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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2020 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12341
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This article develops a computational framework to analyze dynamic auctions and uses it to investigate the impact of information sharing among bidders. We show that allowing for the dynamics implicit in many auction environments enables the emergence of equilibrium states that can only be reached when firms are responding to dynamic incentives. The impact of information sharing depends on the extent of dynamics and provides support for the claim that information sharing, even of strategically important data, need not be welfare reducing. Our methodological contribution is to show how to adapt the experience‐based equilibrium concept to a dynamic auction environment and to provide an implementable boundary‐consistency condition that mitigates the extent of multiple equilibria.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2020