonymousreviewersfortheircommentsand ortheleft(Norris,2020). recommendations. PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 552 ConflictofInterests Chapel Hill Survey. (2019). 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Sur- vey. Retrieved from www.chesdata.eu/2019-chapel- Theauthordeclaresnoconflictofinterests. hill-expert-survey Cole, A. (2018). Crowning Jupiter: The 2017 French References electoralseriesinperspective.ParliamentaryAffairs, 501–520. Aprasidze, D., & Siroky, D. S. (2020). Technocratic pop- delaTorre,C.(2013).LatinAmerica’sauthoritariandrift: ulism in hybrid regimes: Georgia on my mind and in TechnocraticpopulisminEcuador.JournalofDemoc- mypocket.PoliticsandGovernance,8(4),580–589. racy,24(3),33–46. Barlow,N.(2017).Macron’slessonsfortheBritishcentre. Dryef, Z. (2017, July 4). Trois hommes + un logiciel ThePoliticalQuarterly,88(3),400–403. = l’Elysée? [Three men + a software = Elysée?]. Bickerton, C., & Accetti, C. I. (2017). Populism and tech- Le Monde. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde. nocracy:Oppositesorcomplements?CriticalReview fr/m-moyen-format/article/2017/04/07/trois- ofInternationalSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy,20(2), hommes-un-logiciel-l-elysee_5107263_ 186–206. 4497271.html Birnbaum, P. (2012). Genèse du populisme: Le peuple et Elgie, R. (2018). The election of Emmanuel Macron and lesgros[GenesisofthePopulism:Thepeopleandthe the new French party system: A return to the éter- fat].Paris:Hachette. nel marais? Modern & Contemporary France, 26(1), Bordignon, F. (2017, April 28). In and out: Emmanuel 15–29. Macron’santipopulistpopulism.LSEBlogs.Retrieved Emmanuel Macron n’est plus encarté au Parti social- from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/ iste [Emmanuel Macron is no longer member 28/macron-anti-populist-populism of the Socialist Party]. (2015, February 18). Boudet, A. (2017, June 29). Dans le portrait officiel Le Figaro. Retrieved from https://www.lefigaro.fr/ d’Emmanuel Macron, ces détails qu’il a voulu que politique/le-scan/coulisses/2015/02/18/25006- vous voyiez [On the official portrait of Emmanuel 20150218ARTFIG00160-emmanuel-macron-n-est- Macron, those details he wanted you to see]. plus-encarte-au-parti-socialiste.php The Huffington Post. Retried from https://www. Emmanuel Macron: Face au système, “ma volonté de huffingtonpost.fr/entry/sur-le-portrait-officiel- transgression est forte” [Emmanuel Macron: Faced demmanuel-macron-ces-details-quil-a_fr_ with the system, “my will to transgress is strong”]. 5c92efbde4b06857fcbc3353 (2016, October 16). Challenges. Retrieved from Buštíková,L.,&Babos,P.(2020).BestinCovid:Populists https://www.challenges.fr/election-presidentielle- in the time of pandemic. Politics and Governance, 2017/emmanuel-macron-face-au-systeme-ma- 8(4),496–508. volonte-de-transgression-est-forte_433063 Buštíková, L., & Guasti, P. (2019). The state as a firm: EnMarche.(2020).Lemovement[Themovement].EM! Understanding the autocratic roots of technocratic Retrievedfromhttps://en-marche.fr/le-mouvement populism. East European Politics and Society, 33(2), FrenchRepublic.(2015).Loinº2015-990du6août2015 302–330. pour la croissance, l’activité et l’égalité des chances Caiani, M., & Graziano, P. (2016). Varieties of populism: économiques[Lawno.2015-990of6August2015for Insights from the Italian case. Italian Political Sci- the growth, activity and equal economic opportuni- enceReview/RivistaItalianaDiScienzaPolitica,46(2), ties].Paris:FrenchRepublic. 243–267. Ganuza, E., & Font, J. (2020). Experts in government: Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and Whatfor?Ambiguitiesinpublicopiniontowardstech- the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), nocracy.PoliticsandGovernance,8(4),520–532. 2–16. Godin, R. (2016, November 16). Emmanuel Macron Caramani, D. (2017). Will vs reason: The populist and ou le populisme d’extrême-centre [Emmanuel technocratic forms of political representation and Macronortheextremecenterpopulism].LaTribune. their critique to party government. American Politi- Retrievedfromhttps://www.latribune.fr/economie/ calScienceReview,111(1),54–67. presidentielle-2017/emmanuel-macron-ou-le- Castaldo, A., & Verzichelli, L. (2020). Technocratic pop- populisme-d-extreme-centre-617015.html ulisminItalyafterBerlusconi:Thetrendsetterandhis Guasti, P. (2020). Populism in power and democra- disciples.PoliticsandGovernance,8(4),485–495. cy: Democratic decay and resilience in the Czech Chabas, C. (2014, August 27). Emmanuel Macron, Republic(2013–2020).PoliticsandGovernance,8(4), de “Mozart de l’Elysée” à ministre de l’économie 473–484. [Emmanuel Macron, from “Mozart of the Elysée” to Guasti, P., & Buštíková, L. (2020). A marriage of Minister of Economy]. Le Monde. Retrieved from convenience: Responsive populists and responsible https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2014/08/ experts.PoliticsandGovernance,8(4),468–472. 27/emmanuel-macron-de-mozart-de-l-elysee-a- Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2012). ministre-de-l-economie_4477318_823448.html The paradox of nationalism: The common denom- PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 553 inator of radical right and radical left Euroscepti- “allons”à“vertu”[Thewordsofthecandidates,from cism. European Journal of Political Research, 51(4), “let’s go” to “virtue”]. In P. Perrineau (Ed.), Le vote 504–539. disruptif:Lesélectionsprésidentielleetlégislativesde Haughton,T.,&Deegan-Krause,K.(2015).Hurricanesea- 2017 [The disruptive vote: Presidential and legisla- son: Systems of instability in Central and East Euro- tive elections in 2017] (pp. 129–152). Paris: Presses pean party politics. East European Politics and Soci- deSciencesPo. eties,29(1),61–80. Momtaz, R. (2020, May 31). Macron loses absolute Havlík, V. (2019). Technocratic populism and political majority in parliament. Politico. Retrieved from illiberalism in central Europe. Problems of Post- https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron- Communism,66(6),369–384. loses-absolute-majority-in-parliament-france Ivaldi, G. (2019). Populism in France. In D. Stockemer Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government (Ed.),Populismaroundtheworld (pp.27–48).Cham: andOpposition,39(4),541–563. Springer. Mudde,C.,&RoviraKaltwasser,C.(2018).Studyingpop- Jublin, M. (2018, November 22). Emmanuel Macron se ulismincomparativeperspective:Reflectionsonthe désigne désormais comme “populiste”: Comment contemporary and future research agenda. Compar- s’yretrouverparmitouslespopulismes?[Emmanuel ativePoliticalStudies,51(13),1667–1693. Macron now calls himself a ”populist”: How do Norris, P. (2020). Measuring populism worldwide you find your way among all the populisms?]. (Working Paper Series RWP 20–002). Boston, LCI. Retrieved from https://www.lci.fr/politique/ MA: Harvard Kennedy School. Retrieved from emmanuel-macron-se-designe-desormais-comme- https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/ populiste-comment-s-y-retrouver-parmi-tous-les- measuring-populism-worldwide populismes-2105364.html Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Key points of Macron’s plans after ‘Great National Trump,Brexit,andauthoritarianpopulism.NewYork, Debate.’ (2019, April 26). France 24. Retrieved from NY:CambridgeUniversityPress. https://www.france24.com/en/20190426-france- Perottino, M. (2016). The disappearance of politics, or macron-speech-response-yellow-vest-protests- depolitizationintheCzechway.SocialStudies,13(1), taxes-national-debate 45–56. Kuhn,R.(2017).Expecttheunexpected:The2017French Perrineau,P.(Ed.).(2017).Levotedisruptif:Lesélections presidential and parliamentary elections. Modern & présidentielle et législatives de 2017 [The disruptive ContemporaryFrance,25(4),359–375. vote: Presidential and legislative elections in 2017]. Lynch, J. (2019). Populism, partisan convergence, Paris:PressesdeSciencesPo. and mobilization in Western Europe. Polity, 51(4), Pietralunga, C., & Bonnefous, B. (2016, November 16). 668–677. EmmanuelMacron(enfin)candidatàl’électionprési- Macron ne croit pas “au président normal, cela désta- dentielle [Emmanuel Macron (finally) candidate for bilise les Français” [Macron does not believe “in thepresidentialelection].LeMonde.Retrievedfrom the normal president, it destabilizes the French”]. https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle- (2016, October 16). Challenges. Retrieved from 2017/article/2016/11/16/emmanuel-macron- https://www.challenges.fr/election-presidentielle- candidat-a-l-election-presidentielle_5031923_ 2017/interview-exclusive-d-emmanuel-macron-je- 4854003.html ne-crois-pas-au-president-normal_432886 Pietralunga, C., Zappi, S., & de Royer, S. (2020, April 15). Macron, E. (2016). Révolution [Revolution]. Paris: XO Coronavirus: Emmanuel Macron cherche son ‘union Éditions. nationale’ [Coronavirus: Emmanuel Macron looks Macron, E. (2017a). Profession de foi du candidat E: for his ‘national union’]. Le Monde. Retrieved from Macron au premier tour de l’élection présidentielle https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/04/ 2017 [Presentation of the candidate E. Macron for 15/coronavirus-emmanuel-macron-cherche-son- the first round of the 2017 presidential election]. union-nationale_6036620_823448.html Paris: LREM. Retrieved from https://promesses. Putnam, R. (1977). Elite transformation in advanced fr/profession-foi-emmanuel-macron-premier-tour- industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the election-presidentielle-2017 theoryoftechnocracy.ComparativePoliticalStudies, Macron, E. (2017b, May 8). Inauguration speech. BBC. 10(3),383–412. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world- Radicalisation: Macron juge les élites en partie respon- europe-39842084 sables [Radicalization: Macron holds elites partly Mandrin, J. (1967). L’énarchie ou les mandarins de la responsible]. (2015, 29 November). Les Echos. société bourgeoise [The enarchy or the mandarins Retrived from https://www.lesechos.fr/2015/11/ of the bourgeois society]. Paris: Éditions de la Table radicalisation-macron-juge-les-elites-en-partie- Ronde. responsables-282766 Mayaffre, D., Bouzereau, C., Ducoffe, M., Guaresi, M., Robequain, L. (2016, June 12). Le buzz des Etats- & Precioso, F. (2017). Les mots des candidats, de Unis: À New York, Emmanuel Macron joue la PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 554 carte de l’anti-système [The buzz of the United vote: Presidential and legislative elections in 2017] States: In New York, Emmanuel Macron plays (pp.205–220).Paris:PressesdeSciencesPo. the anti-system card]. Les Echos. Retrieved from Surel,Y.(2019). Howtostaypopulist?TheFrontNation- https://www.lesechos.fr/2016/12/le-buzz-des- alandthechangingFrenchpartysystem.WestEuro- etats-unis-a-new-york-emmanuel-macron-joue-la- peanPolitics,42(6),1230–1257. carte-de-lanti-systeme-221043 Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open Univer- Rosanvallon, P. (2020). Le Siècle du populisme: Histoire, sityPress. théorie, critique [The century of populism: History, Učeň, P. (2007). Parties, populism, and anti- theory,criticism].Paris:Seuil. establishment politics in East Central Europe. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems: A frame- SAISReview,27(1),49–62. work for analysis. New York, NY: Cambridge Univer- Ventura, S. (2018). Emmanuel Macron: Un leader sityPress. antipolitique, outsider et gaullien? Image et narra- Stauber, J. (2019). Party institutionalization in the Czech tion d’un candidat présidentiel en dehors des partis Republic.InR.Harmel&L.Svåsand(Ed.),Institution- [Emmanuel Macron: An anti-political, outsider and alization of political parties: Comparative cases (pp. Gaullian leader? Image and narration of a presiden- 215–238).London:ECPRPress. tialcandidateoutsidetheparties?].InP.J.Maarek& Stavrakakis Y., & Jäger, A. (2018). Accomplishments and A. Mercier (Eds.), 2017, la présidentielle chamboule- limitationsofthe‘new’mainstreamincontemporary tout: La communication politique au prisme du populismstudies.EuropeanJournalofSocialTheory, “dégagisme” [2017, the presidential election upset: 21(4),547–565. Politicalcommunicationthroughtheprismof“degag- Stockemer,D.(2017).TheFrontNationalinFrance:Con- ism”](pp.91–107).Paris:L’Harmattan. tinuity and change under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Zulianello, M. (2020). Varieties of populist parties and MarineLePen.Cham:Springer. partysystemsinEurope:fromstate-of-the-arttothe Strudel, S. (2017). Emmanuel Macron: Un oxymore poli- application of a novel classification scheme to 66 tique? [Emmanuel Macron: a political oxymoron?]. partiesin33countries.GovernmentandOpposition, In P. Perrineau (Ed.), Le vote disruptif: Les élections 55(2),1–21. présidentielle et législatives de 2017 [The disruptive AbouttheAuthors Michel Perottino is an Associate Professor and a Head of the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. Between 2000 and 2013, he was the General Secretary of the French Centre for Research in Social Sciences (CEFRES) in Prague. His research spe- cializes on the French and the Czech politicalsystems (political regimes, institutions, and actors) and political parties (especially on the Czech political parties). He is the author of the monograph French Political System (SLON, 2005, in Czech) and published on the transformation of political parties and partysystemsinEurope,theFrenchpresidency,anddepoliticization. PetraGuastiisaSeniorResearcherattheInstituteofSociologyoftheCzechAcademyofSciencesand aPostdoctoralResearcherattheUniversityofJena.Inacademicyear2018/2019shewasaDemocracy VisitingFellowattheAshCentreforDemocraticGovernanceandInnovation,HarvardKennedySchool. Her main research focus is the growing tension within the system of representative democracy in respect to its legitimacy. Her research appears in Democratic Theory, Democratization, Communist andPost-CommunistStudies,amongothers. PoliticsandGovernance,2020,Volume8,Issue4,Pages545–555 555

Journal

Politics and GovernanceUnpaywall

Published: Dec 17, 2020

There are no references for this article.